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ABSTRACT

Between 1890 and the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, nations on both sides of
the Atlantic attempted to gain prestige by building the world's greatest steamships for
their merchant marines. In 1901, the United States entered this competition with the
advent of J.P. Morgan's International Mercantile Marine, which built on the previous
work of shipping magnate Clement Griscom. This project will explore why and how
Morgan built his monopoly and the implications and repercussions this project had for
both Atlantic shipping and U.S. foreign relations. Moving beyond Morgan the man, it
also tells the story of the key figures in American politics and business that supported
his venture.
To reconstruct this history, this dissertation draws on a wide variety of
primary source materials. These include archival materials housed at the, University of
Liverpool and the Ismay-Cheape Family Archives. It also draws from published
sources, including period newspaper articles, advertising material from the IMM and its
constituent lines, and political speeches and documents that supported American
shipping.

iv

Although many secondary sources exist on the history of trans-Atlantic liners,
much of this literature has been written by enthusiastic amateur historians and
antiquarians. This dissertation, by contrast, makes a more scholarly contribution to this
field. Influenced by scholarship on the history of U.S. foreign relations and American
and global capitalism, this dissertation analyzes the history of the trans-Atlantic ferry
from new angles. In the process, it also makes a new contribution to studies of shipping
and international politics. While many scholars have examined the link of the race for
battleships in the lead up to the First World War, professional historians have largely
ignored the role of commercial super ships in this international rivalry. My project
begins to correct this oversight.

v

Chapter 1

Launching the Ship of State
The Origins of a Multinational Corporation

It was a dark and stormy night in the Belgrave Park area of London on April
30, 1907 when Lord William Pirrie, chairman of Harland & Wolff Shipyards welcomed
J. Bruce Ismay, president of the International Mercantile Marine and chairman of the
White Star Line, into his home. The oppressive fog off the Thames cloaked the evening,
adding an air of mystery to the proceedings. 1 Discussion surrounded the Cunard Line’s
steamers, Mauretania and Lusitania, and how the International Mercantile Marine could
top Cunard's achievement. Over the course of the evening, Ismay and Pirrie discussed

Monthly Weather Report of the Meteorological Office. Westminster: Wyman and Sons,
1907. s.v. "April, 1907." http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/archive/monthly-weather-report1900s (accessed October 3, 2013).
1

1

building liners so large, so luxurious, they would cement the White Star Line, a client
company of IMM, as the leading trans-Atlantic shipping firm for years to come. The
three new liners would be the last word in comfort and elegance.
Within a few years, this informal dinner conversation would come to represent
one of the most important points in the history of North Atlantic shipping and business,
a watershed moment that ultimately led to the resurgence of the United States merchant
marine. The American merchant navy had virtually ceased to exist, except coastally,
during the 1860s. As business and technology changed over roughly 45 years between
1860 and Pirrie’s dinner with Ismay in 1907, the American merchant marine was
reimagined and rebuilt as an international conglomerate. Although the combine they
built would ultimately fail, the IMM’s rise and fall marked a critical chapter in the
history and evolution of the American merchant marine.
§§§
In the late 1800s, the Great Powers of the world acquired a new status symbol:
the ocean liner. Designed not only for utility but also as emblems of nationalism, ocean
liners carried trade, power, and the flag of their nations around the world. They each
represented tremendous investments in time, material, and technology. Crossing the
globe in growing numbers, they were increasingly coveted by nations that did not have
them. At the same time, they presented nations on the fringes of power with a new
means to display their status and wealth and to assert their growing political and
2

economic strength. The late 19th and early 20th century growth in shipping both
reflected, and led to, changing relations between business and government. The
massive size of the new super ships required improvements of infrastructure, such as
increasing size of docks, constructing new fueling depots, and staffing repair facilities.
In some countries, including Great Britain, France and Germany, such needs led to
government support in the form of subsidies.
Although the United States lagged behind other nations for much of the 19 th
century, by the late 1890s many American businessmen had developed a renewed
interest in shipping. Eventually, their pressure prompted the U.S. government to lend
modest support to American lines as well. 2 However, unlike their European rivals,
American industrialists had to pursue alternate, and in many ways, innovative paths to
build a new shipping empire. Led by Clement Griscom and then J. P. Morgan, the
United States reentered the Atlantic and tried to form an ambitious new transnational
monopoly: the International Mercantile Marine. A Tall Ship asks how and why did
American businessmen take up this challenge what is the significance of their efforts?
IMM was the brainchild of Morgan and built upon Griscom’s earlier successes
forming the International Navigation Company. Griscom wanted to build ships that
could transport American goods to Europe directly without having to pay foreign

Steven Ujifusa, A Man and His Ship: America's Greatest Naval Architect and His Quest to
Build the SS United States. (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2012), 8-12.
2
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shippers. He hoped to drive transport costs down so that American products might be
more easily introduced in foreign markets, creating demand for American goods. After
his attempts to build a domestically-owned firm with native built ships foundered
because of the lack of modern shipbuilding capability and outdated laws, Griscom
formed the Red Star Line in Belgium, with active support from that nation’s king and
government. Building on these successes, Griscom expanded his company through the
purchase of British assets.
Beginning in 1900, Griscom’s fortunes took another turn, when he sought and
received financial support from J. P. Morgan. For reasons similar to Griscom’s, Morgan
had become increasingly interested in a trans-Atlantic monopoly. Between 1900 and
1905, Morgan bought up controlling stock interests in previously established foreign
shipping lines. Often Morgan’s purchase price was far above market value, creating an
asset valuation problem that would haunt IMM throughout its existence. Most of the
companies Morgan bought were based in Great Britain, with a few others
headquartered on the continent of Europe. Morgan’s raid of European shipping
resulted in the direct intervention of the governments of Great Britain and Germany to
maintain the independence of their merchant marines with varying degrees of success.
Failure to secure a true monopoly caused intense competition between the British
government-backed Cunard Line and Morgan’s IMM, resulting in construction of
bigger and more superlative ships, including most famously the R.M.S. Titanic.
4

Already by the 1910s, however, IMM had begun a slow decline. Loss of the
Titanic, followed by leadership vacuums at the highest levels of IMM, led to financial
losses and instability. Although World War I brought a temporary windfall of profits,
those profits came to an end in 1918 when British ships, released from war service,
returned to the Atlantic. Additionally, IMM faced competition from the U.S.
government as ships confiscated from Germany were released for civilian use under
domestic ownership, usurping IMM’s position as the United States’ merchant marine.
By the mid-1920s, IMM began selling off its foreign assets, ceasing to be a truly
international merchant marine.
The history of the International Mercantile Marine reflects many aspects of the
economic, ideological, and foreign policy evolution of the United States during the late
19th and early 20th centuries. First, the way IMM was built, primarily through the
purchase of foreign assets, sometimes at far above their actual value, demonstrated the
growing power of the American dollar. This was highlighted particularly well, as we
shall see in later chapters, in the 1901 purchase of the White Star Line. Second, IMM’s
history reflects a change in American naval ideology, a worldview that included
commercial as well as military ships. Built on a foundation of the importance of sea
power promoted by naval theorist Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, policy makers supported
by the American people, began a program of expansion that encouraged a parallel rise
in merchant fleet strength. Finally, the rise of IMM illustrates a more ambitious and
5

engaged foreign policy between the United States and the rest of the world in general,
and Europe in particular, during the late 19 th and early 20th centuries.
Even though the above scope of analysis is a full one, immigration is
conspicuous for its absence. The transport of European immigrants was a major source
of income for all the shipping line, and provided an abundant source of labor for
American factories. Indeed one of the most lasting affect of IMM may be the cultural
impact of the many people its’ ships brought to Ellis Island. However, adding that story
to the already complicated and, at times, highly convoluted narrative and analysis of
business, corporate espionage and government machinations would easily double the
size of this dissertation. Contributing to this are limited time and resources with which
to complete the project. For that reason, an analysis of immigration is left for the future.
Through IMM, the United States became more engaged in an interconnected
world economy in which nations became strongly interdependent because international
trade became even more tied to local market places. The history of IMM, in short, offers
valuable perspectives on the history of the United States and its relations with the
world.

6

Context of the Times: Formal and Informal Imperialism and the Place of IMM in U.S.
International Relations

Historians have long noted the rapid changes that reshaped both U.S. and
world history during the second half of the 19th century, a process that is now
commonly referred to as “globalization.” Discussing the years from 1850—1914, Gary
Magee and Andrew Thompson use the term “globalization” to describe a process in
which time and space were compressed, accelerating the interdependence of societies
and states.3 Much of this process was due to imperial pursuits, in which militaristically
strong nations, such as Great Britain and Germany, took control of weaker regions or
entire states, such as ports in China or large parts of Africa. 4 Others, such as MarcWilliam Palen, have pointed to a growing belief at the time in free trade, including
loosening restrictions on imports and exports between nations. These processes led to
more interconnected economies, which in turn increased the pace of globalization. Yet

Gary B. Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and Globalization: Networks of People
Goods and Capital in the British world, c. 1850-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 2-4.
3

Jurgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth
Century World. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), xx – xxi.
4

7

even as free trade ostensibly increased, its effectiveness relied on imperial power. 5 For
example, the so-called “opening” of China to European and eventually American
exports—heralded by many at the time as an example of free trade—was built and
maintained with military intervention.6
Many historians examining these late 19th and early 20th century shifts focus on
the beliefs and ideologies of policy makers. Whether grounded in scientific racism,
nationalism, a sense of civilizing mission, or a combination of these factors, it is the
ideologies of empire that take center stage in much of the historiography. Of course,
Edward Said’s Orientalism is a classic in this field. Briefly stated, Said believed that
Orientalism was a way in which imperial nations, specifically in Europe, viewed, and
characterized the middle east and Asia. These characterizations, often based on race and
perceived cultural backwardness – as compared to European defined technological and
societal advancement – supported colonial ideologies. 7
Since its publication, Said’s analysis has been highly influential and has informed
many studies of imperialism, including scholarship on the United States. In the time

Marc-William Palen, the Conspiracy of Free Trade; The Anglo-American Struggle over
Empire and Economic Globalization, 1848-1896, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2016), xvi – xix.
5

Robert Bickers, “Chinese Burns: Britain in China 1842-1900,” History Today, August
2000, Vol. 50 Issue 8, p10-17, 8p.
6

7

Edward Said, Orientalism, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 9-12.
8

since his book came out, moreover, a number of authors have examined diverse
motivations for empire—ideological and otherwise—in the late 19 th and early 20th
century United States.8 Walter Nugent, for one, suggests that American expansion, like
its European counterpart, was initiated by a search for more resources for both
agriculture and industry. However, he argues, the motivations were different, at least in
the view of Americans. Americans saw themselves as “beacons to mankind.” In their
minds, in other words, American imperialism was desirable because it uplifted those
areas brought under American control.9 Even though Europeans also believed in the so
called “white man’s burden” of civilizing what they saw as backwards regions,
Americans believed they were more humane in pursuing the same mission. Howard
Jones likewise points out that common Americans bought into the civilizing mission of
imperialism, reinforced by political and intellectual leaders which led to calls for

For more on the American impulse for imperialism see Nathan Jessen, Populism and
Imperialism: Politics, Culture, and Foreign Policy in the American West, 1890-1900.
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2017; Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism; The
United States, Great Britain and the Late-Industrializing World Since 1815, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981; Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire; A History of
American Expansion, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008; Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default:
The Spanish American War and the Dawn of the American Century, New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1998; Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude
to Globalization, Berkley: University of California Press, 1999.
8

9

Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiii – xvi.
9

increased missionary work.10 More recently, historians like Kristin Hoganson (along
with many others) have introduced and explored the theme of cultural imperialism –
the practice of changing another nation by introducing goods and services – into the
debate. Hoganson, a prime example of this cultural turn, argues that the United States
created an informal empire through business expansion, philanthropy and missionary
work.11
While some historians have focused on how the United States fits into the
history of imperialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries, others have worked to expand
definitions of empire by considering the categories of formal and informal empire (and
their relationship to one another). Originating as far back as the 1940s, and gaining
steam with the work of John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, the concepts of formal
and informal empire have been debated by historians for many decades. 12 Writing in
1997, John Darwin defines formal empire as a process that includes “explicit transfer of
sovereignty and, usually, the imposition of direct administrative control.” He further
defines informal empire as relying “upon the links created by trade, investment or

Howard Jones, Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897,
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2001), 1-3.
10

Kristin L. Hoganson, Consumer’s Imperium: The Global Production of American
Domesticity, 1865-1920, (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 1-5.
11

John Gallagher, and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." The Economic
History Review, New Series, 6, no. 1 (1953): 1-15. doi:10.2307/2591017.
12

10

diplomacy, often supplemented by unequal treaties and periodic armed intervention to
draw new regions into the world systems of an imperial power.” 13 More recently, Peter
Cain and A. G. Hopkins have refined the concept of informal empire, and the associated
term “gentlemanly capitalism,” to connect imperialism to financial pursuits that directly
or indirectly propelled formal imperial projects. They see the motivation for empire as a
means to cement economic security in an uncertain world, especially in connection to
events such as the economic depression of the late 19 th century.14 While these
discussions have been focused on explaining British imperialism, many of the
arguments can and have been applied to American imperial activities as well. 15
April Merleaux's Sugar and Civilization, for instance, examines the role of
corporations in expanding American influence, showing this as an example both formal
and informal empire simultaneously. Focusing in on the sugar industry, Merleaux
examines how sugar investors used new corporation laws to control United States sugar

John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial
Expansion." The English Historical Review 112, no. 447 (1997): 614-42.
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/stable/576347.
13

P. J. Cain, and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2015, third Edition, (London:
Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016), 2, 7-10, 36-39.
14

A. G. Hopkins, American Empire: A Global History, (Princeton; Princeton University
Press, 2018). Hopkins. Having moved to the University of Texas at Austin, followed up
his studies of British imperialism with one on the United States. His book examines U.S.
imperialism over its history and compares it to British imperial projects over the same
time.
15

11

manufacturing through a holding firm in New Jersey. Importantly Merleaux examines
the interaction between nation-states and ostensibly private business. 16 Likewise, Jason
Colby’s Business of Empire examines the rise of the United Fruit company in the
Caribbean. Colby points out that United Fruit became the most power economic entity
in the region, becoming an imperial project because of its corporate nature, rather than
active support of Washington policies. 17 Other scholars, including Hoganson, William
Leach, and Lizabeth Cohen, have called attention to the links between mass
consumerism in the United States and U.S. commercial exploits abroad. Between the
purchasing power of common Americans and growth of American business interests, as
these and other authors show, informal empire became the primary form of American
expansion as consumers sought new products and business sought new markets. The
American economy and its ability to shape national and international policy is thus a
running theme in the story of American empire. Together, these and other scholars have
advanced important new perspectives, helping scholars understand how the United
States developed as a global, imperial power. 18

April Merlaux, Sugar and Civilization: American Empire and the Cultural Politics of
Sweetness (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 10, 16-17.
16

Jason Colby, The business of Empire: United Fruit, race, and U. S. Expansion in central
America (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 2011), 3-5.
17

For more on the power of the American economy, consumerism, informal and
American empire see Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political
Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico During U.S. Colonialism, (Durham: Duke
18

12

This newer reading of imperialism, which includes formal and informal empire,
is part of a larger historiography with which A Tall Ship enters into conversation.
Morgan's IMM stands out as a major project of financial expansion, and it served in
many ways as a tool of informal empire. Morgan's IMM used a structure that is familiar
to discussions of economic imperialism: a corporation, in this case based in New Jersey,
held controlling interests in firms in several foreign nations. This new combine had to
engage in negotiations with heads of state or their representatives to do business. Like
other imperial projects, IMM also concentrated economic and political power within the
hub of an imperial network.
These similarities between Morgan's attempted takeover of the Atlantic and
more obvious imperial projects have been virtually ignored by historians. Part of the
reason this dissertation argues, is the power relationships at play between the parties
involved. Unlike smaller countries in the Caribbean or Central America, Great Britain
and other nations in Europe had the power to resist formal U.S. imperialism as defined
by Darwin, Gallagher, Robinson and others. Morgan simply could not expect U.S.
armed forces to support his bid to build an Atlantic monopoly, nor could he expect
European nations to be intimidated by political power or industrial imbalances.

University Press), 2003; Katherine C. Grier, Culture and Comfort: Parlor Making and
Middle Class Identity, 1850-1930, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 2007;
William Leach, Land of Desire: Merchants, Power and the Rise of a New American Culture
(New York; Pantheon Books), 1993; Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth
Century, (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1995.
13

However, he could rely on American economic power—the power of the dollar—to
create inroads to otherwise impenetrable competing empires. Morgan used his
overwhelming financial resources to offer more profit to European shipping owners
faster than they could have otherwise realized. Through investments, he was able to
bring foreign assets under American control, a process very much in line with Darwin’s
definition of informal empire.
At the same time, however, it is equally important to note the differences
between IMM and other types of imperial relationships. Political and corporate leaders
in Great Britain and Germany worked to limit Morgan’s influence once they realized his
plan. Cunard Line, Britain’s last remaining major steamship company after the
purchase of White Star Line in 1901, had a financial foundation strong enough to
withstand Morgan’s overtures of buy out. Parliamentary intervention gave Cunard’s
British stockholders an alternative that no Caribbean, Pacific, or African target of
imperialism could ever enjoy. Likewise, personal intervention from Kaiser Wilhelm II
and the strength of the German economy maintained the independence of German
shipping as well. In the face of this kind of opposition, Morgan and his investors had to
accept “no” as an answer to their economic pursuits. This was simply not the case in
any other example of formal imperial projects.
Jenifer Van Vleck's Empire of the Air illustrates more clearly how American’s
informal empire flourished with regards to transportation technologies; though focused
14

on the mid-20th century, her work presents a useful model for thinking about IMM’s
history. Much like the ocean liners of the 19th and early 20th centuries, airplanes
revolutionized travel and business and expanded American influence. The rapid
transport and growing omnipresence of American products and culture served to
“Americanize” regions all over the world at a faster rate. Unlike the great liners,
airplanes created a truly global economy and transfer of ideas because of their ability to
touch the most remote locations inaccessible to the sea.
Yet as this dissertation argues, this process did not begin with the “ascendancy of
American aviation.” Years before the Wright Brothers ever flew their first test flight, the
liners and super lines of IMM and other firms began this process of exchange, by
bringing ever increasing amounts of goods and people to new markets and locations
often with both positive and negative repercussions. Van Vleck’s observations about the
simultaneously creative and destructive nature of air power, moreover, can also be
applied to the shipping industry.19 Specifically, although Morgan's enterprise attempted
to create an American-owned and operated merchant marine, it did so at the expense of
the European shipping industry. Britain saw a considerable amount of its shipping
industry swallowed by the American corporation, eventually leading to parliamentary
debates and action over the matter.

Jennifer Van Vleck, Empire of the Air: Aviation and the American Ascendency,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
19

15

In comparison to the ethical and philosophical foundations of empire, the
importance of technology and infrastructure highlighted in Van Vleck’s book have
received relatively less attention in the historiography. In more recent years, however,
scholars have begun to explore these material factors of empire in more detail. Michael
Adas, for example, points out that for many Europeans and Americans, technological
advancement became the yard stick by which civilizations were measured. 20 Likewise,
Dwayne Winseck and Robert Pike point out the effects of technological communication
improvements that helped insure stable lines of information. Specifically, they examine
the proliferation of cable networks that provided telegram service to far off locations,
binding together remote locations more closely together into imperial networks. 21
Stephen Kern and Vanessa Ogle, meanwhile, show that these new inventions redefined
time and space. Prior to the revolutions in communications technology, colonies were
not just distant but remote, meaning that communications and reaction to local events
could take months or even years. The advent of the telegraph and telephone, however,
allowed rapid response with increased material resource support. Telephones brought

Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, technology, and Ideologies of
Western Dominance, with a New Preface, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, rpr. 2014),
xiv; Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing
Mission (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006).
20

Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communication and Empire: Media Markets,
and Globalization, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 3-7.
21

16

instant information; its ring was sudden and demanded instant attention, with fast
reactions.22 As these scholars show, without the changes in technology, the rapid
deployment and responses that made late 19 th century imperialism successful on a
global scale could not have happened. It was European technological dominance,
especially in oceanic transport, that allowed Great Britain, France, and other European
powers a head start to begin largescale, worldwide imperialist adventures in the 19 th
century.
While much of this scholarship is focused on European, specifically British,
expansion and empire, a number of scholars have also explored American expansionist
endeavors. For many years, historians of U.S. foreign relations argued that the U.S.
government maintained an inward-looking policy throughout the 19 th century, leading
up to the Wars of 1898. Presuming that policymakers at the time followed the course of
neutrality and non-engagement that George Washington laid out in his Farewell
Address, historians like Samuel Flagg Bemis perpetuated the idea of an “isolationist”
19th century United States.23

Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918 with a New Preface, (Cambridge;
Harvard University Press, 2003), 91. Vaness Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time,
1870-1950 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).
22

Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1936).
23

17

In recent decades, however, a new generation of scholars has overturned that
line of argument, demonstrating the myriad ways in which the United States was, in
fact, connected with the 19th century world, particularly toward the last quarter of the
19th century. Glen Jeansonne points out numerous interactions in diplomacy dating
from the administration of Benjamin Harrison.24 Howard Jones points to Lincoln’s
successful diplomatic strategies to keep Britain and France from recognizing the
Confederacy during the 1860s.25 Walter Nugent documents a long history of American
interaction with other nations dating from 1782 through the present. 26 Together, these
historians and many others have laid bare the myth of 19 th century isolationism.27 A Tall
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Ship continues this dialog by examining American interaction during the period of
supposed isolation from the rest of the world. Indeed, interactions like those of Morgan
helped set the foundation of what has been termed the “American Century” of the
1900s and were an early sign of growing economic strength.

Growing Economic Power: Revolutions in Industrialization and Transportation and
the Development of IMM

During the late 1800s, the United States experienced a second industrial
revolution. New products and patented goods flooded the market. Inventors like
Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell became household names as their new
devices fueled production of new goods and services. At the same time, as both
continental expansion and urbanization continued, new cities were built that required
infrastructure, housing, household items, food and much more. The explosion of new
goods invented in the late 19th century, such as the phonograph, telephone, and many
labor-saving devices, found eager markets across the country and around the world.
The money brought in by these products strengthened the American economy so much
that it rivaled—and soon surpassed—many of the longest standing industrial powers in
Europe.
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A major part of this economic expansion came from the railroads, as historian
Richard White has shown in his analysis of the growth of American railroads and the
evolving business of transportation. As White argues, the expansion of railroads in the
mid-19th century changed the nature of business. Railroads allowed new products to be
distributed to wider markets, increased profits for businesses while encouraging
consumerism, and allowed for further expansion. By the mid-19 th century, railroads and
related industries received major financial support from investors and were sustained
by booming markets created by a large population. American entrepreneurs built
railroads and invested heavily in industry, sustained by a booming population, the
result of both natural growth and immigration. Indeed, the contribution of the railroads
to American economic expansion can hardly be overestimated.
Yet the success of railroads was not only due to private investment and
enterprise. Much like successful European shipping lines that received governmental
support through subsidies and the renovation and extension of port facilities, railroad
owners often received subsidies and government support to expand rail networks,
shipping hubs and repair infrastructure. By the late 1860s, thanks in large part to these
subsidies, transcontinental railroads connected the East and West coasts. As White
notes, the transcontinental railroads existed because of support from the state.
"Government subsidized them, secured their rights of way, regulated them, and
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protected them.”28 Once built, the railroads integrated new and existing settlements into
the United States economy by exporting local products and importing goods from
across the country.29 With tremendous internal markets, the United States had
supported its own economic expansion throughout much of the 19 th century, limiting
overseas colonial expansion as compared to European powers during the same period.
As U.S. territorial expansion culminated in the continental West, the search for new,
overseas markets became more important to U.S. entrepreneurs.
In many ways, the history of the railroad industry in the mid-19 th century United
States mirrored the evolution of the shipping industry later in that century. It also helps
explain why Griscom, an investor in railroads and shipping, as well as his successor, J.
P. Morgan, believed a merchant marine could be built from scratch: they had done it
with railroads earlier. In terms of business, credit rather than capital formed the
foundation for railroad construction. As White discusses at length, the use of bond sales
to finance the construction of hundred-mile increments of the transcontinental railroad.
These bonds were sold to investors who expected to receive dividends based on the
operations of the completed railroads.30 Here again, a remarkable similarity exists
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between American expansion in the Atlantic to the railroads. In preparing to finance the
construction of the massive Olympic class liners, Morgan's IMM offered bonds to the
public. While the railroad bonds were made convertible into federal bonds to attract
buyers, IMM's bonds attracted buyers based on the previous history of the constituent
shipping lines that Morgan purchased to build his conglomerate.
Another similarity to American railroads included the horizontal and vertical
integration that had proved so vital to the railroad expansion. One of Morgan's key
partners in bringing together his combine was Lord William Pirrie, chairman of
Harland & Wolff Shipyards. Harland & Wolff's important role in IMM is frequently
ignored. In much of the existing historiography, Harland & Wolff is discussed in
relation to the White Star Line, a British shipping company that later became the
flagship line of IMM. Roy Anderson's White Star, Robin Gardiner's History of the White
Star Line and Wilton Oldham's The Ismay Line examine the White Star Line in depth, but
they too tend to stop at a cursory look at the relationship with Harland & Wolff
Shipyards.31 The development of technology, subsidies, the nature of competition and
international policy or monopoly is left almost entirely unexplored. This leaves an
incomplete picture of the forces that produced the Olympic class ships. A Tall Ship
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rectifies this omission by bringing all these disparate subjects into one dissertation
focused on an industry long ignored by historians.
Andrew Porter's Victorian Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy is one of the
few books that demonstrates the similarity between shipping and the railroads. 32 In fact,
Porter directly connects the growth of Britain's railroads to maritime expansion; the
ability to bring more exports to coastal ports faster supported local manufacturers’ role
in international commerce.33 Porter's work focuses on the Castle Line, a British firm
founded by Donald Currie that primarily served ports along the West African coast. It
details the use of subsidies in the growth of the shipping business and how a deft
businessman brought that together with a growing market in South Africa that required
shipping services. Much like the railroads, the Castle Line's expansion in South Africa
sponsored economic growth by regularly bringing building materials, mail and other
resources necessary for expansion. Porter’s book highlights the importance of
government subsidies for expansion of the shipping industry. Routinely, Currie built
bigger and faster ships to maintain mail subsidies offered by the government. The
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subsidies then increased which encouraged the construction of faster ships forming a
self-sustaining cycle.34
Subsidies – and more frequently the lack of them – play an important part in the
history of IMM. Just as both Porter and White show how generous subsidies insured the
survival of growing concerns, A Tall Ship demonstrates how the lack of similar
subsidies hindered American entry into Atlantic shipping, providing to the existing
scholarship a new way of looking at American shipping and the challenges it faced. It
also explores the ways that Griscom and Morgan differed from their predecessors in the
railroad business, for example by exploring how they dealt with international entities
rather than a single federal government.
While it contributes to the historiography of transportation and economic
expansion generally, A Tall Ship, of course, also contributes to the history of ocean liners
more specifically. Existing ocean liner scholars such as John M. Brinnin and John
Maxtone-Graham, both authors on the North Atlantic trade, tend to focus on the ships
themselves, offering social histories of the people who sailed and worked them. 35
Stephen Fox's Transatlantic focuses more on business history and technical innovation,

34

Porter, Victorian Shipping, 61-62,175-177.

John Malcolm Brinnin, The Sway of the Grand Saloon: A Social History of the North
Atlantic, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971). John Maxtone-Graham, The Only Way to
Cross, (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1972).
35

24

examining the influence of Samuel Cunard and others.36 However, he leaves aside most
of the financial machinations that went into the creation of the International Mercantile
Marine and its implications on shipping. Steven Ujifusa's A Man and His Ship also
briefly touches on business history, but like other authors, his focus lays elsewhere, in
this case the construction of the S.S. United States of 1951. In working his way to the
1950s, however, Ujifusa discusses the difficulties in funding the Olympic class and the
intense international rivalry that existed between shipping. 37 A Tall Ship expands on this
existing scholarship by describing that competition and examining the extremes to
which the shipping companies went to war with each other. The corporate espionage
that existed during the formation of IMM has not been detailed in previous accounts
either, and adds significantly to the historiography of transnational business.
A Tall Ship also connects IMM to studies of the early 20th century origins of
globalization. To create his monopoly, Morgan relied on purchasing existing foreign
shipping firms and bringing them under American ownership. The lack of
infrastructure in the United States to build modern steel ships created a considerable
obstacle to Morgan's project, but it was not insurmountable. Morgan could and did
create a self-supporting combine, much like his railroad monopolies thus alleviating a
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need for shipbuilding facilities in the U.S. Once created, Morgan’s monopoly helped
bring American products, culture and more to Europe in ever increasing amounts. As
consumerism grew, demand for American products grew. The growing American
culture and industrial dominance was even noted at the time. 38 The International
Mercantile Marine played a role in this process, and A Tall Ship brings its vital history
into conversation with existing scholarship.

The Influence of Alfred Mahan on Commercial Affairs: IMM as a Complement to the
History of Naval Expansion

While the economic power of the United States grew, Admiral Alfred Mahan
promoted the expansion of the country’s nautical power. While primarily known for his
military advocacy, Mahan also encouraged the expansion of the merchant marine for
the purposes of economic strength and diplomacy. After promoting his ideas for more
than a decade, Mahan watched as the Spanish-American War of 1898 erupted, a conflict
that seemed to validate many of Mahan’s ideas to both the American people and policy
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makers. The swift and overwhelming victory of American forces led to increased
popular support for nautical expansion, support that was encouraged by literature,
household goods and even games. General press books and other ephemera
personalized the conflict for people far away from the theater of war while a market
grew for memorabilia related to Admiral George Dewey, commander of American
naval forces in the Pacific. A tour of his flagship, U.S.S. Olympia which is docked in
Philadelphia, provides indications of his personal renown. For instance, where Dewey
stood during the battle of Manila Bay is marked by a brass plate. This growing acclaim
for naval heroes and events was not lost on policy makers. From President McKinley to
congressmen and local clubs were established, and policy began to take shape that
supported expansion and set up modest (at least compared to Europe) government
support for mercantile shipping growth. However, this was only after a long period of
neglect.
A generation prior to the 1870s and '80s, the United States fought a destructive
internal war, one of the effects of which was the loss of its merchant marine. The
massive war fleet it had built up in the 1860s, once one of the most powerful and
technologically advanced in the world, had rusted and rotted in obsolescence by the
1880s. At roughly the same time, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) started publishing
his ideas on naval power. The world soon took note. Mahan believed that a strong navy
and merchant marine were key to a nation's wellbeing. In his best known work, The
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Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan argued that nations rise and fall in war and
peace based on their strength at sea.39 Yet as historian Jon Sumida points out, merchant
marines were just as important to Mahan as naval strength.40 Indeed, according to
Mahan, part of the reason Napoleon's France failed was the inability to effectively use
maritime trade to harness support from overseas colonies and trade partners. 41
Sumida's emphasis on Mahan's ideas on commerce form a foundation for the argument
of this dissertation. As primary documentation and secondary sources reveal, it is clear
that Mahan's arguments were not lost on Americans, nor on the leaders of other nations
of the world who sought to increase their status in the 1880s and 1890s. 42
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As historian Roger Parkinson notes, by 1889 American policy makers began
taking the idea of an oceanic navy seriously, turning away from old naval doctrines
based primary on coastal defense and commerce raiding. Even before this, in 1885,
American naval cadets trained at Glasgow and Greenwich, Royal Navy bases in Great
Britain.43 Parkinson’s arguments are significant because they show a growing interest in
international naval affairs prior to the Spanish American War, which is often recognized
as the point at which United States naval policy took an international turn. This
supports other historians such a Paul Kennedy and Dirk Bönker who analyze the
growth, increased professionalism, and innovation of navies around the world during
the 1880s and 1890s.44 While Kennedy concentrates on the British and American navies
and the technological changes of the era, Bonker discusses the new professionalism and
rivalry of the era, especially concerning the Imperial German Navy and the American
Navy, and examines the influence of Mahan on policy makers. Together, this recent
scholarship reflects a subtler reading of Mahan that looks deeper than the overt
imperialism of establishing bases to spread military power.
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Bonker, Parkinson, and other scholars also focus on the technological changes
within the more professionalized, bureaucratized navies of the world. For instance, the
ships that fought at Trafalgar in 1805 were not all that different than ships that fought in
the Anglo-Dutch War of the 1660s, in terms of construction. However, during the 1870s,
'80s, and '90s, technology changed incredibly rapidly in areas such as armor,
propulsion, watertight integrity, and more. At the same time, navies benefitted from
growth in the bureaucratization of government, which created professional
administrations that controlled logistics, personnel, and public relations. 45
For all their value, these naval histories largely ignore an element that Mahan
believed equally important to a nation’s strength: the existence of a strong merchant
marine. While Bönker and Parkinson focus on national navies, their arguments could
well be extended to the private shipping sector, and to the new professionalism and
competition that redefined it. Like the warships they discuss, merchant ships
experienced a rapid evolution of technology in the 1880s and 1890s. Ships evolved
radically while, at the same time, the business of shipping transformed into a massive
bureaucracy so connected to government that shipping lines almost became
government departments themselves. This dissertation adds to those analyses by
looking at the merchant marine through a similar lens as military historians have
viewed the U.S. Navy.
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While Mahan and others, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore
Roosevelt, attempted to renew the U. S. Navy, Clement Griscom, a Pennsylvania
businessman, began to build American shipping lines that evolved into an attempt to
build a North Atlantic transport monopoly. That led to the construction of massive
ships because of intense competition between Morgan’s IMM, Britain’s Cunard and
other shipping firms on the European continent. This dissertation brings these events
into conversation by tying together the threads of technological development, the
evolution of business, and the changing relationships between business and the U.S.
government. While my dissertation focuses on the civilian merchant marine, Mahan's
prolific writing created support for expanded maritime participation and provided the
initial spark of interest in all things maritime for the American people.
Given their importance to the development of commercial shipping, it is worth
returning to Mahan’s own theories and analyzing them in greater detail, exploring the
elements of his writings that other scholars have neglected. Although he never found
fame as a commander at sea, Mahan reshaped history and foreign relations as a scholar,
commentator, theorist, and critic of naval policy. Historians have sometimes depicted
Alfred T. Mahan solely as a proponent of imperialism and expansion; Mahan's writings,
however, indicate a far more nuanced, internationalist worldview. From the 1880s
through the early 1900s, Mahan promoted the use of navies as instruments of foreign
policy by nations in general and the United States in particular. Though he modified his
31

theories considering events such as the Spanish American and Sino-Japanese wars,
Mahan emphasized three major themes throughout his lifetime.
First, Mahan enthusiastically promoted external trade. Using examples from
history, such as the Southern Confederacy and Napoleon's France, Mahan documented
the importance of trade to the survival of a nation at war. Secondly, he wanted to end
American both political and economic isolationism. Mahan encouraged more
interaction in the wider world. The fact that new technology made distance less of an
obstacle was not lost on him. Greater interaction with the world simply could not be
avoided as economies became more intermingled. Ignoring this, Mahan recognized, did
not change the reality of the situation and encouraged a change in U.S. foreign policy to
become more proactive in world events. Finally, he wanted to form alliances with other
naval powers to act in concert to deter aggression. The growth of new expansionist
nations, particularly Imperial Japan, caused Mahan concern. 46 In Mahan's view,
alliances with nations which had similar interests allowed nations to minimize
expenditures without losing defensive integrity.47
In his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan described the dominance
of French land-based trade and the its failure to take advantage of foreign and sea borne
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trade. "With all her natural gifts,” he wrote, “France wasted away because of want of
that lively intercourse between the different parts of her own body and constant
exchange with other people, which is known as commerce, internal and external."48
Mahan was correct. Napoleon instituted his "Continental System," which attempted to
prevent British goods entering Europe, but also crippled smaller nations on the
continent. As Britain invaded Europe, trade began in Portugal, Spain and other places
constricting French continental trade as Britain gained allies and trade partners. 49
Potentially, Mahan warned, this fate could befall the United States should it enter a war.
Mahan did not just apply his ideas to historical events. As a veteran of the
United States Navy, he maintained an interest in the Navy and the issues under which
its personnel labored. His work appeared in newspapers and magazines across the
country. In an article written in 1890, Mahan addressed the need of entering the world
market, not only for economic prosperity and growth, but for security. In the same
article, which was later published together with others in book form, he suggested that
even if the United States did not actively pursue international trade, rivalry from other
great powers would eventually bring the United States into conflict with them as
foreign powers entered American markets.50

48

Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 198.

49

Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, 135.

50

Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, 5-8.
33

While stressing the importance of trade and commerce, Mahan did not
neglect the importance of defense. Still, trade formed the central foundation of his
concern. Throughout his writings, Mahan emphasized the importance of strong
international commerce, usually connecting it to national defense. He considered trade
beneficial but pointed out that it also brought certain risks. For instance, though he
favored the construction of the Panama Canal, its potential greatly worried Mahan. The
canal would bring untold trade opportunities, allowing the rapid transport of goods
from the Atlantic to Pacific oceans while cutting travel time and costs. At the same time,
it would become a strategic resource that European colonial powers might covet to the
point of conflict to control it. Mahan suggested that while the United States was isolated
by custom and distance, the canal would bring aggressive European powers much
closer much more frequently than in the past. 51 "In our present state of
unpreparedness,” he argued, "a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the
United States and especially to the Pacific coast."52 In other words, if it was going to be
built, such a canal would need to be defended.
While concerned with the future of a Panamanian canal, Mahan also worried
about the Sandwich Islands and the entirety of the Pacific coast. The U.S. position in
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Hawaii provided a base from which trade and a defensive umbrella in the Pacific Ocean
could be expanded. Writing in 1893, Mahan pointed out that Hawaii was the same
distance from San Francisco as it was from foreign outposts in the Gilbert, Marshall,
Samoan, Society and Marquesas island chains. Their importance, he suggested, could
not be overstated.53 The Hawaiian Islands could serve as a trade port, coaling station,
naval base, center of alliance-building and more.54 And while these ports could easily be
fortified, he observed that the historical precedents of fortified islands not supported by
naval fleets being snatched away from the controlling powers by foreign aggressors. 55
The Spanish-American War provided examples of Mahan's idea in both the
civilian and military realms. As historian Thomas Schoonover observes, the war
represented a transfer of leadership dominance in Asia at the expense of European
powers and even Japan. Further, he notes that this was not an aberration but part of
longstanding American policy that promoted interaction around the world, particularly
in economics circles and primarily focused on the Pacific. 56
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While the U.S. government entered the Spanish American War due to economic
issues and public pressures over concerns largely independent of rebuilding the navy
and merchant marine, the war provided an arena in which U.S. nautical strength could
be tested.57 The war erupted over several fault lines, including American investors who
wanted their businesses protected and the American public that became outraged over
atrocities committed by the Spanish against Cuban civilians. 58 This was the first war in
which the United States faced off with a European power since fighting the British in
the War of 1812. One of the important aspects of the Spanish-American War was that it
was primarily a war on the seas, much in the form that Alfred Mahan suggested major
future wars would be fought. In terms of testing international strength and gaining
support at home for nautical expansion, the war came at a fortuitous time for Mahan’s
theories.
After war broke out in the spring of 1898, U.S. troops boarded ships in Tampa,
San Francisco, or San Diego for transport to Cuba or the Philippines. At the same time,
modern American warships fought the Spanish Royal Navy at places such as Manila
Bay and Santiago de Cuba. Unlike prior wars, heroes that Americans read about back
home had titles like admiral and commodore more often than general or colonel. In the
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aftermath of the conflict, popular press books painted heroic pictures of drama on the
high seas.59 In the weeks and months following the successful war, Alfred Mahan
enjoyed even greater renown now that his ideas appeared to have been confirmed. This
propelled the people of the United States to support construction of a new and modern
navy, as well as adding prestige to the validated Mahan. 60 In his Lessons of the War with
Spain and Other Articles, Mahan outlined the experiences of the military in prosecuting
the war, and emphasized the validations of his own ideas. 61 At the same time, policy
makers seemed to be taking his lessons to heart.
In an 1899 message to Congress, President William McKinley listed the
achievements of the Navy and detailed them as having always "maintained the spirit
and high efficiency which have always characterized that service." Additionally, he
noted, "The Nation has equal pride in its early and later achievements," and quickly
followed up that the "people are interested in the continued preparation and prestige of
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the Navy." Drawing on that support, McKinley discussed "early and later
achievements" of the Navy without any specific detail. While exaggerating national
interest in the navy prior to this time, he concluded by urging special legislation to fund
the enlargement of the navy.62
Around the same time, publications and clubs appeared highlighting American
naval triumphs and urging expansion. Henry Beck's Cuba's Fight for Independence and
War with Spain, one of many titles examining the war, was published immediately after
the end of hostilities.63 Beck, primarily an author of local histories in the United States,
wrote for popular audiences rather than for academics. Even so, his book provided a
great deal of information on the military forces involved, especially in comparing and
contrasting the abilities of the Spanish and U.S. navies. He gave biographical
information on naval commanders from both sides as well as a directory of ships in the
fleets. He also listed every ship in the American fleet, giving their complete
characteristics and even commanding officers.64 The book supported and justified a
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growing navy through its documentation of the importance of the navy in the
prosecution of the war.
Beck examined all of the naval battles that occurred during the war in detail. The
battle of Santiago de Cuba, for example, was written in very lurid style. Beck began his
narrative with the raising of the flag on the St Louis' mast as the crew was drummed to
quarters. He followed this with a description of the ship sailing closer and closer to
Spanish forts as shelling grows in intensity. 65 Likewise, he trumpeted Admiral Dewey's
actions at manila Bay with words such as "superb," "unrivalled performance," during
"one of the most note-worthy battles ever fought in all the world." 66 Additionally, the
book was liberally illustrated with both artist renderings and photos of ships and
personnel.
It was not only the "great men" and ships that Beck lionized, however. He also
chronicled the story of common sailors, further romanticizing the idea of maritime
might. Alongside the high-ranking officers whom he profiled, low ranking officers and
common sailors also made an appearance. Ensign Worth Bagely, a 26-year-old North
Carolina native, became the first American to die in battle during the war. Beck spent
two pages outlining Bagely's life, including his ancestry. 67 By providing examples of
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common people serving during the war, Beck connected the reader to the profiled
person inviting the reader to imagine themselves in the midst of the battle, thereby
becoming a sailor by proxy and a participant in American naval victories.
Beck's book and others like it vividly depicted U.S. Navy exploits during the war,
allowing the American people to take part in building a proud naval heritage, at least in
terms of showing their popular support. This theme continued with books like Splendid
Deeds of American Heroes on Sea and Land. Editor Bishop Samuel Fallows and his coauthors chronicle the "glorious naval and military events from Washington to Dewey."
Interestingly, the book made naval history its primary focus, emphasizing the increased
prestige of American naval exploits.68 Books like those by Beck and Fallows worked in
tandem with the writings of Mahan. While the naval theorist presented doctrine and
policy objectives in academic detail, Beck and Fallows offered heroic stories that ignited
the imagination with stories of high adventure on the world's oceans. Nautical
expansion, in short, potentially appealed to the nautical expert as well as the novice.
While these books proliferated, the Navy League of the United States (formed in
1902 and still in existence today) was established, and its members created their own
maritime boosting materials. The Navy League published its own book, A Short History
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of the American Navy, in 1907, which detailed the U.S. Navy's history from the American
Revolution through the present day.69 The organization's express purpose was to "...
acquire and spread before the citizens of the country information as to the condition of
the U.S. Naval forces and ships and to awaken public interest and activity in all matters
tending to aid, improve and develop the efficiency of the Navy." Interestingly, though it
focused on the Navy, the League’s membership demonstrated the connection with
civilian interests. The Navy League boasted J. P. Morgan, creator of the International
Mercantile Marine, as an honorary vice president and his son-in-law, Herbert L.
Satterlee, as councilor at law. Theodore Roosevelt, too, served as an honorary member. 70
In a pamphlet published in 1907, the Navy League boasted a membership of 4,500. 71
Perhaps due in part to their influence, by the eve of World War I, the Navy Department
frequently answered letters asking about naval preparedness by chambers of
commerce, local clubs and common citizens. 72
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Naval affairs and shipping even found their way into popular entertainment.
Parker Brothers, founded in 1883, produced no less than five board games based on the
war. The War in Cuba, (1897) portrayed the Cuban rebellion from Spain. The other four –
The Battle of Manila (1898), The Siege of Havana (1898), The Blockade Runner (1899), and
Dewey's Victory: Never Beaten (1900) – all allowed players to command ships running
missions during the war. Although simplistic – two of the games featured wooden
"shells" that could be "fired" at the Spanish fleet – they brought the naval battles of the
Spanish American war inside the American home. Advertising showed families around
a table playing the games together.73 Even today, a casual Google search of Spanish
American War popular goods will result in a plethora of items, many of which center
on the fame and exploits of the Navy. Admiral George Dewey was immensely popular.
Aside from envelopes, pictures and other paper ephemera, his likeness appeared on
plates, glass jugs, souvenir spoons, butter dishes shaped like battleships, and even
candy molds.74 Likewise, his flagship Olympia, enjoyed equal popularity. Even today,
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model kits of Olympia are available, some with original manufacturing dating from
1959, only three years after the ship became a museum in Philadelphia. 75
Individually, these books, organizations, letters from common Americans,
and popular media might not appear all that important. Collectively, however, their
varied nature and continued production throughout the late 19 th and early 20th century
United States points to a wide spread market based on a growing interest in maritime
affairs. As later chapters will show, this enthusiasm continued into the first decade of
the 20th century, with newspapers and magazines featuring design details of major
ocean liners, in places as far from the Atlantic as Salt Lake City and California. The tone
of the articles remained positive and supportive of maritime expansion until the Titanic
disaster of 1912, at which point authors began to question the wisdom of constructing
super liners.
As popular enthusiasm for the idea of the Navy grew in the early 20 th century,
the actual course of naval events after the 1898 War with Spain followed much of the
path Mahan had suggested. The United States continued to build up its fleet after the
war. Between 1900 and 1907 sixteen new battleships joined the fleet. 76 At the same time,
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under the leadership of J. P. Morgan, the United States merchant marine grew by huge
proportions. Although largely benefiting by buying out British and European shipping
lines, American cargo now left American ports on American-owned ships. 77 This helped
solidify American power along the lines that Mahan had suggested, especially after the
First World War dramatically weakened both the U.K. and Germany. Stated another
way, Mahan had called upon the United States to build up its navy and merchant
marine, build alliances, and establish coaling stations, and enter foreign markets to
increase international trade. Griscom and Morgan attempted to do just this for the
civilian side.
Mahan's success as a writer, followed by his apparent validation through the
Spanish-American War, led to increased popular support for nautical expansion.
Although this support offered a vital cultural enthusiasm for maritime expansion,
another factor—the growth and evolution of business in the United States—provided
the actual ability to expand American shipping and potentially compete with
longstanding maritime power Great Britain, whose shipping lines dominated most of
the world's oceans. The history of the American railroad industry, as well of recent
histories in American economic and imperial expansion, offers the necessary context for
the business aspects of this new interest in commercial shipping.
§§§

77

Anonymous, The Text of the Agreement, The Manchester Guardian, May 9, 1902.
44

This growth came to a grinding halt, however, with the advent of the Great
War. The Great War accelerated changes in nearly every aspect of life all around the
world, including shipping and who controlled it. Leading up to the war, Britain and
Germany had engaged in a naval arms race that strained their economies. Britain's
economy took the worst of it because government policy dictated outbuilding the
German navy.78 Between 1907 and 1910, Britain built 20 dreadnoughts and battle
cruisers.79 By 1914, Britain had produced 2.7 million tons worth of warships, built
specifically to outpace Germany's 1.3 million. 80 Over the course of the war, Great Britain
spent over $23 billion in 1913 dollars and mobilized 9.5 million men. 81 Between 1913 and
1918, British exports declined 59.5% and re-exports declined by 81.8% while the British
trade deficit quadrupled. At the same time, the British merchant marine lost 9 million
tons, including the Lusitania and the American owned (but British built and managed)
Britannic, the largest ship in the world at the time.82 Together, these trends created a
major opportunity for American shipping.
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With British shipping, including British IMM holdings, tied up in the war
effort and German merchant ships interned in ports at home and abroad, a major
vacuum needed to be filled. This created a situation in which IMM was in financial
disarray yet making such massive profits. Stock holders were lulled into a false sense of
security despite a recent fight over restructuring. Likewise, the period from late 1917
through the end of the war saw the former German merchant navy, which had been
confiscated by the United States government, turned over to American commercial
pursuits. The ramifications of these events hastened the demise of IMM as an
international corporation.
This slow spiral played out over the 1920s. Despite cooperating with the Wilson
Administration’s war time goals, by 1918 IMM found itself viewed as the pawn of
British interests by the U.S. Congress. As a result, Congress left IMM out of postwar
spoils such as the Leviathan, a massive German liner that IMM had managed during the
war, but which it lost to a new American shipping company that had gained the
support of the government by 1921. Facing competition from government-supported
shipping firms, both domestic and foreign, IMM found itself in a weakening position
that eventually forced the sale of foreign assets, beginning with White Star in 1926 and
culminating with complete divestment of foreign assets by 1930.
Still, even with this disappointing ending, IMM had played the role Mahan had
predicted during war time. It helped keep the lanes of international trade open,
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allowing the Allies to maintain the importation of desperately needed resources while
giving American manufacturing access to markets, promoting a healthy economy at
home. It had, in short, navigated the tides of war to the benefit of the Allies only to be
stranded on the reef of post-war politics.

Dissertation Structure and Conclusion

A Tall Ship traces the formation, rise, and fall of the International Mercantile
Marine, beginning in the 1870s with its immediate predecessor, International
Navigation, through its early expansion to its ultimate failure as an international
business in the 1920s. Along the way it asks and attempts to answer the following
questions: How did American entrepreneurs navigate the challenges of rebuilding the
American merchant marine in an already crowded market? Europeans dominated the
Atlantic from the 1870s and fiercely fought to maintain that control during IMM’s
ascendancy. What steps did Griscom and Morgan take to try to insure success despite
outdated American shipping laws and a Congress that swung from indifferent to
supportive to hostile? How did the race for the world’s largest liner, the loss of
IMM’s Titanic and WWI affect IMM and did these events contribute to its eventual
failure?
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To create as accurate a narrative and analysis as possible, many sources from the
United States and Europe have been consulted. Among the most valuable of these
sources are the Ismay-Cheape Family Archives and the Cunard Archives housed at the
University of Liverpool in Great Britain. The Ismay-Cheape Family Archives are under
the custodianship of Mr. Malcolm Cheape of Great Britain, a direct descendant of J.
Bruce Ismay. Not seen outside the family since the 1960s, the Ismay-Cheape Archives
contain correspondence, newspaper clippings, diaries and much more relating to the
White Star Line from its founding in the 1870s through the departure of Bruce Ismay
from IMM in 1913. The Cunard Archives in Liverpool includes correspondence from
successive chairmen of Cunard Line and, most importantly, documents the efforts of
Cunard leadership to “remain British” when J. P. Morgan attempted to purchase the
company in the early 1900s. Both of these sources provide valuable insight into the
highest levels of leadership of the businesses and governments involved. Other sources
include newspapers from both America and Great Britain, presidential correspondence,
transcripts of testimony and debates from Congress and Parliament as well as
published and unpublished contemporary writings. Additionally the National Archives
in Washington D.C., the Hathi Trust Digital Library, the Woodrow Wilson Papers,
shipping industry publications and my own collection of material relating to the great
liners, IMM White Star and Cunard were all reviewed providing valuable information.
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Because this history is complicated and highly detailed, with an international cast of
characters, chapters are divided by major events in the life and expansion of IMM.
Chapter Two tells the story of Clement Griscom and his attempts to build an
American shipping firm. Griscom's project faced a number of challenges, including both
antiquated laws and the lack of infrastructure to build American ships. His stymied
attempts to establish an American-owned shipping firm led him to do business in
Belgium and form the Red Star Line in reaction the hostile business environment in the
United States. As his firm became successful, Griscom began lobbying the U.S.
government to make changes to laws that hindered his enterprise. By the late 1890s,
policy makers created new laws more favorable to shipping businessmen. At the same
time, J. P. Morgan also began building his combine. One of his purchases was the wellestablished and well-respected British firm, the White Star Line. At this point, the
dissertation turns to Thomas Ismay and the foundation of his White Star Line to show
how the shipping industry was supported in Great Britain and, more broadly, the more
supportive environment enjoyed by European trans-Atlantic firms. This chapter
examines White Star Line's partnership with Harland & Wolff to explain the
competitive edge it had in its entry into the Atlantic shipping industry. The chapter
concludes by bringing the two narratives together, tracing how Morgan continued to
build his combine and examining the concern he caused in Europe as governments
began to take steps to preserve their shipping industry.
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Chapter Three focuses on the efforts of the Cunard Steamship Line to remain
a British company in the face of Morgan's continued efforts. The changing relationship
between business and government forms a central theme of this chapter, as does the
intense competition between major firms. This chapter documents the ways in which
the competition between IMM and Cunard brought about the massive and still wellknown Olympic class liners and placed in the context of the times. Cunard’s chairman,
Lord Inverclyde, engaged in in an extended delay campaign to preserve the
independence of his company. Engaging in negotiations with the British government,
Inverclyde managed to stave off Morgan, an outcome that would have long term
consequences for IMM. Cunard’s new partnership with the British government helped
redefine the relationship between business and government, especially international or
transnational business. The chapter also traces the high stakes competition between
companies for the most advanced superliners in the world which resulted in the
Olympic class liner. Finally, it examines the loss of R.M.S. Titanic and its effects on the
shipping industry in the context of shipping and what it meant for IMM to the eve of
the First World War.
Chapter Four documents how IMM floundered through the First World War
following the loss of its most talented leadership in the fallout of the Titanic disaster.
While this catastrophe proved incredibly damaging to IMM, the company’s
foundational problems – specifically Morgan purchasing shipping assets for far above
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their real value – also came back to haunt the combine. The ensuing fights over stock
values and restructuring the company forced the combine’s management to spend time
quelling investor revolts and took attention away from planning for the future. Despite
this, the windfall of profits that IMM earned in these years, due to British and German
shipping competition being removed by the war, gave IMM a temporary reprieve.
However, as the chapter describes, the United States government eventually became a
de facto competitor to IMM when it confiscated a large portion of the German merchant
marine upon the United States’ entry into the war. In a relationship akin to that of
Cunard and the British government, the U.S. government created a new American
merchant marine built with confiscated German ocean liners. By the postwar years, as
this chapter shows, this move completely undermined IMM as America’s merchant
marine and sped up its decline as yet another competitor back by the direct power of
government entered the market. In an act of irony, the U.S. government supported the
new venture because of distrust of IMM and its foreign assets in the belief that IMM
was the tool of British investors to cripple American shipping. The chapter concludes
with IMM’s sale of White Star Line in 1926 and traces its decline in international
holdings until they were eliminated altogether.
Chapter Five briefly ties together the loose ends of the narrative by tracing the
later lives of the people, companies, and ships involved in IMM, Cunard, and the other
participants in shipping from the time period. The chapter concludes with a review of
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this dissertation’s central thesis, drawing together the evidence and arguments of the
preceding chapters and offering a final set of takeaway points.
The International Mercantile Marine was a monumental effort that ultimately
collapsed. Yet despite its eventual failure, IMM deserves to be studied, not least for
what it can tell us about the growth of American global power in the early 20 th century.
Morgan intended for this combine to serve as the new American merchant marine and
saw it as a way to introduce American products and American influence into Europe.
As a business, it was one of the earliest efforts at a modern transnational company using
advances in communications and transportation technology. A deeper understanding
of IMM helps give insight on the “American Century” and the modern world.
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Chapter 2

Oceanic Majesty
Clement Griscom, J. P. Morgan and the White Star Line

Lounging comfortably in the smoking room of an Atlantic steamer in 1893, J.
Pierpont Morgan idly conversed with one of his fellow passengers. The other traveler,
well aware of Morgan’s success in gaining control of the railroads along the Atlantic
seaboard, asked him what he thought was a trivial question: would it be possible to buy
up all the shipping on the Atlantic and form a shipping monopoly? Morgan thought a
little, then shifted in his seat. “Ought to be,” he said. 83 While the story may be
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apocryphal, it does speak truthfully about how Morgan saw financial challenges. For a
man who purchased European castles to obtain one or two pieces of artwork, building
an Atlantic monopoly amounted to routine business.
As one of the great "robber-barons" and the richest man in America, Morgan had
the means to make nearly anything possible. A few years later, Morgan joined with
American shipping businessmen, including Clement Griscom, manager of the largest
American shipping concerns at the time, to make that monopoly into a reality. Starting
in 1901, Morgan and his associates began the process of mergers, takeovers and stock
buyouts that created the largest shipping syndicate in history up to that time.
By the 1890s, J. Pierpont Morgan had earned his reputation as one of the world's
greatest businessmen. He accumulated vast holdings in the railroads and oil industries
during the 1870s and 1880s. The decision to develop the International Mercantile
Marine, however, represented the greatest financial risk of his storied career. Although
he had been approached earlier by interested parties to launch a combine, Morgan
initially refused such advances. Yet by the late 1890s, Morgan changed his mind. 84 He
wanted to create a combine in which a major steamer left the port of New York each

84

Jean Strouse, Morgan: American Financier, (New York: Random House, 1999), 458.
54

day with mail, cargo and passengers for Europe making a significant change from the
shape of the shipping industry until that point. 85
Morgan had a great deal of motivation for supporting the International
Mercantile Marine. First was his personal hatred of waste and redundant business
efforts, which he had demonstrated during his days organizing the railroads. 86 In the
late 1890s, several ships left the same port for the same destination once or twice a week
in direct rivalry to each other. Morgan's plan for daily ship departures was designed to
decrease direct competition, offer a more flexible schedule, and reduce rates because
shippers could avoid storage fees while cargos awaited shipment. Daily sailings
decreased the likelihood of spoilage on perishable cargoes that required refunds.
Specific ships could be detailed for specific cargoes as opposed to placing cargo on
whatever ship happened to leave that day, despite its freight capabilities or capacity. 87
Second, his newest trust, U.S. Steel, benefited from a foundation of vertical and
horizontal integration. Morgan controlled every step in the production of steel from
mining to railroad transport right up to delivery at the New York docks. At this point,
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Morgan's control ended and he depended on foreign ships to transport his steel to
Europe.88 Taking the reins of Atlantic shipping potentially allowed Morgan and his
associates to arrange departures that decreased the cost of shipping steel and opened up
markets in which the United States otherwise could not compete.
Third, the ideas of Alfred Mahan gained great acceptance among both the public
and elite circles during this time period, not least with Morgan. While Mahan wrote at
length about military preparedness, the strength of international trade formed a
complementary—and no less vital—part of his arguments about sea power. 89 These
theories became part of the public discourse over the 1880s and 1890s as Mahan
increasingly wrote for mass audiences. Morgan's new and increased shipping plans
required improvements to port infrastructure that could support both civilian and
military needs. Mahan emphasized structural improvements like this in his books and
articles. Although Mahan may not have directly or personally influenced Morgan,
Mahan's close relationship with another individual, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Theodore Roosevelt, certainly benefited Morgan. The International Mercantile Marine
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stood as one of the very few Morgan monopolies that Roosevelt never targeted, almost
certainly thanks to its neat fit with Mahan's ideas.
Together, these three factors led Morgan to decide to pursue IMM in late 1890s.
In analyzing these motivational factors, the chapter will first trace the formation of the
Clement Griscom's shipping lines up to the founding of J. P. Morgan's International
Mercantile Marine and his decision to purchase the White Star Line in 1901. Next, the
chapter will travel back in time to 1875 and review the formation of White Star,
providing a contrasting example of the relative ease European shipping companies
enjoyed compared to the obstacles Griscom faced. Since Griscom's Red Star Line and
Thomas Ismay's White Star Line formed within just a few years of each other, 1870 and
1875 respectively, the contrasting examples will demonstrate the difficulties of
rebuilding American shipping, painting a more complete picture of international
shipping and trans-Atlantic economics at the time.
In existing scholarship, the formation of the International Mercantile Marine
(IMM) is often portrayed as merely a step towards the construction of the Titanic in 1912
or as part of the history of the White Star Line that owned this ill-fated ship. In some
ways, this narrative is accurate. Without the financial backing Morgan provided, White
Star would not have been able to build the three massive liners of which Titanic was just
one member of a larger design class. And yet, the formation of Morgan's Atlantic
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combine represented much more than a story of the Titanic’s origins. It also has an even
longer and richer origin story than historians typically acknowledge.
As an early example of an American- based, multinational conglomerate, IMM
has much to tell us about the intersection of international business and politics.
Studying its history also shows how American businessmen, including Griscom and
Morgan, applied the lessons of horizontal and vertical integration to a transcontinental
enterprise that attempted to unite land and waterborne travel. And yet, few authors
have examined IMM in this context.90 While several journal articles have analyzed the
events of the merger, they have not considered the history of the IMM in the greater
contexts of global capitalism, imperialism, or U.S. foreign relations. 91 Even fewer have
looked at Morgan's quests to add Britain's Cunard Line and Germany's Hamburg
Amerika Line, which evaded his grasp and ultimately contributed to IMM's failure.
As this chapter will argue, the International Mercantile Marine provides an early
example of economic imperialism in which the United States expanded influence and
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power without taking physical territory from other world powers. As many historians
have argued in recent years, the geography of U.S. and European empires transformed
in important ways during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With advances in
transportation and communication technologies, imperial rule and the projection of
power became much easier to accomplish around the world. Additionally, larger
empires could be controlled with smaller forces since telegraph and radio
communication allowed a rapid response from neighboring forces. 92 Economic
imperialism improved on this by reducing the reliance on hard, or military, power. By
selling goods in a foreign nation, the exporter (in this case the United States) not only
exported products, but the culture attached to those products. As Woodrow Wilson
later asserted, this would "...convert them (foreigners) to the principles of America." 93
IMM helped promote this economic imperialism by giving American exports an edge in
transport and distribution in the European marketplace with simplified sailing
schedules and lower shipping rates.
At the same time, the world economy changed in significant ways. The formerly
insular nature of many industries grew as the ability to export increased. With limited
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means to transport products to remote locations, industry could only expand as far as
transportation network it had access to allowed, despite growing production power
through new machinery and techniques. To make use of this force, however, nations
needed markets for their surplus products. Imperial powers, such as Germany, Great
Britain, and eventually the United States, did not have to control ports as long as their
goods arrived there and flowed into the market place. Ensuring these flows of capital
and goods constituted a new sort of imperialism. For those powers that took advantage
of the new economic imperialism, economic dominance grew as imported goods
displaced native products, increasing imperial power both at home and abroad. 94
Previous histories of IMM have neglected the issue of economic imperialism. By
extending its control of trade through ownership of the steamships with which it was
conducted, IMM provided the United States with the commercial foundation that
Admiral Alfred Mahan taught was necessary for U.S. defense and economic stability.

Emily S. Rosenberg, A World Connecting: 1870-1945, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2012), 297-298. For additional background on this see Neil
Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization, Berkley:
University of California Press, 2003; C. A. Bayley, The Birth of the Modern World: 17801914, Oxford; Backwell Publishing, 2004; Shigeru Akita, Ed., Gentlemanly Capitalism
Imperialism, and Global History, Basingstroke UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; Jan De
Vries, The Industrial Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the
Present, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2008; Daniel R. Headrick, Power Over
Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism 1400 to the Present, Princeton:
Princeton university Press, 2010.
94

60

At the time, the British press deduced that Morgan built IMM as a means to
distribute products produced by him and "his friends" cheaply, opening England and
Germany to American products.95 "Mr. Morgan and the group of capitalists for whom
he operates are resolved to make the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans American lakes so far
as commerce is concerned, "declared the Liverpool Daily Mail.96 They were only half
right. While cheaper exports formed the ultimate goal, the means to get there proved far
more alarming, especially for the British.
While it explores these issues of economic imperialism, this chapter also
contributes to historiography by introducing issues of cultural imperialism in the
discussion of IMM. For centuries Great Britain enjoyed the reputation as "ruler of the
waves." Since Elizabethan times and the destruction of the Spanish Armada, England's
reputation for oceanic dominance, and for producing superior ships and sailors, had
grown. By the late 1800s and early 1900s, it enjoyed recognition as the world's leading
nautical power.97 With American entrance into the maritime world, however, that
longstanding British dominance faced a new threat. In terms of cultural imperialism,
since Britain linked its national identity to its nautical heritage, American buyouts of
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established and prestigious British shipping lines represented both a perceived and real
assault on its national identity and development.98 Liverpool or Southampton graced
the stern of every British-built and owned ship as the city of registry, proclaiming
British sea power in the most distant world ports. From the British point of view, seeing
those same ships have Liverpool painted out in favor of New York or Atlantic City
would represent a humiliating loss of cultural identity. 99 This is especially true
considering that the loss would come, as perception would dictate, because British
businessmen valued American dollars more than national heritage. 100 Even to the
present day,Great Britain treasures its maritime heritage. In the time period this
dissertation examines, British ships sailed the seas in the hundreds, if not thousands.
Watching that massive armada willingly lost to American dollars came as a great shock
to the British public, especially after almost 400 years of fierce defense of international
dominance.
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Clement Griscom and United States Shipping in the Late 1800s
In 1900, even after twenty-five years of efforts to increase American shipping
capacity, only 8.2% of American foreign trade left ports on American-owned
ships.101American exports for 1900 totaled $885 million ($26,643,241,071 in 2018) and
British exports for the same period totaled $1.477 billion ($44.465 billion in 2018), mostly
traded on British-built and owned steamers. 102 A great deal of revenue awaited
American investors, such as Morgan, if they tapped into the shipping market and
opened European markets to American made goods. Yet to accomplish this goal,
Morgan, or one of his contemporaries, first had to rebuild and consolidate the American
merchant marine. They would have to do so, moreover, in the face of tremendous
opposition from the British merchant marine and the British government, which dated
back to the mid-1800s. Additionally, American shipping interests faced higher
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construction costs and did not enjoy the subsidies British shippers did. 103 Developing
the American merchant marine, in short, would be an uphill battle.
While it is generally believed the idea of an Atlantic combine began and ended
with Morgan, he did not take the initial steps towards making this vision a reality.
Clement A. Griscom, a young Pennsylvania railroad executive, initiated this process by
building up American shipping during the last decades of the 19th century. Born in
1841, Clement Acton Griscom descended from an old Pennsylvania Quaker family. At
age 16, he began working for the shipping brokerage of Peter Wright & Sons of
Philadelphia. In May 1871, the brokerage bought the initial issue of stock in the
International Navigation Company when its charter gained authorization from the
Pennsylvania General Assembly. By the time of the charter, Griscom was a partner in
Peter Wright & Sons, and he largely controlled operations for International Navigation
Company.104
In 1872, Griscom, with the support of business associate J. Edgar Thomas of the
Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR), decided to organize the International Navigation
Company to serve Europe and the United States. Griscom hoped the new service would
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expand anemic American shipping which modestly increased when the American Line,
also chartered by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1871, inaugurated services
from Liverpool to Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania Railroad, which owned controlling
interests in their respective stocks, ultimately controlled both the American Line and the
International Navigation Company, from their formations in 1870 and '71. Members of
the board of directors of PRR populated the boards of the new shipping concerns but
managed by Peter Wright & Sons managed them in day to day operations—or, in other
words, by Clement Griscom.105
Griscom intended his new company to provide service from Antwerp, Belgium
to Philadelphia, using foreign built ships, crews, and registry.106 Griscom took this path
for several reasons. First, he preferred foreign-built ships for their technological
supremacy. Since no major civilian ship construction occurred in the United States after
1865, shipyards did not keep up with technological advances that modern European
Atlantic liners featured. Writers and historians documenting the formation of Griscom's
and later Morgan's syndicates have noted the dominance of Britain's shipbuilding
industry.107 British built ships tended to include steel hulls featuring subdivision into
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watertight compartments, while American hulls were typically wooden or iron and
lacked many of the modern advances of competing ships.
Second, he hoped to avoid the expense and complications presented by
American registry laws. While Griscom wanted American-built and owned ships, U.S.
laws prevented Americans from simply buying foreign-built ships to create an
American transport line.108 These registry laws dated from as far back as the founding of
the country. Statutes passed in December 1792, specifically, stated that for a ship to
have American registry it had to be built in the United States, wholly owned by and
under the captaincy of American citizens.109 Compounding the problem of creating an
American shipping line, a law passed in February 1866 made it impossible for ships that
had been previously built in the United States, but "which shall have been licensed or
otherwise authorized to sail under a foreign flag, and to have had protection of any
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foreign government during the existence of the rebellion," to return to American
registry.110 In other words, those ships whose owners sought foreign registry to avoid
astronomical insurance rates caused by Confederate commerce raiders could not return
their ships to American registry.
This act essentially punished shipping owners for avoiding ruinous insurance
costs and further handicapped the restoration of American shipping over the challenges
already existing from the 1792 law. By disallowing American registry, Congress
compelled the few remaining American shipping owners to employ cheaper European
crews and ships. As an unintended consequence, it fortified British dominance of
Atlantic shipping by making establishment of new American firms prohibitively
expensive, especially in the face of subsidies, which the United States did not offer but
Britain did. Even if American owners could obtain ships, they could not competitively
operate them with British companies, who could offer passenger rates at cost and still
make a profit off the mail subsidy offered by Great Britain. 111 When Griscom looked to
found his Red Star Line, foreign registry offered the simplest and cheapest option to
most of his problems.
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The monarch of Belgium played a direct part in making all of this possible. In
1872, after determining that Belgium provided the most central location to base logistics
in Europe, Griscom went to Antwerp to seek government support. Visiting Brussels, he
met with American minister to Belgium, John Sanford, who arranged for a meeting with
King Leopold. The king, who had a reputation as a man of business, liked Griscom's
ideas and promised his support for a charter and mail subsidy and that he would "see
that Parliament grants you everything you need." 112
Shortly after meeting with the king, Griscom contracted with a shipyard for
construction of a pair of steamers. The ships, produced in Belgium, were "built
especially for this trade; of iron, with double bottoms and in accordance with the
strictest regulations of English Lloyds." 113 Additionally, Griscom's new ships boasted
special adaptations for safety, comfort and speed, with saloon and first-class
accommodations in the center of the ship where the least motion was felt. 114 They
followed a fashion set by the British trans-Atlantic shipping and passenger company,
the White Star Line, just a year or two before.
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By 1873, Griscom’s ships were sailing and his International Navigation Company
gained assets in Britain, Belgium, and the United States. Yet while Griscom's Red Star
Line grew and flourished, it remained largely a foreign concern. Though the ultimate
ownership was American, Red Star's ships flew Belgian colors, sailed with Belgian
crews, and retained Belgian registry. None of this fit Griscom's overall goal of
American-owned and registered shipping. His primary impediment in achieving that
goal lay with American registry laws, laws which still stated that to have American
registry, the ship had to be built in the United States.115 Starting off, Griscom did not
have the assets to afford these types of ships.
Over the next ten years, this situation began to change. The Red Star Line,
registered as the Société Anonyme de Navigation Belge-Américaine, and ultimately
managed by International Navigation Company of Philadelphia, built up a prospering
business, offering bi-weekly and eventually weekly sailings between Philadelphia and
Antwerp. By 1884, the line had expanded to the point that Griscom could finally afford
to purchase American-built steamers. By 1886, the company owned twelve steamers
totaling over 45,000 tons.116 At about the same time, the foundering Inman Line, an
established and formerly profitable British line, came to Griscom's attention. Griscom's
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subsequent pursuit of the Inman Line, carried out over the next few months in many
ways foreshadow Morgan's later, grander pursuit of European shipping in general.
Griscom and the Inman Line
The Inman Line had a glorious history dating to December 11, 1850 when
William Inman, a partner in a sailing packet line, began experimenting with chartered
iron steamers. He formed the Liverpool, New York and Philadelphia Steamship
Company, better known as the Inman Line, directed at serving the immigrant market.
Shortly after, he and his wife made a trip across the Atlantic to personally study the
needs of his passengers. The company proved a success and by 1870 carried 3,635 first
class and 40,635 steerage passengers (the vast majority immigrants), as compared to
Cunard Line's 7,638 and 16,871.117
By 1886, however, the once thriving Inman Line was a dying concern. The death
of its founder in 1881 left the line without a determined leader. Business
miscalculations, coupled with unsuccessful steamers, led to a debt that exceeded the
value of the entire fleet. For example, City of Rome, built in 1881, proved disastrous. Built
to compete directly with Arizona of the Guion Line, City of Rome, in fact took two days
longer than its rival to travel from Queenstown, Ireland to New York. The return
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voyage took one day longer than Arizona's time as well. Sent back to the builder for a
six-month overhaul, she still proved unsatisfactory and ended up back once again with
her builders.118 In 1866, seeing a clear business opportunity, Griscom bought a
considerable sum of the Inman Line's debt and approached British stockholders with
the idea of selling all of their stock to him. On October 18, 1886, the stockholders voted
to go into voluntary liquidation and sold out to Griscom. Within weeks of the purchase,
the new Inman and International Steamship Company came into being, managed by
Richardson, Spence and Company of Liverpool.119
British subsidy laws enhanced the appeal of purchasing Inman. The Atlantic
mails had been subsidized as far back as the 1830s, providing significant sums to ships
that transported British mail across the Atlantic. At the time Griscom purchased Inman,
three companies split the lion’s share of the British North Atlantic Subsidy: Cunard,
White Star, and Inman.120 The subsidies allowed the lines to cover expenses associated
with the high cost of providing regular service to trans-Atlantic ports. Ships serving the
route had to be fast, reliable, and maintained in prime condition to endure the
mechanical stresses of routine high-speed crossings. While income from passenger
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traffic helped, the subsidy often made the difference between solvency and bankruptcy.
With Inman's part of the subsidy totaling £35,000 ($5,537,660 in 2018), it also proved an
attractive selling point for Griscom.121
Acquisition of the Inman Line finally put Griscom in control of an established,
respected shipping firm known for owning some of the finest ships on the Atlantic.
Inman ships, such as the City of Richmond and City of Montreal, had reputations as some
of the most beautiful ships afloat in an age of "floating teakettles." Featuring clipper
bows and figureheads, Inman steamers harkened back to the era of sailing ships with
their long, low, sleek lines. Griscom decided to build on this reputation with two new
twin steamers and catapult the Inman and International Line into position as the
leading Atlantic company. He therefore entered negotiations with J & G Thompson
Shipbuilding Yard of Clydebank, Scotland. Fortunately for Griscom, a recession had hit,
which no doubt gave him an advantage making his deal. Griscom left Scotland with a
contract for the largest, fastest, most luxurious ships in the world, at the cost of
$1,850,000 ($47,562,789 in 2018) per vessel.122
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Christened in 1888, the first of these two ships, City of New York, delighted many
Americans. Described as "huge and beautiful" and "the "Flying Dutchman" of the
Atlantic," she garnered extensive praise. Observers raved that she was built on yachtlike lines and appreciated her "enormous engines that develop extraordinary power,”
reducing the Atlantic crossing to under six days. Her other reported virtues included
being "lavishly equipped" with life saving devices including a "superabundance" of
lifeboats. The Associated Press further reported that her design included plans for quick
conversion into an armed merchant cruiser should the need arise. 123 She and her sister,
City of Paris, proved extremely successful and won the Blue Riband, a coveted award for
speed on the Atlantic, for fastest crossing both east and west bound on the Atlantic run
in 1889.124
1891 opened new possibilities for American merchant shipping, and for Griscom
in particular. In that year, Senator William P. Frye of Maine introduced two subsidy
bills for debate. Frye, a proponent of rebuilding and expanding the merchant marine,
intended to provide enough incentive to American shipbuilders for the immediate
formation of a wholly American company. Unfortunately for Frye, when the bill went
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before the House of Representatives, his generous subsidies were reduced by one third.
Whereas companies would have earned $6 ($160.43 in 2018) per mile outbound under
Frye’s bill, the law that finally passed reduced these subsidies to $4 ($106.95 in 2018). 125
The law thus did not have the effect of stimulating North Atlantic trade (though it did,
however, aid American shipping lines in the Pacific, Gulf of Mexico and South
Atlantic). As originally written, moreover, the law still mandated that ships must have
American registry which required construction in American yards. 126 The same old
stumbling block remained.
In 1891, however, the precise type of bill needed to remove this obstacle began to
make its way through Congress. The bill, ultimately named "An Act to Encourage
American Shipbuilding," held great significance for Griscom financially, because the
Parliament of Great Britain cut Inman and International Line out of the mail subsidy
when it came up for renewal the year before. The official explanation for the change,
according to Parliament, was that with modern technological advances, White Star and
Cunard easily met requirements for uninterrupted mail service with two instead of
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three sailings a week. Unofficially, as Griscom understood it and explained during a
subsequent Congressional hearing, the British government did "not feel that a company
owned entirely by American capital should receive mail pay from the British
Government, and so we were not considered when the new contracts for two sailings
per week were concluded."127 Griscom’s suspicions of national rivalry seem grounded,
since Inman and International owned the largest, fastest, strongest built ships in the
world at the time in the City of Paris and City of New York, ships specifically designed to
provide reliable cargo and mail service between Great Britain and North America.
British officials clearly only wanted to subsidize ships that brought prestige to their
own flag. The British made their message clear: If Americans intended to enter Atlantic
shipping they needed someone else's subsidy.
Inman's control of such prestigious ships may have raised concern in Parliament,
but they positively influenced Congress's decision to change U.S. policies on the matter.
The resulting "Act to Encourage American Shipbuilding" passed on May 10, 1892. It
allowed ships, "of not less than eight thousand tons, and capable of speed not less than
twenty knots per hour," to have American registry despite construction in a foreign
yard. The legislation required the shipping company to have American owners, and
"have built or have contract to build, in American shipyards, steamships of an
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aggregate tonnage of not less in amount than that of the steamships so admitted to
registry."128 Not coincidentally the City of New York and City of Paris weighed in at 10,802
and 10,795 tons respectively, not only meeting but surpassing the tonnage requirement
of the law.129 They also surpassed the speed requirement with record crossings at 20.1
and 20.7 knots.130 The act finally gave Griscom what he had long desired: American
registry for his American-owned ships, without the need for convoluted ownerships
and multiple boards in multiple nations.
A follow-up bill paved the way for further expansion. Hotly debated in both
houses of Congress, the Free Admission to American Registry of Ships Built in Foreign
Countries Act ultimately passed and became law in 1893. 131 Those opposed to the bill
based their arguments on protecting the shipbuilding industry. The Minority Report on
the bill stated that, "The course proposed in this bill is wholly opposed to American
interests and American spirit. It proposes still further blight upon American enterprise
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and American industry." The Minority suggested that by buying ships, the shipbuilding
industry in the United States would stagnate to the point that even naval construction
might depend upon European shipyards.132 Proponents pointed out that, "Lines that are
essentially American lines are sailing the ocean under the British and other foreign
flags. Ninety percent of the stock of some of these foreign lines is owned by citizens of
the United States."133 Without mentioning Griscom's firm by name, the Majority Report
described the condition of the Red Star Line almost exactly.
The importance of the 1891, 1892 and 1893 laws cannot be overemphasized. They
marked a turning point in the quest to rebuild American shipping on the Atlantic and
encouraged J. P. Morgan's later actions to build on Griscom's achievements. American
entrepreneurs now enjoyed more equal footing with their European competitors. Even
so, British subsidies still far exceeded what the U.S. federal government authorized. The
P&O Steamship Company, another British firm on the Atlantic, received an annual
subsidy of £330,000 in 1899 (roughly $54,277,809 in 2018). 134 By contrast, Griscom
testified in 1898 that the annual subsidy income of his line amounted to just $750,000
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yearly ($21,797,283 in 2018, 2.5 times less than its British rival). 135 The subsidy may not
have resolved the disparities between European and American competition, but they
nevertheless served to facilitate Inman’s competition with European rivals.
Transfer to American registry prompted celebration, not just within the Inman
and International Line but in the new home port of New York. The New York arrived in
harbor first after passage of the bill and garnered the more lavish of ceremonies to mark
her transition to American registry. The event occurred on George Washington's
birthday, 1893, in front of thousands who braved harsh weather conditions to line the
sea wall at the battery to view the spectacle hailed as nationally important. President
Benjamin Harrison himself raised the colors on the New York's sternpost as guns from
the cruiser Chicago and Castle William thundered in salute. Harrison had also prepared
remarks. He began by saying, "I have felt both as a citizen and as president, the
mortification that every American must feel that examines into the standing of the
United States in the merchant marine of the world." He went on to praise the design of
the New York and express excited anticipation that it was a "precursor of many others
that are to float this flag."136 The arrival of the Paris a few short days later prompted
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similar festivities, although this time Griscom's thirteen-year-old daughter, Frances,
raised the colors. The event enjoyed even more of a triumphant air as the supremacy of
Griscom’s ships became clear. The Paris had not only overtaken the newer White Star
Liner Teutonic, which had left Liverpool thirty-five minutes earlier, but had beaten her
British rival to New York by three hours.137 This despite the fact that the newer and
larger Teutonic and her twin sister Majestic were designed with speed in mind.138
Transfer to American registry also brought a number of changes for the
company. Inman and International Line ceased operations under that name. In a nod to
their new role in American shipping, they were re-christened as the American Line. The
newly branded American Line promptly contracted with Cramp and Sons Ship and
Engine Building Company of Philadelphia to build two additional ships: the St. Paul
and St. Louis, each of 11,600 tons and capable of at least 20 knots speed. 139 The two new
steamers entered the water in 1894 and 1895. President and Mrs. Cleveland attended the
launching, with the First Lady breaking the christening bottle on the bow of the St.
Louis. The steamers were so large that they required new piers in the North River to
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accommodate them.140 Described as "thoroughly American in design as well as
construction," an author claimed that a trained sailor "would recognize them as Yankee
vessels a dozen miles away." They "have a straight bow... the long, fine Yankee sheer,
the graceful stern, the wholesome freeboard... all salient characteristics of the modern
seagoing steam merchantmen of the United States." They had two clean masts, free of
yard arms while "foreign craft were still dragging about the cumbersome square yards
and canvas."141 While never Blue Riband winners, they met and surpassed the
conditions set by the 1892 law.
The construction of the new American Line ships, however, had come at great
cost. In 1900 Thomas Clyde, of the Clyde Steamship Company, testifying before
Congress, noted that St. Paul and St Louis "cost more than twenty-five percent more
than they would have cost abroad." Another ship, he noted further, had cost more than
fifty percent.142 In his own testimony, Griscom noted that the cost differential both in
construction and operation made further ships of the St Louis and New York types, let
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alone improved or enlarged versions, prohibitive at best, unless Congress increased
federal subsidies.143
Fortunately for Griscom, Congress was in the mood to support the expansion of
the merchant navy, due to contemporary geopolitical concerns. In April 1898, the
United States had entered Cuba’s revolution against Spain, transforming that conflict
into the Spanish-American War. Unlike previous U.S. wars, a substantial part of it raged
at sea. Much as Alfred Mahan had predicted, the American Merchant marine played a
major role in this conflict, both in the actual fighting and in support roles. St. Louis, St.
Paul, New York, and Paris all became armed merchant cruiser auxiliaries of the United
States Navy. To mark this change in status, Paris served as Yale and New York as Harvard
for the duration of the conflict.144
The war records of the American Line ships validate much of what Mahan
predicted about the use and value of merchant ships in war time. Harvard and Yale
proved useful to the U.S. Navy over and over as fast scouts for the fleet and as flanking
forces during battle. Their cargo and passenger capacity allowed them to ferry entire
brigades of soldiers to the front lines and they even proved capable of taking and
defeating smaller but purposely built Spanish warships. St Louis took part in cutting an
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underwater cable, hobbling communications with Spanish commanders in Cuba with
Spain, and disabling the Spanish destroyer Terror. She also served as the prison for
captured Spanish officers, including Admiral Pascual Cervera, Spanish commander at
the battle of Santiago de Cuba.145
An account of the cable-cutting adventure of the St. Louis, provided by an
unnamed soldier, offers a more detailed example of these varied exploits. The mission
began on the moonless night of May 15 at the entrance of Santiago Harbor. The
operation took several days, making it even more harrowing. By 7:00 a.m. on May 17,
St. Louis engaged the forts protecting the cable as her crew grappled with the cable 500
fathoms below. The guns of Morro Castle opened fire followed by a shore battery after
noon, to which the St. Louis redirected her own guns, ultimately silencing Morro Castle
after an extended exchange of fire. During the battle, the ship's crew grappled the cable,
hauled it up, cut it and released the ends back into the sea. 146
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In cutting the cable connecting Santiago de Cuba and Jamaica, the crew of the St.
Louis assured an isolated command in Cuba that could not alert supporting forces in the
area to the daily needs of army or navy logistics or the rapidly changing threats posed
by the American army and navy. While it is conceivable that other ships could have
performed these functions, it would have slowed American operations because of the
limited number of warships available to engage in these secondary, but vital,
operations. This kind of operation enjoyed growing significance as communications
technology improved.
During the Spanish-American War, the ships of Griscom's American Line had
thus performed exactly as Mahan had predicted they would in his The Influence of Sea
Power upon History, in several key respects. First, while the American navy had enjoyed
a revival in the form of new construction in the years leading up to the war with Spain,
it did not possess nearly enough ships to perform all the roles needed. Troop ships, and
cruisers in particular, required supplemental vessels. American Line ships provided
these supplements, making them vital as troop transports, supply ships and more.
The speed of the American Line ships made them further invaluable for
communications purposes, a second point Mahan had suggested. By scouting out
enemy forces, American Line ships allowed commanders to prepare for and
outmaneuver Spanish commanders in days before wireless communications. In prior
wars, news from the front often arrived months after the actual events, constraining and
83

sometimes even eliminating reactive moves by an opposing power. Communications
cables allowed rapid reactions which often saw smaller military forces prepare for and
even defeat larger powers. Controlling communications, with the aid of the American
Line steamers and other auxiliary consorts, gave the United States a tactical and
strategic advantage without sacrificing offensive units in primary operations.
Conversely, Spain's relative lack of large merchant auxiliaries prohibited rapid
resupply, communications or any other logistical support, exactly as Mahan predicted.
Additionally, at no point during the war was American trade seriously
threatened, a third issue Mahan had discussed. Mahan's writings emphasized this
particular concern in potential future conflicts, citing lack of external trade as a major
factor in the defeat of Napoleon's France. Although the United States’ internal trade was
quite strong, and although the war ended up being short in duration, the means to
protect American commerce had been put in place, even if not to the extant Mahan
would have liked. Thus, in terms of quality, communications and trade, the value of
American Line ships in the Spanish-American war validated Mahan and maritime
expansion to the nation.
Aside from validating Mahan, these events also provided heroic tales that the
American people at home latched onto and formed a basis for support of later
expansion of the merchant marine. Tales like the St. Louis cable story, the capture of the
Spanish collier Restormal by the St. Paul, or the arrival of Gen. Duffield's 1,300-man
84

brigade aboard the Yale surfaced regularly in the press all across the United States
during the war. Such stories of heroic deeds no doubt influenced the public support
encouraging congressional action. They also renewed and bolstered prewar efforts to
revive the merchant marine, justifying their expense to both the American public and
Congress.147
And indeed, within a year of the close of the war, Congressional debates opened
with the object of expanding subsidies, much to Griscom’s delight. At this point,
however, Griscom's successes still appeared small compared to British dominance of
the Atlantic. A concerted effort by British shipping owners to quell the upstart
American expansion might well have ended Griscom's efforts, but British shippers
chose to ignore Griscom. Even as late as 1901, after J.P. Morgan entered the picture,
leading British shipping magnates, such as Lord Inverclyde, chairman of Cunard Line,
refused to fully acknowledge the threat. However, Morgan's now direct participation
set the stage for dramatic changes, whether the British were ready for them or not.
Enter Morgan
Until 1900, J.P. Morgan had restricted his participation in Griscom's enterprise to
that of an interested observer. While he assisted in finance, he did not directly advise or
intervene in day to day operations or even major decisions. That changed with the
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opportunities presented by potential new acquisitions. Morgan brought a new
aggressiveness to the renewal of the American merchant marine. Well known as the
richest man in the world, Morgan had a reputation of sparing no expense when it came
to the things he wanted. He now turned that "never take no for an answer" attitude and
vigor to the project of an international Atlantic combine and injected the determination
and financial foundation that could make an international conglomerate possible.
By 1899, Griscom was in a position to refinance his debts and begin new
construction. At the same time, the Leyland Line of Great Britain announced plans to
acquire the Atlantic Transport Company of Baltimore, Maryland. If Leyland Line
gained control of Atlantic Transport, Griscom's position on the Atlantic and his scheme
to build an American shipping empire would be seriously threatened. 148 Griscom
intended to add Atlantic Transport to his own holdings, fortifying his position by
consolidating with a successful freight service. Had it fallen into British hands it might
have serious consequences for American shipping. Congressional hearings opened that
year to discuss subsidies and potential increases to rates.149 If American concerns
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proved vulnerable to British takeover, why should Congress support them with
American tax dollars?
This perceived danger to United States interests may have been the final push
that prompted Morgan's grand entry into the Atlantic, for at first, that prospect seemed
unlikely. In July 1900, when he was initially approached by British financiers to help
with the creation of an Atlantic combine, most likely formed on the merger of Leyland
and Atlantic Transport, Morgan replied that he did not care to engage in the shipping
business.150 Without the kind of financial backing Morgan could provide, Leyland's
purchase of Atlantic Transport came to a halt. By December of 1900, however, Morgan
had not only changed his mind, but had started creating his own combine. 151
The fact that Congress began debating increased subsidies no doubt made direct
involvement more appealing for Morgan. For years Griscom had built his shipping lines
without the benefit of American subsidies, making it harder to build a truly American
line. With potential subsidies coming available, the likelihood of success for an Atlantic
combine increased substantially, making profitability of investment a stronger
possibility.
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Morgan financed the merger of International Navigation Company with the
Atlantic Transport Company and provided the money for the construction of more new
ships. At that early stage, he stayed mostly passive in company operations. Then, in
1901—no doubt adding insult to the injuries caused by his refusal to back the British
attempt at a merger—Morgan bought out the Leyland Line, adding it to the syndicate. 152
With that purchase, Morgan went from financier to co-owner of the syndicate. Atlantic
Transport, International Navigation and J. P. Morgan & Company equally divided the
stock of Leyland Line between themselves.153
The British press published widely on the terms of the buyout, and very little of
the reporting showed any support. The Liverpool Daily Post characterized the Leyland
buyout as "A Blow to British Shipping."154 Another editorial called the trust socialism,
referring to Morgan as a despot.155 The hostility to Morgan grew such that one editorial
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felt the need to discuss and ultimately refute "All manner of occult explanation of his
rise to unexampled power, of his business methods, of his plans and prospects is
offered to what the politicians call "a confiding and generous public."" 156 A certain
amount of alarm was understandable; Leyland Line operated hulls totaling roughly
300,000 tons and enjoyed a reputation among the best of British shippers. 157
Trying to allay concerns, Walter Glynn, managing director of Leyland Line,
noted in an interview with the Liverpool Daily Post that operations of the line would
continue without any changes. He also clarified that while Morgan was not buying the
fleet, per se, he was buying a large amount of stock held by ordinary stockholders. 158
J.R. Ellerman, owner of Leyland Line, got Morgan to agree to pay £14 10s ($2,253 in
2018) per share. Ellerman alone held 71,000 shares, which all went to Morgan.
According to the same report, the remaining holders of the outstanding stock, valued at
Morgan's buyout price totaling £1,750,000 ($276,780.18 in 2018) intended to sell. 159 This
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represented a considerable profit because a Frederick Leyland & Company balance
sheet from December1900, provided to a general meeting in May 1901, showed those
same stocks issued at £10 ($1,598.07 in 2018). 160
The tremendous amounts of money at play should have raised more alarm in
British shipping circles concerning their own future independence. However, George
Burns, second Baron Inverclyde and chairman of Cunard Line, seemed unbothered. "I
cannot say I am at all surprised at the Leyland deal,” he noted. “I had expected
something of that sort would happen before long between some of the American
Millionaires and one of our big Shipping companies on this side, although I did not
know which." Inverclyde went on to blame the government because, "they do not
apparently fully recognize how necessary it is to support our Mercantile Marine against
the encroachment of other countries." 161
One of his associates, David Jardine, wrote Inverclyde reminding him that
Ellerman of Leyland Line had made overtures to buy out Cunard a short time before
through an intermediary named Bellow.162 The next day Jardine wrote again, remarking
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that the board of directors of Cunard were "terribly exercised about this affair of
Morgan's" and wanted to know what overtures, if any, had been made. 163
Inverclyde's response displayed a remarkable lack of concern. "I do not see that
there is anything so very greatly to worry about in connection with the Leyland deal...,"
he said. And as for Bellow, "Personally, I think Bellow is, and always has been, a perfect
nuisance and I desire to have nothing to do with him, directly or indirectly under any
circumstances." He went on to state that overtures at buyout had been soundly rejected
by his late father, John Burns, first Baron Inverclyde, and the cause for concern
remained minimal, at least for Cunard.164 However, this statement came before
Morgan's purchase of Cunard's most direct rival, the White Star Line.
With the means for cargo transport firmly in hand, the time had come to find a
flagship passenger line for the great Atlantic combine, to be called the International
Mercantile Marine when officially formed later in 1902. Morgan chose his personal
favorite: White Star Line. It had the international prestige his other shipping lines
lacked. White Star enjoyed a reputation as a luxury steamship line. Its liners garnered
praise for their design and comfort, and in less than thirty years since the lines’
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founding, earned a reputation rivaled only by Cunard Line. White Star would be the
jewel in the crown of Morgan's International Mercantile Marine.
The White Star Line
This history of the White Star Line provides an interesting counter to the
problems Clement Griscom had in forming his Atlantic shipping lines. Thomas Ismay,
the founder of the White Star, began his foray into Atlantic shipping just a couple years
before Griscom formed his Red Star Line, while the White Star Line began service on
the Atlantic at roughly the same time as its American competitor. In Britain, however,
the advanced shipbuilding industry and generous subsidy laws made starting a new
firm far easier. In contrast to Griscom, who had to deal with laws that seemed designed
to prohibit American-owned shipping concerns, Ismay's problems centered on standing
out from established lines and attracting cliental rather than the initial formation of the
line or even finding investors. He found that unique quality in the comfort his ships
gave to passengers. While other lines offered speed alone, his provided speed tempered
by comfort and luxury on innovative and attractive steamers. This soon made White
Star the primary luxury steamship line on the Atlantic and, ultimately, a highly
desirable addition to Morgan's IMM.
The ease with which Ismay formed his business contrasts dramatically with the
hurdles Griscom had to overcome. Comparing and contrasting these two concurrent
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ventures, therefore, demonstrates the relative imports the governments of the United
States and Great Britain placed on shipping. For instance, Great Britain's generous
subsidies pointed to strong support of shipping for national interest purposes. On the
other hand, the American Congressional reticence to support shipping through
subsidies was indicative of the dominate laissez faire philosophy of governance relative
to oceanic transport businesses. In other words, unlike Great Britain, if American
businessmen planned on rebuilding American shipping, they would do it on their own,
with their own money.
The story of Griscom’s rival began in 1867, when a young Thomas Ismay
purchased the name, goodwill, and house flag of the bankrupted White Star Line.
Ismay, just thirty years old at the time, already enjoyed success at the head of T.H.
Ismay and Company, which managed trading ships sailing to ports in Mexico and the
West Indies. After purchasing the White Star name, he expanded his business by
adding Melbourne, Australia to the company's ports of call. He soon operated a
successful line of mail packets serving Australia. 165
As a result of these successes, during an informal game of billiards between two
Liverpool businessmen in 1869, an investor named Gustave Schwabe approached Ismay
about the possibility of founding steamship line on the Atlantic. Schwabe, a shipping
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magnate in his own right, already held shares in the Bibby Line, a small but growing,
British firm. Schwabe's nephew Gustav Wolff, a cofounder of Harland & Wolff
Shipyards, provided both incentive and opportunity to offer Ismay a very unique
proposition.166 Schwabe told Ismay that he was looking for new shipping investments.
He promised Ismay financial backing for the formation of a new steamship line on the
condition that Harland & Wolff build all the new company’s ships. 167 Ismay agreed and
formed the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company with shareholders that included
Gustav Schwabe, Edward J. Harland and Gustav Wolff, adding steam to his already
successful sailing packet line.
The new White Star Line and Harland & Wolff enjoyed a unique relationship.
Harland & Wolff agreed never to build ships for any company in direct competition
with White Star. In return, White Star agreed to never use any other shipbuilder. 168 In
fact, White Star never bothered with a traditional “contract” at all, but instead made a
general agreement with Harland & Wolff regarding the price of the ships they built. The
relationship, as Thomas Ismay’s son J. Bruce Ismay observed, meant that "They have
carte blanche to build the ship and put everything of the very best into that ship, and
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after they have spent all the money they can on her, they add on their commission to
the gross cost of the ship, which we pay them. We have never built a ship by
contract.”169 The commission in the original agreement between Thomas Ismay and
Messrs. Harland & Wolff was a four percent profit on the cost of each ship. 170 This
relationship gave Harland & Wolff a reliable income stream which allowed the
shipyard to continue expansions and investments over time.
These unique arrangements between White Star and Harland & Wolff allowed
shipyard engineers far more latitude than many of their competitors. Other lines had to
be more cost-conscious or had to labor under less cozy relationships with the builders
of their ships. White Star, however, benefitted from experimentation in design and
layout that Harland & Wolff pursued. In addition to building the basic bones of the
ship, Harland & Wolff fitted out the vessel, meaning that they decorated and furnished
the liners they built. All shipyards fitted out ships as part of construction, but in their
unique partnership White Star again enjoyed better results than others, such as their
main competitor, Cunard. Besides getting the best product possible from Harland &
Wolff, White Star also got a ship that had the finest interior design, furnishings, and
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decoration money could buy, rather than sub-contracting with additional costs.
Additionally, Harland & Wolff usually carried out repairs and upgrades. This insured
minimal time in refit as the shipbuilder was already intimately familiar with the ship
they were modifying. In many instances, the same yard crew that built the vessal
carried out modifications. As White Star ships changed over time from the original
design specifications, Harland & Wolff could conduct maintenance more quickly. 171
This contrasted with the common practice of other shipping lines. Most others
used multiple builders for multiple ships, even of the same class. For example, Cunard’s
three-ship Abyssinia class of 1870 took shape with two different builders, resulting in
different fuel requirements, speeds, and one sister, Parthia, which was smaller than the
other two.172 White Star, on the other hand, benefited from one design team and one
yard, often using the same basic engine design. This standardized fuel requirements
and made support logistics less complicated. The only major drawback of White Star's
relationship with Harland & Wolff, however, lay in that ships could only be built one,
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or sometimes two, at a time. Thus, it took longer for White Star to bring their steamers
online.
Despite this issue, the White Star Line clearly towered over its rivals. White Star's
first steamer, Oceanic, had several features that set her apart from all other ships on the
Atlantic at that time. One observer exclaimed she looked “more like an imperial yacht
than a steamer.”173 Edward Harland, who personally designed most of the ship,
identified one key reason for Oceanic’s success: “Another feature of novelty in these
vessels,” he noted "consisted in placing the first-class accommodation amidships, with
the third-class aft and forward.” Prior to this change, all liners had placed their cabins in
or near the stern of the ship where vibration and smells from the engine room, as well
as the cork-screw motion of the ship in heavy seas, were most severe. The inclusion of
“These and other arrangements,” Harland recognized, "greatly promoted the comfort
and convenience of the cabin passengers, while those in the steerage found great
improvements in convenience, sanitation, and accommodation… In short, for the first
time perhaps, ocean voyaging, even in the North Atlantic, was made not only less
tedious and dreadful to all, but was even rendered enjoyable and even delightful to
many.”174
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At 420 feet long and 40 feet wide, Oceanic's more streamlined hull, one of the first
taking advantage of the new science of hydrodynamics, also allowed for higher speeds
and lower fuel consumption than its competitors.175 The hull had a length to width ratio
of 10:1 instead of the more traditional 8:1. 176 This meant Oceanic was ten times as long as
she was wide. The traditional ratio of 8:1 created a much bulkier hull. The slimmer hull
allowed the water to flow more swiftly with less resistance. Lower water resistance put
less pressure on the engines to gather and maintain speed and decreased fuel
requirements.
Together, these features—improved accommodations and faster speeds at less
cost—helped seal Oceanic’s success. Oceanic arrived at Liverpool on February 26, 1871
and opened to the press and public for inspection. Although nearly empty on her
maiden voyage, carrying only 64 passengers (out of a potential 166 1 st class and 1,000
steerage), accounts still described her as a success. In New York, she again opened to
the public and 50,000 curious people saw the first of the new breed. The competing
Cunard Line, though serving more passengers (300 passengers on R.M.S. Calabria,
which sailed in direct competition to Oceanic on her maiden voyage) and representing a
more established company, could no longer rely on simple speed and reliability to claim
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dominance.177 Nor could any other line continue to offer only the basic requirements of
speed, regularity, and safety. White Star's arrival on the Atlantic signaled a new kind of
ship, something of higher caliber that made the trans-Atlantic crossing more
comfortable and enjoyable as opposed to a necessary drudgery.
In quick succession, Oceanic's three sisters—Atlantic, Baltic, and Republic—
followed her onto the world stage, appearing in the later months of 1871. Together,
these four ships helped set the terms by which the contest for dominance on the
Atlantic were fought until the eve of World War I. White Star had thus introduced
greater comfort and a high level of passenger service to set itself apart from other, more
established lines. From here on, something had to stand out to attract passengers,
something more than just a basic mode of transportation.
At the same time as White Star and Harland & Wolff were making waves in the
Atlantic, investment and expansion opportunities for Ismay began opening up in the
Pacific. In 1874, ambitious railroad barons of the American West formed the Occidental
and Oriental Steam Ship Company (familiarly known as O&O) in a bid to control
shipping from Asia into U.S. Pacific ports and then into their own railroad networks in
the continental United States. From the date of its incorporation, O&O enjoyed a
relationship with White Star, chartering ships from White Star to sail on Pacific routes.

Duncan Haws, Merchant Fleets: White Star Line, (Hereford, England: Starling Press
Ltd., 1990), 30 - 31.
177

99

The ships that White Star provided for the San Francisco - Yokohama route included the
finest and most advanced on the Pacific. In addition to providing these ships, which
retained White Star names and livery, White Star employed the officers required to run
them, although the O&O furnished the crews. 178 O&O chartered White Star's Oceanic in
1876 with the Gaelic and Belgic to help fulfill mail contracts.179 The O&O experiment
expanded with ports of call including Kobe, Nagasaki, Shanghai and Honolulu. 180 White
Star-owned ships, designed and built by Harland & Wolff, served O&O successfully on
the Pacific, providing added experience for White Star's officers and Harland & Wolff's
engineers.
In 1880, White Star entered into an arrangement with Shaw, Savill and Albion
Line (SSA) on much the same terms as with O&O. White Star provided ships and entire
crews, this time on runs to New Zealand, while SSA managed schedules and local
logistics. Ships built for this trade included the Ionic, Doric, and the appropriately
named Zealandic, under a business relationship that lasted into the 1930s. 181
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These charters provided several advantages to White Star. First, they allowed
older Atlantic liners to find new and profitable lives on secondary trade routes. Without
these life-extending charters, older ships would have been sold off because of rapidly
changing technology. Often these ships sold at a loss while still relatively new. The
chartering company also gained a competitive advantage. The former Atlantic liners
retained the luxurious fittings usually reserved for the more prestigious North Atlantic
route. Other lines simply did not meet the same standards and could not garner as
much of the customer base. As a side benefit, White Star boasted a world-wide fleet,
with the publicity boost of having ships that sailed all over the world. Finally, the
charters provided an additional stable revenue stream that allowed White Star more
freedom for expenditures on its primary Atlantic trade routes. Thus, it could pay higher
stock dividends and set up a financial reserve. By the mid-1880s White Star and
Harland & Wolff enjoyed world-wide recognition and a stable financial base, despite
the often harsh trading conditions on the North Atlantic.
As White Star expanded, so did Harland & Wolff. With the certain income
stream provided by the profit agreement with Ismay's line, Harland & Wolff enjoyed
more freedom to expand their Belfast holdings. Harland & Wolff routinely bought
major new pieces of equipment such as lattice work cranes, expanded their yards for
building larger slips, and bought out smaller companies to increase their own abilities.
An example is the 1878 purchase of Alexander McLaine & Sons for £7,000 ($1,104,959 in
101

2018), which allowed Harland & Wolff to build their own engines instead of subcontracting.182 The 1880s brought a downturn in ship building due to the proliferation of
firms and the way failing shipping lines were leaving the market. The income from
White Star made the downturn less severe for Harland & Wolff, however, and assured
their survival while other shipyards closed. Additionally, the reputation they had built
with White Star's now world-famous ships helped bring in new contracts that less wellknown firms would not have been able to secure.
At an 1885 meeting of shareholders aboard the Adriatic, built in 1872, Edward
Harland remarked on how well White Star’s older ships competed with newer, larger
and faster ships, “with their splendid load of nothing in them and producing less than
that as a dividend to their shareholders.”183 Congratulating Ismay, Harland no doubt
took satisfaction in knowing his shipyards constructed the high-quality steamers on
which White Star built its reputation. Indeed, having revolutionized the Atlantic
passenger trade and expanded interests the world over, Thomas Ismay was content to
pursue a “rest-and-be-thankful policy” during most of the later 1880s. 184 At that same
shareholder's meeting, Ismay's business acumen also garnered Harland’s praise. T. H.
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Jackson, who chaired the meeting, pointed to Ismay's "cool judgment" of not being led
into costly new steamers, predicting that "when he (Ismay) thinks the time has come to
build larger and faster boats we, as shareholders, shall be in safe hands." 185 Jackson's
speech proved prophetic. By the 1880s newer vessels, especially from archrival Cunard,
finally attained the standards of comfort and luxury White Star had inaugurated. To
maintain the position as the leading trans-Atlantic firm, White Star needed newer ships
and increased financial means to build them.
At the same time, White Star had proven such a formidable competitor that John
Burns, first Baron Inverclyde and chairman of Cunard Line, entered into direct
communication with Thomas Ismay over matters of competition and how to divide the
limited trade on the Atlantic. In 1885, diminishing trade with the United States
prompted Inverclyde to talk face to face with Ismay about their line’s competition. 186
Not coincidentally, Griscom's Red Star Line enjoyed increasing success in this period.
While not directly mentioned, this no doubt partially prompted Inverclyde and Ismay's
dialog.
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From Ismay's point of view, the problem stemmed from Cunard's introduction of
extra ships on the New York trade. Ismay believed they should first make "the sailings
on Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday sailings from Liverpool as efficient as possible to
the Postal authorities, Passengers, and Shippers." To do this, Ismay stated he would
willingly work with Inverclyde on scheduling sailings. However, he added,"...your
steamers alone would accommodate twice the number of saloon passengers that are
likely to be crossing," making sailings from his and other companies "inadequate to
remunerate them for the extra steamers employed."187
Replying that he did "not share the views which you express,” Inverclyde
doubted Cunard’s ability to earn enough to pay for the extra sailings Ismay decried.
Arguing that he must use the ships he had to shorten the rotation between sailings and
best serve his stockholders, Inverclyde claimed that the decision came "purely from a
mechanical point of view," not one of direct competition. He went on to say, however,
that "As to the White Star Line building more powerful steamers, I have not a word to
say - simply because it does not concern me - nor would it weigh with me in the
conduct of affairs relating to the Cunard Company." 188 Yet clearly White Star did
concern Inverclyde, as evidenced by the very fact that he had initiated negotiations for
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decreasing competition of the Atlantic trade. His concern was hardly surprising. In a
few short years, Ismay's White Star had proven such a formidable competitor Ismay
said he could out-build his rival if terms for co-existence could not be found. Although
communications continued to be open between John Burns and Thomas Ismay, they
more and more took on a no-nonsense, business only tone. 189
As the 1880s gave way to the 1890s, increased international rivalry for imperial
colonies added another dimension to the Atlantic shipping scene. The 1885 war scare
over Russia’s seizure of Afghan territory near the Oxus River and the British
Admiralty’s consequent use of liners as auxiliaries presented Ismay with an idea. 190 In
the past, the Royal Navy, like others around the world, had used merchant ships as
auxiliaries to increase patrols of the sea lanes.191 This often led to disaster. Most of the
merchant ships were not built to withstand combat duties or even the sailing
requirements of a navy vessel. Ismay planned to build ships to admiralty specifications
under their supervision, in exchange for an annual subsidy. The ships would be built in
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such a way as to minimize the time needed to convert them into a new breed of ship
called the armed merchant cruiser. 192
Ismay had already found favor with the Admiralty by offering the entirety of
the White Star fleet to the government in case of war with Russia in 1885. In 1886, Ismay
entered into correspondence with Arthur Forwood, Parliamentary Secretary to the
Admiralty. In these letters, Ismay negotiated the terms under which his ships would be
available for government use and the terms under which "one or two vessels of high
speed" might be built specifically for use as armed merchant cruisers. For each ship
chartered, the parent company was to receive 15s per gross ton annually for five years.
The resulting Teutonic eventually weighted in at 9,984 tons. Her yearly subsidy totaled
£7,488 ($16,003,543 dollars in 2018. After two years of service to White Star, the ships
would be available for purchase by the Admiralty at cost. The contract covered other
provisions, such as how many members of the crew had to be Royal Navy Reserve and
how much the subsidy would increase if White Star lost the mail contract. Should White
Star be required to sell any ship to the Navy, they (White Star) were allowed to "remove
from the Ships or Ship, the plated ware, cutlery, crystal, earthenware, blankets,
counterpanes, and linens, which articles shall not be considered part of the equipment
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of the ship." Furthermore, preparation of the ship for naval service and restoration for
peacetime service would be paid for by the Admiralty. 193
Ismay's new idea gained quick acceptance and Edward Harland immediately
began drawing up acceptable plans for a pair of ships. 194 Teutonic and Majestic, launched
in 1889 and 1890, were the results. The ships were built for speed and quick conversion
to auxiliary cruisers, with hidden gun mounts and structural support built into the
design so as not to interfere with their primary role as passenger liners. The twins could
be armed with twelve Armstrong 26 pounders, with a range of 200 yards, and eight
machine guns.195 Proclaimed the best designed ship the Admiralty had yet seen,
Teutonic was finished in time for conversion to an armed merchant cruiser and
presented at the Spithead Naval Review of 1889. 196
White Star's Teutonic and Majestic also introduced several other major
innovations in the construction of the ocean liner. Naval vessels faced greater sailing
stresses than their commercial counterparts. They tended to sail at maximum speeds for
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longer periods of time and received less frequent stays in dry dock for maintenance and
repair. The new ships were built accordingly. And because they were expected to be
fast, Harland & Wolff designers installed the most powerful engines possible. This
allowed White Star to finance the costs of competing for the Blue Riband with
government subsidies instead of company profits. By doing so, they avoided some of
the costs other lines incurred in maintaining speed records.
At the 1889 naval review at Spithead, Britain in honor of Kaiser Wilhelm II of
Germany's state visit, Teutonic played guest to members of the British royal family. 197
Kaiser Wilhelm also paid the liner a visit, marveling, "We must have some of these,"
marking Germany's entry in the race for the greatest ocean liner. 198 The elegance of the
Teutonic and Majestic marked a new standard in luxury and comfort. White Star found
that their new twins attracted passengers because of comfort alone.
As had become typical, the White Star-Harland & Wolff cost-plus relationship
resulted in superior ships. Meanwhile, the British government's subsidy was based on
size, speed and usefulness of the liner to the admiralty. 199 Building the largest, fastest
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liner possible became particularly important to the interests of both White Star and
Harland & Wolff. Although the cost of building larger and faster ships increased
significantly for White Star, especially given the military standards now included,
larger ships also brought larger subsidies to the company. White Star, meanwhile, could
count on a new income stream that promoted the best upkeep possible. As a final
display of shrewd business sense, White Star could benefit from the publicity it received
from presenting itself as a patriotic company. Teutonic arrived at the naval review of
1889 fitted out as an armed merchant cruiser for that reason.200
However, White Star had its eye on more than just government service. White
Star also took advantage of increased import-export business by building liners
expressly for cargo and livestock service. During the 1890s, as it asserted dominance
over the British share of the Atlantic market, the company also expanded into the
development of cargo liners. Harland & Wolff provided such ships as the Nomadic and
Tauric of 1891 and Naronic of 1892. These ships were specially designed for the exclusive
transport of livestock, with minimal accommodation. They were designed principally
for ranchers to oversee their stock, not for general passengers. These were shortly
followed by the "Jubilee" class of 1899. These five ships took advantage of lessons
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learned on the Australian run and Shaw, Savill, and Albion charter routes. They carried
as many as 100,000 beef carcasses in refrigerated cargo holds.201 Here again, Harland &
Wolff provided White Star with the best possible ship with new technologies,
specifically in the refrigeration plants.
Queen Victoria's naval review at Spithead, near Hampshire, in June 1897
provided another chance at innovation for Harland & Wolff engineers. Even though the
assembled might of Her Majesty's navy and mercantile marine lined the harbor, the hit
of the show was the uninvited, privately-built and owned Turbinia. The first turbine
powered ship in the world, it raced through the lines of anchored ships at 32 knots.
Although Royal Navy launches attempted to catch the intruder, Turbinia effortlessly left
them wallowing in her wake.
Inventor Charles Parsons, observers later learned, had privately designed the
ship.202 His invention, the turbine, was able to use steam that usually got wasted
through exhaust. This made steam engines more efficient and powerful and lowered
the consumption of coal. This innovation in steam engines not only made the power
plants more efficient, but far more economical and allowed higher speeds than ever.
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Most ships of the era had one or two screws. Now, a third screw could be added using
the left-over steam in a low-pressure turbine. The development made for more fuel
efficient, faster ships that that cost the same, if not less, than earlier vessels.
Both merchants and naval leaders immediately looked into using turbines on
their ships. White Star built major ships to test the new style of engines. Magantic and
Laurentic of 1909, for example, were identical ships except for the difference in their
engines.203 One ship was powered with triple expansion engines and a turbine geared
to three screws, while the other ship had older style quadruple expansion engines
geared to two screws. Testing found that that the ship with turbines, Laurentic, was
faster and more economical than her twin sister. This despite the fact that Laurentic’s
hull was dirty and Megantic’s had been recently cleaned and painted, decreasing water
resistance.204 The information got tucked neatly away for the Olympic class, already in
the earliest design phases at Harland & Wolff.
In the meantime, White Star’s leaders decided to continue the advancement
of the Atlantic liner in the direction that had already brought them such accolades.
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Having found a partial recipe for success in the Teutonic and Majestic, the company
decided to go all in on the idea that comfortable crossings were the preferred mode for
the sea faring public with the Oceanic of 1899. When White Star ordered its next ship
from Harland & Wolff, it emphasized this new strategy, leaving speed laurels, extra
maintenance, and higher fuel costs to Cunard and other lines. 205
R.M.S. Oceanic, representative of this new focus on comfort and luxury,
gained note for several reasons. First was her size. At 705 feet long and 17,274 tons, she
earned the title "largest ship in the world."206 She was the first ship to exceed the length
of the Great Eastern built forty years before, yet was lighter in tonnage. Her interiors
were lavish in the extreme. The Ismays spent a great deal of time with consultants to
make sure the designs were perfect for the new company flagship. 207 Passenger
accommodation stood at 410 1st class, 200 2nd and 1,000 3rd. 208 While immigrant
passengers remained the dominant share of profit (311,715 people divided among the
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Atlantic lines in 1899), cargo also accounted for a significant share of the profits. 209 In
1899, the total value of American exports exceeded $1,478,050, 000 ($45,033,334,246 in
2018 dollars).210 Oceanic's expanded hold areas allowed increased cargo capabilities, not
to mention profit, for White Star. This potential for profit was not lost on the
management of the other lines trading on the Atlantic. Immigration to the United States
was generally a one-way trip, meaning ships usually sailed home with a nearly empty
3rd class. By including large and fully loaded cargo holds, shipping lines could
guarantee profit in both directions.
The Oceanic represented the pinnacle of White Star’s achievements but also
represented tragedy for the Ismays. Thomas Ismay died not long after Oceanic’s
completion. With his death the chairmanship of White Star passed into the hands of his
son, J. Bruce Ismay. The younger Ismay came to power just as Griscom’s and Morgan’s
associates began working on their International Mercantile Marine Project.
Interestingly, on May 7, 1901, Ismay replied to a letter from the second lord Inverclyde
addressing concerns about the growing threat of an American take over. “I cannot at
present see how our interests will be influenced by the amalgamation,” he wrote, “but
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feel sure The Americans have made Their mind to have a larger share of the Atlantic
trade.”211 Ismay could not have been more correct with his prediction. Within a year of
that letter, White Star became part of the amalgamation.
Conclusion
The late 19th century proved fertile, if challenging, territory for the rebirth of
the American merchant marine. Clement Griscom took steps to build on and expand
new business opportunities, aided by modern communications technology and changes
in business. Although these efforts faced challenges in the form of antiquated and over
protective registry laws, they nevertheless slowly changed in the face of economic
opportunity provided by new communications and travel technology that made
international conglomerate business possible, practical and potentially highly
profitable. Between the economic opportunities and the growing acceptance of Mahan's
naval theories Griscom's endeavor enjoyed a favorable atmosphere that did not exist
previously. The story of White Star’s founding and early growth, by contrast, provide
an interesting counter narrative of national policy in a country with a history far more
positively disposed to shipping. That these stories eventually converge helps illustrate
the changing nature of business at the time.
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To circumvent the obstacles in his path, Griscom used new developments in
technology to take advantage of more friendly business environments, most notably in
founding the Red Star Line in Belgium. By offering sailings supported by the
Pennsylvania Railroad and choosing a centralized location in Europe as a base, Griscom
offered shippers low rates and an excellent distribution point. These benefits were
particularly advantageous for J. P. Morgan's U. S. Steel. Morgan's involvement as an
early investor in Griscom's International Navigation Company allowed Morgan to see
the potential for a larger Atlantic monopoly. While this occurred, Alfred Mahan was
building an ideological base among politicians and the public that supported nautical
expansion and an expanded merchant marine. After languishing for some time, the
American merchant marine soon experienced a renaissance as a result of these collective
factors.
At the same time, across the Atlantic, the founding and growth of Thomas
Ismay's White Star Line demonstrated the potential of sympathetic interests acting in
concert, even in the face of a crowded business with long established rivals. Like
Morgan's integrated business interests, White Star and Harland & Wolff Shipbuilders
supported one another through their early struggles and built a foundation for future
expansion. When Ismay threatened John Burns with a shipbuilding race in 1885, Burns
knew his Cunard Line would lose. While Burns had to negotiate with shipbuilders for
new terms on each ship he built, Ismay could rely on the relationship with Harland &
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Wolff to build the best ships at the lowest prices. Additionally, Burns' ships, even when
they were the same class on paper, often differed wildly from one another in reality,
while White Star ships were more uniform designs, easing White Star's logistical needs.
The structure of the partnership between White Star and Harland & Wolff, with its
efficiency and foundational strength, no doubt enhanced the line’s standing as
Morgan's favorite Atlantic transport. When the time came to choose a flagship line,
what better line for Morgan to select? The next chapter will explore the implications of
this choice on both sides of the Atlantic and for the future of international shipping.
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Chapter 3

Olympic Dreams, Titanic Troubles and Gigantic Responses
The White Star Buyout, Cunard's Escape and the Olympic Class Liners

After stunning the shipping world with the purchase of Leyland Line, J. P.
Morgan and his International Mercantile Marine became the greatest threat that British
shipping had ever faced outside of war. The question looming in British shipping circles
centered on what Morgan’s next acquisition would be. 212 The answer did not take long
to discover.

Anonymous, "American Shipping Trust Rumors." Manchester Guardian, January 21,
1902. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/advancedsearch.html (accessed October 28,
2014). Anonymous, "The European V. American Merchant Navies," The Manchester
Guardian, April 30, 1902. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/advancedsearch.html
(accessed October 28, 2014
212

117

White Star Line, with its new, superlative steamers made an obvious target,
especially considering the recent death of its founder and the ascension to leadership of
next generation family members. While J. Bruce Ismay, son of the line's founder,
wanted to continue family stewardship for White Star, other, older members of
company leadership looked forward to retirement. 213 That William Pirrie, chairman of
Harland & Wolff, emerged as Morgan’s primary ally in negotiating with the Ismays no
doubt made them more willing to listen to Morgan’s buyout offers. When Morgan’s
negotiations with the Ismays reached a successful conclusion, the controversy of the
Leyland purchase looked like a festive occasion by comparison.
For Morgan’s monopoly to work effectively, however, he had to control all major
shipping firms on the North Atlantic that served American ports. To have this control,
Morgan concluded, he also needed to acquire the Cunard Line. Yet in contrast to his
successful acquisition of the White Star Line, Morgan’s pursuit of Cunard proved a far
more complicated affair. In large part, this was due to the intervention of the British
government through loans and subsidies that allowed Cunard to remain independent,
renew its fleet and construct two of the most successful liners ever built to that time.
The desire to compete with Cunard's new liners, in turn, prompted IMM’s leaders to
produce still bigger and more superlative ships under the auspices of White Star Line.
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Having worked so hard to build an international conglomerate, Morgan—and perhaps
equally, J. Bruce Ismay and Lord William Pirrie of Harland & Wolff—would not let
Cunard have the greatest liners in the world without a contest.
IMM’s position may have seemed secure in the early 1900s, but in little more
than a decade, all of this—the elusive pursuit of Cunard, the increased competition with
that firm, and the consequent shipbuilding program—would lead to IMM's ultimate
downfall. In the short term, White Star's new building program brought improved
financial stability, thanks to increased stock sales and public relations gains as the new
ships gained press coverage around the world. In the long term, however, the loss of
two out of three of the new ships would bring on public relations nightmares and
contribute to the loss of talent in leadership at the highest levels of IMM. Specifically,
the sinking of Titanic caused a significant loss of confidence among the public in
massive liners. The fact that J. Bruce Ismay survived the Titanic disaster, moreover,
made him undesirable as president of IMM from a public relations standpoint, even
though he had provided excellent leadership that stabilized IMM during his tenure. 214
Complicating matters further, J. P. Morgan's death in 1913, not only removed the
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driving force of IMM but further decreased public trust in its leadership as previously
unknown or secondary figures took over leadership positions. In the wake of these
ruptures, the third ship in the Olympic class, Gigantic (hastily renamed Britannic) never
even entered commercial service; instead, it served as a hospital ship in World War I,
until sunk by a mine near the Greek island of Kea in 1915. Together, these events
proved serious blows to what had become a shaky organization.
Although all of these factors contributed to IMM’s decline, one additional issue—
the escape of Cunard Line from IMM—arguably played an even greater part in the
company’s ultimate demise. Without Cunard, Morgan never held complete control of
all the major shipping entering or leaving New York. Although Morgan later made
arrangements that allowed IMM to at least co-exist with the shippers on the European
continent, such as the French Line, Hamburg-Amerika Line and the German
Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL), Cunard remained completely British. This was significant
from both symbolic and economic points of view. Symbolically, the oldest transAtlantic shipping firm, established in the 1830s, remained British. Economically,
Cunard gained the backing of the British Empire for its coming competition with IMM.
Despite the important role that each of the forgoing factors played in IMM’s
20th century decline, historians have largely failed to analyze their significance to the
IMM's story. As mentioned in the introduction, most historians have proven more
concerned with the Olympic class ships in their own right. Scholars tend to explain the
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creation of the Olympic class as a vanity project for J. Bruce Ismay in reply to Cunard's
Lusitania and Mauretania, if they connect them to previous events or successive superliners at all.215 They also fail to consider the leadership vacuum caused by the
devastating losses of Ismay and Morgan to the long-term health of IMM and the public
relations ramifications that resulted. All of these events played a role in the history of
IMM in particular and the North Atlantic in general. 216 Considering the historical
context, much of this is not surprising. The loss of Titanic occurred just two short years
before the outbreak of World War I. Britannic's sinking happened as part of the greater
horrors of the Gallipoli campaigns, with what could be considered trivial loss of life (34
total) compared to the context of the theater of war let alone the entire war. 217 At the
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same time, the difficulties IMM faced in the boardroom got eclipsed by a nation
alternately studiously avoiding and then preparing for war. With this international
maelstrom of cataclysmic events, it is hardly surprising that relatively mundane
business history has been largely ignored. This chapter will not only examine that
history, but also bring it into the context of the world events that surrounded them.
Writing on shipping during this period is dominated by the construction of
warships and the dreadnought arms race.218 This is understandable because of the
stunning proliferation of dreadnought battleships prior to World War I. For example,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, nicknamed the "ABC Countries" took part in the naval race
resulting in the near ruin of their economies. The climax came when Brazilian policy
makers attempted to build the largest, most power dreadnought in the western
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hemisphere. Named Rio de Janeiro, the warship measured 671 feet and carried seven
turrets mounting a total of fourteen 12 inch guns. By July 1912, the Brazilians realized
they could not afford the ship and began looking for buyers. The Ottoman Empire
purchased the ship while still being built, renaming her Sultan Osman I. The
intervention of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty prevented her delivery
and she ended up in the Royal Navy as Agincourt after the Ottoman's friendly relations
to Germany were revealed. The Ottoman's Reshadieh became the Royal Navy's Erin for
the same reason. Likewise, Chile's Almirante Latorre, and Almirante Cochrane became
Britain's Canada and Eagle because of Chilean financial problems. 219 The drama and
technological achievements that surrounded the dreadnought race make for fascinating
reading and certainly draw attention because of their direct relation to the causes of
WWI.
In an effort to fill this gap in the historiography, this chapter will examine events
between 1901 and 1912, including the buyout of White Star, the escape of Cunard, and
the idea, planning, construction and reception of the Olympic class. It will consider the
Olympic class in detail, with a focus not solely on ships, but instead on those ships as
symbols, analyzing what they meant at the time and what competing lines were
prompted to do in response. The ships enjoyed status as technological marvels. Each
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ship featured new innovations from swimming pools, electric lights and
communications devices, elevators and safety controls to what today seems like a basic
service such as individual restrooms and bathing facilities for cabins. All of these
enhancements blazed new trails in comfort during trans-ocean travel.
Additionally, the ability to build these ships reinforced an industrial elite
separating nations by capacity and levels of craftsmanship during an age of
international empire. A sign of Germany's emergence as a world power stemmed not
only from its industrial might, but its newfound ability to ship those goods on native
built ships that equaled or exceeded Britain's most advanced designs. Likewise, even
the names of these ships conjured images of national strength, industrial might, and
both current and long past imperial glory. Roman provinces such as Mauretania and
Lusitania, were represented by British ships that were olympic, titanic and even
gigantic in scale. The Germans honored emperors (Imperator) or the nation itself
(Vaterland). Looking at the ships and the business and politics that surrounded them
helps give insight into the popular psyche of the era.
This chapter brings all of the issues into conversation with the more dominant
events of the time period to establish a more complete picture of how commercialism
influenced the age of empire and general society on both sides of the Atlantic.
Historians who examine this period have documented the maritime naval race for
dreadnought supremacy during the era. They have also studied the technological race
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for advance land and air forces. However, the race for dominance in civilian maritime
circles and how it fed into this intense nationalist competition has largely been ignored.
The liners themselves encourage this perception. While viewing the grandeur of
Titanic's first class reception room or Mauretania's skylights, or the comfort of
Vaterland's lounge, it's hard to see these ships as statements of nationalist supremacy.
One is easily diverted to admiring the artisanship of stained glass windows, hand
carved woodwork, ornate paintings and comfortable looking club chairs that filled all
the great liners. Nonetheless, these ships served a role in claiming nationalistic
dominance just as much as they served as modes of travel, goods transportation, and
recreation. This struggle is illustrated particularly well by Morgan's attempt to gain
control of Cunard and the events the followed which led directly to the inception of the
Olympic class liners.
1902 and Full Speed Ahead
White Star's Cedric sailed on her maiden voyage in 1902. Her new design,
balancing cargo and passenger into a highly profitable combination on both legs of the
Atlantic route, may have helped set White Star above Cunard on Morgan’s list of future
acquisitions. The new ship had a cargo capacity of 17,000 tons and a service speed of 19
knots using 280 tons of coal per day. It also soon set the company record for carrying
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passengers at 2,957 during one trip in 1904. 220 In the minds of the White Star’s leaders,
Cedric had achieved the optimum cargo-passenger-fuel ratio. Its success prompted them
to build three sisters—Celtic, Baltic, and Adriatic—over the next four years. Each was
slightly longer and heavier than the one before it and each held the record of world's
largest liner.221
As compared to White Star's Britannic of 1874, Cedric represented the
tremendous changes in shipping technology that had occurred over the past quarter
century. Britannic and her identical sister, Germanic, debuted as Blue Riband racers, each
gaining the speed award. Both originally had auxiliary sails coupled with a single
screw. Cedric, like Britannic, had her passenger accommodations in the center of the
ship, with ends reserved for cargo. The newer ship, however, showed the increased hull
volume that allowed for significantly more cargo capacity. Additionally, by 1901,
multiple propellers joined the many designs allowing steamers to dispense with sail
altogether, another factor that allowed dramatic growth. No longer hindered by having
to remain small enough for the wind to propel it, ships could grow to enormous
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proportions. Cedric thus demonstrated the continuity and the changes in liner design
and technology that had occurred in the past 28 years.222
The four new ships, built between 1901 and 1907, allowed White Star to gain
more experience with cargo-passenger ships while building its reputation for
comfortable transportation. Harland & Wolff, meanwhile, honed designs that coupled
reliable engine plants, moderate speed and hull forms that emphasized comfort at sea
with increased internal volume. The process had been a long one. White Star and
Harland & Wolff's business partnership had been beneficial for both parties and
provided them with a great deal of practical experience in a short amount of time. By
establishing solid business foundations, the companies were in position for bigger
things.
The means to finance larger and larger ships, however, faced several hurdles. At
this point, the technical expertise already existed with Harland & Wolff to build the
Olympic class, but the financial means, not to mention the motivation, did not—at least
not yet. White Star could not count on the admiralty subsidy for armed merchant
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cruisers because they no longer built the fastest ships, though the mail subsidy
remained intact. The company was profitable, but that did not give them enough cash
on hand and the company never took loans for new construction. The company's
profitability, sales of stock, and revenue from government subsidies had always been
sufficient to cover business expenses and reasonable expansion. As ships got bigger,
those expenses multiplied. Longer, heavier ships required stronger engines which
needed greater amounts of fuel. Increased passenger space had to be furnished,
equipped to fill passenger's needs, victualed and maintained, which required increased
staff. This exponential increase in ships' size corresponded to an exponential increase in
business expenses. Potentially, these expenses could be more easily handled as part of
an international combine.
Morgan’s initial overtures for purchase of White Star occurred at this time with
the first newspaper rumors appearing in October 1901. Reports said that once Morgan's
current tour of the Pacific ended, he intended to go to Liverpool to complete
negotiations, which were to be started by his representative, Clinton Dawkins. Both J.
Bruce Ismay and John Lee, American-Canadian manager of White Star, denied the
report. According to stories in the Mail and Express, even Dawkins claimed ignorance
saying, "If there are any negotiations pending for the control of the White Star Line I do
not know of them. Mr. Ismay denied the reports when he was here. If there had been
any change I have not been informed of it. I do not think there is anything in these new
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statements." The paper also observed that White Star's capital stood at £750,000
($11,866,905 in 2018) in 750 shares of £1,000 each. Making purchase of a controlling
interest even more difficult was that most of it belonged to the Ismay family. 223 Rumors
continued in the press through October and into December, despite repeated denials by
Ismay.224 One paper even quoted Ismay as saying "Mr. Morgan hasn't money enough to
buy the White Star Line."225
On October 21, 1901, Lord Inverclyde's associate, David Jardine, received word
from Vernon Brown, a shipping agent in New York, that he had gotten a call from a Mr.
Scwabb of North German Lloyd (NDL). Schwabb had confided to him that not only
White Star, but also Cunard, had been bought by Morgan's syndicate. While Brown
thought the rumors were incorrect, he noted that Ismay had consistently denied being
in negotiations with Morgan. "Mr. Ismay could very likely truthfully say that he had
had no interview or negotiations whatever with Mr. Morgan, but I do not think he has
ever been asked to affirm or deny whether or not he has had any negotiations with
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other parties,” Brown explained. “I have good reason to believe that various interviews
were held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel between Mr. Ismay and Messers. Griscom and
Barker,” he continued, “both of which gentlemen were also at the Waldorf the evening
before Mr. Ismay sailed for home."226 It is worth noting that Ismay arrived in New York
in September 1901 aboard the new Celtic, accompanied by William Pirrie of Harland &
Wolff. While his arrival was mentioned in the press at the time, the recent assassination
of President McKinley overshadowed news of potential meetings between Ismay and
Morgan.227 One of Morgan’s allies in the negotiations to purchase White Star Line was
William Pirrie, first viscount Pirrie, chairman of Harland & Wolff, who counted Atlantic
Transport, an earlier Morgan purchase, as a client of his shipyard. Lord Pirrie became
Morgan's primary negotiator with White Star stockholders, no doubt giving Morgan's
overtures a friendlier face.228
By November, Jardine had a stream of intelligence coming in from Vernon
Brown regarding negotiations between Morgan, Ismay, and others. Brown seemed to
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have contacts close to the negotiations. On November 15 th, he reported that the
Hamburg-Amerika line had been approached and that Albert Ballin, chairman of the
line, visited London to flatly refuse the sale. Likewise NDL, the other leading German
line, refused to consider any offer. Brown believed this to be German national policy. "I
have reason to believe [Kaiser Wilhelm himself] has personally expressed his
displeasure of the scheme," he commented. 229 Brown also believed that negotiations
were ongoing with White Star, though he had very little solid information. In what
seemed a backhanded way, even to Cunard leadership, pressure decreased on Cunard.
"The fact that no overtures have been made to the Cunard Company so far as I know
would seem to indicate that they are no longer considered so important a factor in the
trade as formerly."230 Inverclyde seemed to feel that Cunard was so insignificant that it
was not worth Morgan's pursuit.
Inverclyde had plenty of reasons to make this assumption. From the point of
view of potential outside investors, such as Morgan, the entire Cunard fleet consisted of
obsolete and aging ships. To be competitive with Morgan's combine—or as Inverclyde
seemed to believe, to be considered worth adding to the combine—Cunard needed a
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major fleet renewal program. This was out of the question, however, for an independent
company with limited funds and a shaky future. Brown wrote about this topic a few
times noting that "we cannot afford to sit still and see our business drift away from us,
and yet the very discouraging outlook for shipping for the next year or two at any rate,
coupled with the uncertainty of the fate of the Ship Subsidy Bill cannot but cause
serious doubts and anxiety in the minds of yourself and associates as to the policy to be
pursued."231 Besides making Cunard unattractive for outside investment, the state of the
fleet appeared to make it a minimal threat in commercial competition.
Just a few days later, in November 1901, Brown had more news to share: a friend
of his, whom he did not name, but who was apparently was "close to Mr. Morgan and
other members of the Syndicate (and who I have suspicions may be a member himself)"
told Jardine that during Ismay and Pirrie's recent visit to New York, Ismay had named
terms for the buyout of White Star. Brown's associate, however, believed that the large
figures named by Ismay made a sale improbable "without modifications." At the same
time, Dominion Line, a shipping company primarily serving Canada, came to an
agreement with Morgan through Pirrie, whom the Dominion board of directors had
authorized to negotiate for them.232 The importance of the acquisition by Morgan of the
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Dominion Line lay in that the company served ports as far south as New Orleans and as
far north into Canada as Montreal, with direct service to Europe. Although Dominion
did offer some passenger service, the fleet’s more significant virtue was that it provided
substantial cargo transport capacity.233 This gave Morgan's export import shipping lines
a greater share of the market as well as serving a wider variety ports making the
combine's services more available to shippers.
Interestingly, this friend had asked Brown about possible Cunard negotiations,
which he avoided. Brown warned Jardine, however, that he might be approached by
syndicate representatives in the near future, even noting that some syndicate
representatives had recently departed for England on Cunard ships. He also cautioned
against "naming any price or even admit[ting] that a proposition might be
entertained."234 Brown gave sound advice. Naming a price tended to only encourage
Morgan; it suggested that a deal could be made and only details need be negotiated.
The newspapers seemed to bear out Brown's assessment. One report stated, "The
White Star people were informally asked to name a figure at which they would sell, but
that figure proved so far beyond the ideas of the proposed purchasers that the subject
was not pursued further.” The report continued that “the contention that of the White
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Star people that no negotiations whatever had been entered into is, therefore,
technically correct."235 A New York paper quoted Ismay as saying, "The White Star Line
is not for sale." Yet that interview happened in January 1902, when Ismay arrived in
New York with Lord Pirrie, Henry Wilding, and a pair of maritime lawyers. 236 Another
paper illustrated the lengths to which Morgan interests went to secure infrastructure to
support the shipping trust. Documenting a "land grab" to build a railroad to service the
waterfront, the paper explained, "English and American capitalists, worth hundreds of
millions of dollars, are backing this scheme." After noting that $60 million had already
been earmarked for the project, the paper hinted, "Others are ready to furnish all the
money necessary to push the project to completion." 237 Added together, all this pointed
to Morgan's willingness to spend whatever it took to accomplish his goals—including
getting Ismay and the White Star Line leadership to visit New York to at least hear
Morgan out.
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Relief from Brown's report, if any, proved short lived because on January 17,
1902, Brown wrote that "Messers. Ismay, Graves, Pirrie, Wilding and Dickenson" had
departed Liverpool on Celtic for New York. "This indeed looks like business and would
make it seem probable that some sort of an arrangement is likely to be reached." 238 A
few days later, Brown wrote again with detailed information, which later proved highly
accurate. Ismay and Pirrie, Brown believed, were authorized to negotiate on behalf of
White Star and Dominion Lines, respectively. Morgan, Brown thought, intended to take
all the shares he and his syndicate had acquired and place them in a parent company,
along the same lines of Morgan's Northern Securities. 239 Northern Securities held
control of the Burlington, Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, Northern Pacific, and Great
Northern railroads stock, effectively creating a massive land based transport monopoly
(although the justice department later sued and broke up the monopoly under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, this was not finalized until 1904). In 1902, Morgan's intentions
seemed clear.
Brown assumed that Morgan planned to build an Atlantic monopoly exactly like
Northern Securities. In doing so, Morgan would control land- and sea-based shipping
from the Pacific coast all the way to Europe. Brown still thought Ismay intended to
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name a value for White Star far beyond a reasonable exchange of stocks options in
Morgan's syndicate. However, he thought a cash price might be indicated to which
Morgan would agree. Concerning Morgan's resolve to see his project completed, Brown
wrote, "...I assume he has gone so far in this matter that he will strain a point to
accomplish his ends rather than abandon the project."240
Ominously, Brown noted that if White Star made a deal, Cunard would be the
only independent company on the Liverpool trade. Brown offered to act in negotiations,
but he thought that Morgan's friends might have something more subtle in mind.
Brown knew that some associated with the syndicate already held Cunard stock and
could discreetly get more, perhaps enough to gain control of the company without
having to go through a buyout. In fact, John H. McFadden, a Mr. Dempster, "and others
who are acting in harmony" supposedly owned one-third of Cunard stock, and Brown
believed they "had been in communication with some member of the Syndicate." 241
Although rumors remained inconclusive regarding Morgan’s intentions toward
Cunard, the German lines seemed to have come to an arrangement. While they avoided
being subsumed into the syndicate, they did reach an agreement with regards to rates
as long as they respected rates for British ports. However, Brown noted that Albert
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Ballin of Hamburg-Amerika and Director Wiegard of the board of NDL were expected
to arrive in New York shortly.242 Experience suggested that when a shipping line's
leadership traveled to New York, a buyout announcement soon followed. Concern
grew that the German lines may still be in play for acquisition. Coyness on the part of
White Star leadership only served to compound rumors.
Even at this late date, Ismay, Pirrie and others flatly denied impending buyouts.
The group that arrived in January 1902 included Ismay, Pirrie, and White Star board
member W. S. Graves; Henry Wilding, English agent of Griscom's International
Navigation and chairman of Leyland Line; and maritime lawyers Ralph Neville and
John Dickerson. All claimed ignorance. Ismay stated to reporters," I wish to say
positively that the White Star Line is not for sale. There is not money enough in the
possession of any American capitalist or combination of American capitalists to buy it."
When asked the significance of so many important men of the steamship business
arriving together, Ismay replied, “Our coming as members of one party is purely a
coincidence."243 This convenient story got further embellishment in other papers, with
ever more ridiculous claims.244 No doubt Inverclyde fumed while reading Vernon
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Brown's reports side by side with the newspaper accounts, including Brown's most
recent letter, which stated that the Ismay party had several meetings with Griscom and
his representatives, including a partner of Morgan's named Steele.245
Finally, on February 5, 1902, Lord Inverclyde received news from Brown in a
coded telegram: "Contradict Syndicate Acquired Cloakedly Clepsommia All Services
Clepsommia Party Acosmia Oceanic Bashful Cacophonie With Clickers Clewlines." 246
Inverclyde wrote back saying he translated the code to say, “Contradict syndicate
acquired Dominion White Star Line all services. White Star party sail from here Oceanic
referring to our letter of (blank) working agreement established between Hamburg
American Packet Co. and North German Lloyd." Evidently, the code proved opaque
even to Inverclyde, who wasn't certain what letters Brown referred to and lacked clarity
on what the coded message meant.247 Inverclyde replied, "Even with all your letters
before me, the whole thing remains somewhat of a mystery, because what did the
distinguished party connected with the White Star company go to New York for?" 248
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The word "contradict" confused him, even though it later turned out to be part of the
code.
In a follow up letter, also on February 5, Brown finally broke the news to
Inverclyde: White Star and Dominion Line had both been acquired and that shortly an
American parent company would indeed be formed along the lines of Northern
Securities. Although each line would continue to manage its own day-to-day
operations, Morgan and "his friends" now owned a controlling stock interest and the
parent company would have an American board of directors.249 As for the coded
telegram, Brown clarified that "our letter" referred to the letters of the February 5th and
7th and that the rumors they contained were correct.250 The confusing word "contradict"
had meant that the telegram was intended for Inverclyde only.
Brown's information proved mostly accurate, although it did not include some
side issues about which his associates could not have known. For instance, in February
1902, as an incentive to Lord Pirrie, Morgan offered an agreement to Harland & Wolff,
which stated that “all orders for new vessels and for heavy repairs, or alterations that
require to be done at a shipyard in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
including reboilering, re-engining [sic] and suchlike" would be given to Harland &
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Wolff.251 This move gave the firm not only the lucrative repair and maintenance work
for hundreds of ships, but also the majority of the new construction contracts. The
influx of business assured Harland & Wolff's financial status for as long as Morgan's
trust existed. It also further reinforced their ability to upgrade and expand the
shipyards as new technologies became available. As for the specifics of the deal with
White Star, Morgan offered the shareholders a payment of $32 million ($940,967,441 in
2018).252 Interestingly, Brown had guessed that this figure would be between $40 and
$45 million.253 Of that sum, 25% would be in cash and 75% in preferred stock of the
International Mercantile Marine, worth 37.5% of the total stock of the syndicate. 254
The negotiations for White Star demonstrate the length to Morgan would go for
his objective. To purchase what he envisioned as his flagship line, Morgan offered vast
sums of stock, cash, and other benefits for a highly profitable and widely respected
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Atlantic steamship firm. Cunard Line did not enjoy the stature of White Star during
this period, giving Inverclyde reason for concern. If Morgan should make offers to
Cunard Line stock holders, what reason would they have, aside from patriotism, to
keep Cunard British? They were men of business after all, and Morgan seemed to have
the money to make a Cunard buy out very good business.
At this point, the deal for White Star had just one more step: formal approval
from the Ismay family. At first, the Ismays resisted the offer. Margaret Ismay, the
widow of company founder Thomas Ismay, stood strongly against the buyout for
sentimental reasons. In the end, however, she accepted Morgan’s terms, though not
without some sadness. As she recorded in her diary in mid-May 1902, “The Annual
Meeting of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Company, and the last one I fear, as it has
passed into the hands of others. It is a great wrench being 'His' life’s work…” Earlier in
the month she expressed similar feelings, adding that she believed Bruce Ismay, the
company chairman and her son, had done the best he could in the negotiations. 255 With
the sale, White Star went from a family-owned business to just one part of a vast
international concern.
§§§
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J.P. Morgan’s 1902 purchase of White Star sent shockwaves through the British
shipping industry and the British government, causing even more consternation than
the earlier purchase of Leyland Line. White Star, along with Cunard, stood as the great
symbols of British international commerce. Not only had the largest British cargo
carriers fallen into American hands, but so had many passenger lines. This was
especially distressing in the case of White Star since its most recent ships combined
large cargo and passenger capabilities, making them perfect for use as military
transports. Without the cargo and troop capacity these ships represented, many Britons
recognized, Britain’s position in the event of war could become very precarious indeed.
In Parliament, the president of the Board of Trade, Gerald Balfour, and the
Secretary to the Admiralty, Hugh Arnold-Forster faced questions as concern now grew
for the future of Cunard.256 The topic became a recurring one in Parliament. On May 1,
Sir James Woodhouse made a lengthy floor speech asking questions about the syndicate
and what it meant to British shipping. He also expressed concern of another registry
bill being enacted by the American Congress, which would allow ships under Morgan's
control to gain American registry. Another member of Parliament, Gibson Bowles,
observed that 350 ships representing over 2,000,000 tons sailed under Morgan's control.
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Although Balfour and other government leaders tried to calm the members of
Commons, questions became heated before ending for the day. 257 On May 12,
recriminations resumed as three members of Commons took Balfour to task, grilling
him on whether the Syndicate could take over Cunard as well. 258 Concern for Cunard
continued as Lord Charles Bearesford asked pointedly if any contract or agreement
existed allowing the syndicate to buy out Cunard. Again, Balfour answered no. 259
Cunard’s continued independence would, in time, come back to haunt the
International Mercantile Marine.260 In the first years of the 20th century, however, British
fears were definitely stoked as Morgan's syndicate, having just purchased White Star,
turned its attention to actively and rather openly pursuing Cunard.
Cunard’s Evasive Action
As Morgan turned his attention to Cunard, many Britons began to fret. If Cunard
were bought out, they recognized, Britain, the "ruler of the waves," would lose all of its
most prestigious merchant ships and many navy auxiliary vessels. Concern now grew,
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among British politicians and citizenry, for the future of the line. The results of the
sideshow playing out with Cunard provided the prompting to build the Olympic class.
Between 1901 and 1902 Morgan made repeated buyout offers to Cunard Line,
each of which its chairman, Inverclyde, rebuffed. Inverclyde hoped that as concern
grew in Parliament that the Empire was losing its merchant fleet, government officials’
understanding of the importance of Cunard would grow, allowing him to use it as
leverage to encourage government intervention.
Hindering Lord Inverclyde’s efforts, however, was the fact that Cunard
possessed an aging, deteriorating fleet. In 1902, the company's newest vessels were
Campania and Lucania, both built in 1893. The rival White Star fleet, by contrast,
included Oceanic (1899) and Celtic (1901), and planned to add more within the next
couple years. Each of the White Star ships had taken the title of largest ship in the
world, gaining headlines for White Star and IMM. Cunard’s most recent run at the
headlines, conversely, proved far less positive. During a recent voyage, the Etruia, of
1884 vintage, broke her sole propeller shaft. She lay dead in the water until a cargo
steamer came along and towed her to the Azores. Even more humiliating, Etruia once
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held the Blue Riband and the freighter that towed her to safety belonged to Morgan's
syndicate.261 Even the German lines outshined Cunard's best.
As Cunard's ships slipped into obsolescence, the German NDL and HamburgAmerika lines built new liners designed for speed. From 1897 until 1907, when
Cunard's new Lusitania brought the Atlantic Blue Riband home, the prestigious award
for speed belonged to the Germans. One ship after another—beginning with Kaiser
Wilhelm der Grosse, and followed by Deutschland, Kronprinz Wilhelm and finally Kaiser
Wilhelm II—held the Riband with increasing records.262 The ships themselves also
created a fashion trend that dominated the Atlantic for decades: they inaugurated the
four-funneled liner. The German ships featured superior speed and aesthetic aspects
that drained business not already absorbed by the Morgan syndicate. The names of each
ship, painted on the hulls of such massive industrial marvels, proclaimed imperial
German triumph and tarnished British shipping all the more by comparison. With the
American Morgan buying up British shipping on one side of the Atlantic and the
Germans’ rapidly growing continental dominance on the other, Cunard stood alone as
the last major standard-bearer of British maritime commerce.
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While this situation was in many ways an embarrassment, it also created an
opportunity for Inverclyde. His strategy of remaining independent relied on playing the
British government against the Morgan Syndicate. Writing to friends, he encouraged
questions about the deal between White Star and the Morgan syndicate to be asked in
Parliament.263 In at least one case, this plan backfired. Lord Selborne of the House of
Lords questioned the actions of the Cunard board of directors, asking if they had taken
steps to prevent sell out by stock holders and if not, why not. Inverclyde wrote Selborne
personally to explain there was nothing he could do in that regard. "I cannot prevent
Trustees or ordinary shareholders from selling,” he noted, “& if such an offer as I
indicated is made I am bound to bring it before them and I think a large number would
accept it."264 Despite this early critique, however, Inverclyde's machinations soon
seemed to have a more positive effect. Lord Selborne happened to be First Lord of the
Admiralty, a position he held through 1905. On March 13, 1902, he invited Inverclyde to
meet with him at the Admiralty in person, to discuss the future of the Cunard fleet. 265
Shrewdly, Inverclyde used this meeting to press his advantage. Writing to
Selborne a few days later, he explained he saw no choice but to sell the fleet, noting that
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"The Company have been approached by outsiders with proposals.” If followed up, he
noted, these proposals “would lead to the transfer of control of the Company's property
on very profitable terms, and in giving up the right to entertain offers for the sale of the
ships, the Directors would be relinquishing the possibility of making a very
advantageous arrangement." Inverclyde added that he could not see renting out the
fleet because it would "destroy entirely the company's regular business." Concluding
his letter, Inverclyde explained that conditions on the Atlantic had changed to such an
extent that free and open business competition would soon end, meaning that "trade
will be regulated to a great extent by influences which are not British and which may be
used to deter this Company."266 If Selborne wanted Cunard to stay British, in other
words, he would have to find a way to help Cunard stay competitive and profitable on
the Atlantic trade despite its competition with a massive monopoly.
Fortunately, Inverclyde had a suggestion for Selborne: help Cunard build new
ships. As Invercylde well appreciated, the Admiralty’s greatest concern was becoming
involved in a war only to find that Morgan's syndicate denied the use of formerly
British-owned ships to Britain. Worse yet, what would happen should those ships be
employed as a bunch of "Alabamas?" asked a newspaper article, referring to the
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Confederate cruiser that destroyed so much of the Union merchant fleet in the 1860s. 267
The clear solution, according to Inverclyde, would be an arrangement in which Cunard
built new ships to the Admiralty’s specifications, a win-win situation for both parties.
As Inverclyde contended, "The Cunard Company do not, any more than the Admiralty,
like to see their ships surpassed in power and speed, and would be glad to endeavor to
alter this if they were assured of adequate support."268
Selborne offered a lukewarm response, suggesting that new ship construction
created a separate issue, one he did not care to mix with agreements covering the Royal
Navy's use of Cunard's existing ships in war time. 269 However, Inverclyde insisted that
the issues did connect. The entire future of the company, he stressed, rested upon
building ships with an obligation to the Admiralty. If the company were free from any
Admiralty obligations, it would not only change the direction of construction but future
ownership of the fleet. 270 In a follow-up letter to Selborne, Inverclyde issued an even
more direct and dire warning. "If they [the purchasers of the fleet] had the controlling
power,” he cautioned, “it would be very difficult to prevent their using it to the
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prejudice of this country if it were to their interest to do so."271 By April 3, Inverclyde
began the hard sell by sending Selborne a letter with estimates on the construction of
two types of ships: a 700-foot long model, capable of traveling between 21 and 25 knots,
and a 625-foot variation, capable of 18 knots speed.272 Although the design studies were
by no means final, the 700 foot long 25 knot variant formed the basis for what
eventually became the Mauretania and Lusitania.
Albert Ballin and Germany
Probably the most important man in German shipping circles, aside from Kaiser
Wilhelm II himself, was Albert Ballin, the managing director of Hamburg-Amerika
Line. Ballin first took notice of Morgan's actions in May 1901, during a stay in the
United States, although it is possible he may have known something earlier due to his
friendship with Lord Pirrie of Harland & Wolff. 273 Ballin's chief concern was Morgan's
attempt to buy up a controlling interest in HAPAG stock and bring the German line
into the syndicate. He decided that it would be in the best interest of HAPAG to come
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to an arrangement with Morgan, but he faced complications that British companies did
not.274
First and foremost was Ballin's friendship with, and status as advisor to, Kaiser
Wilhelm. The Kaiser, who fancied himself a nautical man, had an almost paternal
interest in the business of Germany's largest shipping lines, HAPAG and its rival North
German Lloyd (which played the roles of the German White Star and Cunard Lines
respectively). Wilhelm and Ballin met during the launch of Hamburg-Amerika's
Augusta Viktoria, named for the Kaiser's wife, in 1891.275 Wilhelm took direct interest in
the privately-owned lines on the basis of national interest. Wilhelm suggest to Ballin, for
instance, that it would benefit Germany, and please him personally, if more German
liners were built at yards in Stettin and Wilhelmshaven rather than Harland & Wolff. 276
The dread Ballin had for the Kaiser's reaction to the news of Morgan's combine must
have been palpable.
Ballin proposed to Morgan, through Lord Pirrie, that rather than becoming
subsumed into the syndicate, Morgan and a couple of his partners should secretly buy a
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minority stake in HAPAG with shares on the open market, thereby gaining some say in
running the company without destroying its identity as a German firm. This plan,
however, quickly leaked to the German press, prompting the Kaiser's displeasure.
Ballin eventually maintained independent identities for both Hamburg-Amerika and
North German Lloyd by agreeing to a long list of terms. First, the German firms agreed
to join in a profit sharing agreement with the Morgan syndicate. Second, the Germans
would cooperate on setting rates and selecting routes in exchange for the combine
paying out one fifth of the total needed to bring up the German lines' common stock
dividends should they fall below 6%. In exchange, the syndicate would receive one
fifth of all dividends over 6% of the German common stock. Additionally, the syndicate
promised to take control of Germany’s main continental competitor, the Holland
America Line, through purchase of stock.277 Morgan got 51% of Holland America and
then promptly sold a quarter of the total to Hamburg-Amerika and North German
Lloyd.278
At every step of the negotiation, Ballin kept Kaiser Wilhelm well informed.
Losing Germany's greatest steamer lines to Morgan would have been unacceptable to
the monarch. Throughout negotiations, Wilhelm pressured Ballin to make sure the
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independence of the lines was maintained no matter what other accommodations he
had to make. Ballin presented the text of the deal to Wilhelm, who made some
adjustments and approved it based on the continued independence of the German
lines.279
Increasing Pressure in Britain
For Cunard, Morgan’s successful negotiations with the continental lines
represented a very dangerous development. Between the understandings reached with
the German lines and pending ownership of other European lines, Cunard's position as
an independent company could easily become untenable. It might even face the stark
choice of joining the syndicate or going out of business. Making matters worse for
Cunard, the British government began to actively engage Morgan in negotiations to
secure the use of the fleet in case of war. Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain met
personally with Morgan to discuss the shipping syndicate. Chamberlain, angry because
of the endangerment of British national interests, suggested that the government might
purchase White Star’s best ships to secure them for British use. Morgan tentatively
agreed to this proposal, but insisted that the British government pay 40% more than the
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value of the ships.280 Stalemate ensued until the fall of 1902, when a new prime minister,
Arthur Balfour, decided to restart talks.
In the ensuing negotiations, Balfour convinced Morgan to promise to protect
British interests for the next fifty years by maintaining British registry for any Britishbuilt ships and by honoring prior commitments to the Admiralty. Making this pledge
would put IMM in compliance with the Companies Act of 1901, a statute that codified
long-standing practice. Specifically, the law stated that “no corporation shall be
registered as owners of British ships, unless 'established under and subject to the laws
of some parts of His Majesty’s dominions, and having their principle place of business
in those dominions.'”281 In other words, J. P. Morgan could own shares of a British
company, but not the firm itself, while company management had to remain in Britain.
This served British national interests in terms of defense while also fulfilling Morgan’s
goals by giving him domination of the market. Although Morgan controlled rates and
consolidated routes, the British government maintained its access to the massive troop
and cargo capacity that the newly American owned fleet provided. The agreement also
adhered to Mahan's theories, in that profits from this merchant marine now flowed into
American coffers, thus expanding the US economy.
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While these negotiations were taking place, Selborne and Inverclyde continued
their correspondence. The Cunard chairman repeatedly reminded the First Lord of his
responsibility to his shareholders, noting that their interests were paramount. If Great
Britain wanted to retain control of Cunard's fleet, Inverclyde argued, they simply had to
offer something and not just expect Cunard to sign a deal which gave the government
the right to call up the fleet for government service at any time. 282 Selborne, on the other
hand, maintained that he had no say and could not negotiate subsidies, claiming that he
continued to see this as a separate issue. 283
As their communications continued, Inverclyde added Joseph Chamberlain,
Colonial Secretary, to his negotiations with the Admiralty. In a suggested agreement
with the Admiralty, Inverclyde proposed two large steamers, not less than 700 feet long
and able to produce speeds of between 24 and 25 knots for the New York mail service.
Additionally, he wanted four "large steamers" capable of 18 knots, also for New York,
and three steamers for the Boston service capable of 16 knots. This refined the April 3
proposal that included design studies. If the government agreed to subsidize the
building and maintenance of those steamers, a special meeting of the shareholders
would be called to amend the company articles so that no stocks could be transferred to
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foreign holders.284 Once again Lord Selbourne responded in a lukewarm fashion. 285
Inverclyde wrote back expressing frustration, especially considering that a recent
interview at the Colonial Secretary's office led him to believe negotiations had begun. 286
Inverclyde also sent copies of the proposal to Gerald Balfour, president of the Board of
Trade and brother of Prime Minister Arthur Balfour. 287
This back-and-forth interaction proceeded as Inverclyde continued to stress the
danger of a sell-out. Finally, in October 1902, the government proposed the deal for
which Inverclyde had hoped, although negotiations over details lasted into 1903. In
exchange for “staying British," Cunard gained a new yearly subsidy of £150,000
($27,498,586 in 2018) not connected to the mail contract. In addition, the government
offered a loan of no more than £2.6 million ($480,675,292 in 2018) at two and threefourths per cent interest. The loan funded a new pair of major trans-Atlantic liners, built
to admiralty specifications. The ships had to maintain speeds of 24 to 25 knots and be
built as auxiliary cruisers. The government also retained the right to call up the ships in
the event of war. The agreement further stipulated that any future proposed ship with a
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speed of 17 knots or more would have plans submitted for Admiralty approval before
construction.288 This move guaranteed preservation of Cunard's fleet for both national
and business prestige and policy related reasons.
The deal received mixed reaction on both sides of the Atlantic. The North
American Review, however, referred to the deal with Cunard, as well as the deal with
Morgan and IMM to maintain British ownership of vessels despite American control of
companies, as "masterpieces of British business-statesmanship." 289 In Britain,
announcement of the proposed agreement to Cunard shareholders "was most favorably
discussed in the clubs and elsewhere, and it was generally accepted that the
Government and the Cunard Company together had accomplished an effective strategic
move against the American combine."290 As late as 1904, however, the member of
Parliament from Lanarkshire, James Caldwell, posed a series of critical questions before
the House of Commons: Why only two ships? Why only Cunard? Why not twenty
ships and what of the German merchant companies? They had not received subsidies to
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"stay German," he complained. 291 Likewise, Winston Churchill, then a member of
Parliament before assuming executive office, questioned the wisdom of the plan and
asked why warships could not be built that would be equal to the proposed Cunard
liners.292 This long term "buyer's remorse" was significant because it compared the
response of Great Britain to that of Germany, and the resilience of the British merchant
marine. To some, the American takeover and the poor condition of Cunard suggested
the British merchant marine did not have the strength people imagined it did. Perhaps,
these individuals may have concluded, the British merchant marine had reached its
natural end.
Ultimately, however, these criticisms failed to prevent the deal from going
through. Made official on July 30, 1903, the deal with Cunard represented a significant
change in British government policy. Previously, subsidies or contracts might be
offered, but such massive loans changed the business relationship to something more
akin to a partnership. Unlike the deal that subsidized White Star's earlier Teutonic and
Majestic only, this new arrangement created two ships and extended to most of the
current and future Cunard fleet. Additionally, the new annual subsidy fortified Cunard
against competition from IMM, helping to assure its continued existence. The British
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government had taken a direct interest in the future of a shipping company specifically
to safeguard sea-lane lifelines. Britain relied on its imports and exports for its economic
survival. In losing the fleets, the nation faced financial decline in peace and starvation in
case of war. The resulting additions to Cunard, however, placed it on more equal
footing with the newest White Star liners.
Lusitania, Mauretania and Empire
Cunard's two new giants represented a resounding reestablishment of British
maritime superiority. At their premier in 1907, the twin flyers were immediately
recognized as the largest and fastest in the world. Famous long before her demise by
German torpedoes on May 5, 1915, Lusitania measured in at 790 feet overall and 87.8
feet wide and weighed in at 31,550 tons with a designed speed of 25 knots. On her
second voyage, Lusitania took the Blue Riband from Kaiser Wilhelm II with an average
speed of 23.99 knots. Great Britain, and more specifically Cunard, went on to hold the
award for the next twenty-two years, until NDL's Bremen finally won it from Mauretania
in 1929.293 Adding another feather to Cunard’s cap, Lusitania edged out White Star's new
Adriatic—launched just one day after Lusitania—for the title of the largest ship in the
world by 7,099 tons and 61 feet. Such impressive statistics threatened the prestige not
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only of White Star, but by extension the International Mercantile Marine. 294

Figure 1 RMS Mauretania 1907, Credit: Public Domain.

As part of the Admiralty contract, both Lusitania and Mauretania included a
number of structural features designed to increase resilience during wartime service.
The pair had 175 watertight compartments that could be closed simultaneously and
placement for eight 6-inch guns on the shelter deck, four on each side, should the twins
be called up for service as cruisers.295 While not overly impressive as a fleet unit, the
guns and speed made the ships potentially valuable as commerce raiders. Although
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experience in World War I would later demonstrate that Mauretania's value lay in
service as a troop carrier or hospital ship and not as an armed merchant cruiser (AMC),
to observers in the early 1900s she seemed a fairly formidable vessel. 296
The statistics of the new liners remain impressive even today. Lusitania and
Mauretania's passenger capacity each totaled 2,213.297 They featured a cargo capacity of
20,000 cubic feet making them highly profitable cargo carriers. For passengers, novelties
included a complete shipboard telephone system which allowed internal
communications at any time and could be linked into the land-based telephone system
when in New York or Southampton. Children enjoyed their own play areas with childsized furniture and dining accommodations, as well as professionally painted panels
depicting nursery rhymes. For the especially wealthy passengers, two "Regal Suites"
provided private dining, with a small kitchen, bathroom, parlor and two bedrooms.298

As observers would learn in the 1910s, ships of the Mauretania’s size simply proved
too unwieldy as AMCs which needed to be quick to maneuver. Additionally, other
large ships, such as White Star's Oceanic and Cunard's 1914 vintage Aquitania proved
accident-prone as AMCs. Aquitania collided with an escort while still in harbor and
Oceanic ran aground due to bad navigation by a Royal Navy captain inexperienced in
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For the first time, a Cunard liner approached the White Star’s standards of comfort and
luxury.

Lusitania and Mauretania represented a major step in reestablishing the
international prestige and the perception of British dominance in the world market.
Even after years of engineering advancements and a growing share of the market,
Germany's finest ships looked mundane and old-fashioned compared to their new
British counterparts. Germany’s hard-won record for speed had been blown away after
just two voyages of Lusitania. In addition, that Britain could, seemingly at a whim,
revolutionize nautical design and regain national prestige lost to Morgan's combine.
Despite being the darlings of the transatlantic press just weeks before, White Star's "Big
Four”—the Celtic, Cedric, Baltic and Adriatic—suddenly went from being known as the
largest and most luxurious ships in the world to being second-best to Cunard.
Britain's dominance in ship design and construction allowed them to build
steamers that outstripped rivals in terms of technology and size. Mauretania and
Lusitania served as more than just symbols, however. The abundance of shipbuilders in
Britain allowed Cunard to construct in two yards simultaneously, thus placing them in
service (and demonstrating Britain's industrial might) as quickly as possible. This
situation was in stark contrast with Clement Griscom's earlier problems in forming his
steamer lines. The lack of experience in modern shipbuilding in the United States drove
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costs up to build steamers, in those few places where the facilities existed at all. 299
Indeed, prior to this time, the British built the majority of the German merchant navy to
the great consternation of the Kaiser. The largest ship in the German merchant marine,
Amerika, came from Harland & Wolff.300 This dominance extended into naval
construction as well. The Japanese, as well as nations in South America and the
Ottoman Empire, all looked to Great Britain's shipyards for their maritime construction
needs.301 While American finance began to dominate international economics, British
technology and industry continued to dominate shipping design and construction.
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The Birth of the IMM
Cunard's deal with the British government had occurred in October 1902, the same
month that Morgan formally organized his International Mercantile Marine. Morgan,
however, did not sit idly by after this deal had been struck. To the contrary, he
continued to move forward with his own plans despite failing to obtain Cunard. In the
ensuing months, as Cunard advanced the planning and construction of the Lusitania
and Mauretania, the organization of IMM was simultaneously beginning to formalize, as
Morgan set out to remake North Atlantic shipping according to his will.
In the fall of 1902, Morgan officially formed the International Mercantile Marine,
while complying with the previous agreements made in his negotiations with Prime
Minister Balfour. Directors of IMM included William Pirrie, J. Bruce Ismay, three other
British citizens (to represent British Imperial interests), and eight additional
Americans.302 While this board oversaw IMM, each company within the combine
maintained its own board of directors in compliance with the British Companies Act.
However, these boards of directors served largely as rubber stamps, with ships used
interchangeably between routes and even between one company and another by
direction of IMM leadership in New York. For instance, in 1903, five ships changed
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from the Dominion Line and Atlantic Transport Line to White Star for the purposes of
route consolidation.303 This demonstrated the dominance of American leadership in
determining the daily operations of IMM's constituent companies. Although Morgan
abided by his word that the ships themselves would remain British with British
ownership, registry and crews, Americans, led by Morgan, ultimately controlled the
lines. The complexity of running such a vast operation contributed to American
dominance in logistical and managerial affairs, especially with so many ships visiting
the port of New York.
In February 1904, just a little over a year after IMM formed, Griscom outlined the
operations of IMM and the immensity of its scope in System Magazine. By that time,
IMM operated 140 steamships sailing all around the world. As Griscom explained, "It
has dealings with half a dozen different governments and with dozens of cities, each
with individual regulations and port requirements to which it must conform." White
Star ships called at New York, Liverpool, Boston, the Mediterranean, South Africa,
Australia and other points in the Pacific. These legal and logistical complications
multiplied because of the six companies controlled by IMM, each of which served many
international ports.304
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Management of a shipping line encompassed a number of different
administrative areas, divided into three major departments:
maintenance/administration, freight, and passenger. Falling under the control of a
manager, several steamships sailed between certain ports on fixed routes. The manager
insured that the ships stayed in good repair and that the holds and passenger
accommodation had as large a booking as possible. Griscom pointed out that ships only
spent half their time at sea. "During the other half they are in port on one or the other
side of the ocean, undergoing overhauling, cleaning, provisioning, unloading and
loading that are necessary between voyages."305
All of this incurred great expense. Griscom estimated that unloading and
loading, painting, cleaning and making any needed repairs cost between $10,000 to
$15,000 per ship for each one-way trip. ($272,836 to $409,254 in 2018). "This is aside from
the cost of coal,” he continued, “which varies greatly not only with the speed of the
ship, but between vessels of practically the same size and speed." That cost fell at
somewhere between $15,000 to $25,000 ($682,091 in 2018). Contributing further to
expenses were wages for three to four hundred crew, insurance, port charges—all
multiplied by the number of ships within the fleet—plus the maintaining of port
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terminals, offices, and agencies. The need to control these costs, Griscom emphasized,
made careful organization at all levels critically important. 306
Herein lay one of the IMM's earliest and greatest problems. Henry Wilding, who
controlled Leyland, insisted on running the line as though it were an independent
concern, paying little attention to IMM directives.307 In effect, this caused Leyland to be
in competition with its parent company. These failures to coordinate gave IMM a rocky
start.308 Another problem lay in Griscom's management of IMM. Although he had
proved effective in his leadership of his own lines, the massive conglomerate needed a
much stronger hand. Many simply found Griscom's leadership in the massive combine
wanting. In a private 1903 letter to J. Bruce Ismay, Albert Ballin confided that while he
still believed in the International Mercantile Marine, he felt the wrong men had been
involved in its early management. Condemning the work of the first chairman of IMM,
he called Griscom "reckless" and criticized him for his "guile." Ballin hoped that Ismay
might be a better leader if he took over the chairmanship in the next year. 309 Meeting

306

Ibid.

Robin Gardner, The History of the White Star Line, (Surry, Great Britain, Ian Allen
Publishing, 2001), 127.
307

308

Ibid., 128.

309

Albert Ballin to J. Bruce Ismay, 24 December, 1903, Cheape-Ismay Family Archives.
166

with Lord Pirrie in London before sending the December letter to Ismay, Ballin
suggested that Ismay replace Griscom as the best candidate for the job. 310
Ballin was not the only one who felt that IMM needed a change in management.
In late December 1903, C. E. Dawkins and Lord Pirrie wrote Charles Steele to explain
that they and others had come to the conclusion that Clement Griscom should resign.
“The successful working out of the I.M.M. Co.,” they claimed, “is to be found in what is
popularly termed ‘one man of power,’ a power, however, to be wielded by someone
whose whole life has been in the shipping business and whose whole time and thought
would be devoted to the great shipping interests comprised by the I.M.M. Co." 311 That
person—that “one man of power,”—in their minds, was J. Bruce Ismay.
Ultimately, such appeals worked, and Ismay replaced Griscom as president of
IMM. Negotiations for Ismay’s takeover took some time, however. Morgan initially
offered Ismay the position on February 10, 1904 at a meeting at Morgan's home. Ismay
then took some time to consider it. Ismay confided, "There is no doubt that I.M.M. Co. is
at present in an extremely unsatisfactory condition both in regard to finance and
organization, and you will appreciate it will require a great deal of hard and anxious
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work to put it on a proper working basis." He eventually agreed to take the position,
but only if several requests were agreed to.312
Ismay’s list ranged from the sweeping to the mundane. First, he specified his title
should be president and managing director. As such, "his management of the business
of the I.M.M. Co. shall be unlimited and uncontrolled, and his decisions on all points
other than financial matters must be final." Second, he demanded that "the entire
control of all subsidiary Companies of the I.M.M. Co. shall be vested in him, and that
his decisions on all matters of policy and management of these companies shall be final
so far as the I.M.M. Co. can control the same." Third, he required absolute authority to
hire and fire anyone employed by IMM. Fourth, he insisted that J.P. Morgan himself
must be ready to make good on any financial "deficiency" of IMM for three years after
January 1, 1904. Ismay made nearly a dozen other, more minor demands as well, mostly
with regards to his own managerial authority. 313 With these requests, he hoped to gain
clarity in future dealings with issues such as the earlier Leyland Line situation. 314

312

J. Bruce Ismay to Charles Steele, 21 February, 1903, Ibid.

"Memorandum of the understanding. under which J. Bruce Ismay is willing to
consider undertaking the duties of President and Managing Director of the
international Mercantile Marine Company" 20 February, 1904, Ibid.
313

314

C. E. Dawkins to Charles Steele, February 18, 1904, Ibid.
168

Although Ismay agreed to accept the IMM presidency primarily because Morgan
agreed to his long list of demands, encouragement from his mother, Margaret, also
helped convince him to take the post. "I must put my personal feelings on one side, for I
know it is a proud and important position you are offered," she wrote. Margaret Ismay
believed her son was the best man for the job and fully supported his promotion, even
though it meant him living half the year in America and half in England. 315 The
presidency of IMM dictated close work with the other members of IMM's top
leadership. For Griscom, this had been easy residing in Pennsylvania, near the seat of
Morgan's power. Ismay did not have that luxury. Inter-office intrigue and rivalry
inherent in such business, as well as being the only Briton at the highest level of
leadership, made Ismay's presence in New York all the more vital. These factors
demonstrated that while on paper the lines and European leadership committee of IMM
held considerable power, the authority to make the most important decisions
nevertheless remained in New York.
In accepting the promotion, Ismay made his intention to set things right with
IMM his primary concern. Though he continued to hold the positions of chairman and
managing director of White Star, which remained his principle personal interest, IMM
took most of his attention. Writing to Lord Pirrie, Ismay lamented the poor condition of
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IMM, especially in terms of finance. "I know the Company is largely indebted to your
Firm, and we must do all possible to reduce this liability;” he wrote, adding “all I ask is
that you should make it as easy as possible, and not press us unduly." Morgan and his
chief aid Charles Steele, Ismay affirmed, "are quite prepared" to pay claims and make
IMM a success. Ismay also remarked on the "[rate] war in the Mediterranean trade, in
the Atlantic trade both passenger and freight." Both, significantly, were commerce that
Cunard took part in, no doubt contributing to IMM's distress. Despite his concerns,
Ismay closed on an optimistic note. "Well, I have undertaken a big job, and look to you
to help me all you can, and feel sure I can rely on your loyal and hearty support." 316
The cause for Ismay’s financial concern lay in the First Annual Report of IMM in
1904. With net earnings of $4,000,522 ($113,671,011 in 2018) and net expenses totaling
$3,645,227 ($103,575,643 in 2018), IMM’s surplus earnings for the year totaled just
$355,295 ($10,095,368 in 2018), a paltry sum in Ismay’s mind. The fact that 1903 saw a
depression in freight on the North Atlantic had depressed earning by "not less than $1
million,” he estimated.317 Ismay would certainly have been aware of this going into the
IMM leadership position.
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By the time of the report in 1905, one year into Ismay’s presidency, the horizon
already seemed brighter. The surplus earnings totaled $3,127,491 ($89,874,495 in 2018)—
nearly ten times the previous year—while expenses remained largely the same as
previous years.318 While the end of the freight depression played a large part in this
improvement, Ismay's promotion to the top leadership spot in day to day operations
helped as well. As Pirrie pointed out, he was, "sure your decision to accept the position
of president of the IMM Company must have been as great a relief to Mr. Morgan and
our other American friends as it was to your colleagues on this side." 319 The stabilization
of management gave a degree of solidity that no doubt reassured nervous current and
potential investors.
Naturally, the previous announcement of Cunard’s giant new steamers
continued to ruffle IMM's feathers. In 1905, with the combine more stabilized, the
opportunity arose to do something about it. White Star's “Big Four" (Celtic, Cedric, Baltic,
and Adriatic) were smaller and slower than Cunard's new giants. Now the final ship in
the group, Adriatic, lay incomplete in the builder’s yard, robbed of the title largest in the
world and the attending prestige by the rebel Cunard Line’s new twins. As Cunard's
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ships neared launching in 1907, it became more and more clear to IMM’s leaders that
they needed to do something to recapture the spotlight.
Olympic Dreams
Meanwhile back in Belgrave Park, London, Lord Pirrie invited J. Bruce Ismay
into his home for an informal business dinner on April 30, 1907. The new ships, Pirrie
proposed that night, would exceed anything seen before in terms of luxury and
comfort, following the design evolution of White Star's most successful ships. They
would be fast, but not Blue Riband contenders. Guiding the rough design would be
economy of operation and the maximization profits on the order of the "Big Four”—
only magnified.320
Their proposal—which came to be called the Olympic class—could have gone to
any of the lines under the IMM umbrella. While it may have made some sense to place
the ships in the American Line fleet, thereby making the largest, most luxurious and
technologically advanced ships in the world purely American, Ismay insisted that they
be part of White Star.321 In his mind, the ships had to go to White Star for several
reasons. The first was purely personal. Ismay's control of IMM allowed him to make
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sure White Star remained the most prestigious line of the combine and even allowed
him give what he saw as his family's ships received the best care. It was widely known
that Oceanic of 1899, the last ship completed during Ismay's father's lifetime, got an
unequal share of the younger Ismay's personal attention with regards to maintenance,
improvements, and repairs.322
Additionally, White Star's longstanding history and reputation, as well as its
intimate relationship with Harland & Wolff, meant that it was far better established
than any other line under IMM control. Only the Dominion Line was as old as White
Star, but its leadership never contracted with Harland & Wolff until it came under the
stewardship of IMM. Their only Harland & Wolff ships were second-hand purchases, as
was much of their early fleet. In any event, Dominion primarily served Canadian and
secondary American ports, as opposed to White Star which served New York. 323 Red
Star was a Belgium-based company before IMM and had never been as internationally
prestigious an Atlantic carrier.324 Placing the Olympic class in any other line in the
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combine, in short, risked losing the prestige and passengers attracted by the more
established White Star.
With the decision made to place the Olympic class within the White Star line, the
disparate threads of technological advances and the foundations set up by White Star
and Harland & Wolff partnership began to come together. As part of the new combine,
White Star's profits surpassed £1 million in 1910 ($178 million in 2018) for the first time.
To help raise money for construction, White Star placed four and a half per cent
debentures on the British stock market. The debentures, which increased the line's
equity and made the promise to pay dividends at scheduled intervals, raised £2.5
million ($446 million in 2018).325 The line's history and position as a leading firm set a
foundation of public confidence in the new project. The backing of the combine also
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Figure 2: RMS Titanic, 1912. The lifeboat placement and numbers were the same on
Olympic at this time. Credit: F. G. O. Stewart, photographer. Public Domain.

promoted consumer confidence when the new stock options came on the market, a
strength increased further still by the attachment of Morgan’s name to the project.
At the same time, Harland & Wolff expanded and upgraded their facilities. In
1907 work began at the shipyards, demolishing three building slips and replacing them
with two that accommodated ships in excess of 900 feet. The shipbuilder ordered new
permanent freestanding gantries, the scaffolding like structures under which ships were
built, from Sir William Arrol and Company of Glasgow. These gantries were 840 feet
long, 270 feet wide, and 230 feet high. On top sat a massive crane with a load capacity of
three tons with a reach of 135 feet and a capacity of five tons when extended 65 feet.
175

Additionally, three "travelers" moved across the gantry on rails and five more cranes on
each side.326 Besides the physical changes to the shipyard itself, the work force
expanded to 15,000 men, of whom between three and four thousand were assigned to
Olympic alone.327 To service the ships in Southampton, the future home port of the
Olympic class, Harland & Wolff, at White Star's suggestion, leased two acres and built a
new shipyard. By 1907, the Southampton yard was able to handle repairs, including the
reconstruction of the Suevic, which had required the replacement of 130 feet of bow
section.328 It was the most technologically advanced repair of any ship at the time.
As details of upcoming construction of the ships became known, the Olympic
class fired the American public's imagination. Newspapers across the United States
covered their construction as early as 1908. As far away as Salt Lake City, Utah's Deseret
Evening News carried articles detailing the "Monster Liners." 329 The paper described the
liner's innovations in great detail, comparing them to Cunard's Mauretania and
Lusitania. The article's very appearance in a local paper so far from the Atlantic
demonstrated the hold the great liners had on the public's imagination.
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The excitement was clearer still on the eastern seaboard. In 1909, the New York
Times published a full-page, illustrated article discussing the ships and what they
represented. Included were comparison illustrations of the Olympic class and the older
Mauretania. The article promised things not even White Star imagined, such as
photography stores, children's rooms, and a full hospital. The article also discussed the
practicalities that huge new ships demanded, such as improving the pier facilities in
New York and the cargo handling machinery. 330 By 1910 Harland & Wolff engineer
Alexander Carlisle found himself chased by the press in the fashion of modern day
paparazzi during a brief visit to New York. Vowing initially that he would not talk
about the ships, Carlisle eventually answered questions for the New York Daily Tribune
detailing size, speed and decoration. When asked to compare the closest competing
ships accommodations, he remarked, "Be patient and watch for the decorations on the
Olympic."331
The Olympic class had greater ramifications as well, which went beyond public
prestige or even Atlantic shipping. Perhaps most notably, they influenced the
engineering of the Panama Canal, which was then under construction. Specifically, in
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1908, plans for the canal underwent last minute changes when president Theodore
Roosevelt declared that the locks should be built to accommodate the largest ships
under construction at the time. The original size was 900 by 96 but planners increased
this to a length of 1,000 feet by 110 feet wide, specifically for the Olympic class. 332
By 1911 professional and public interest in the Olympic class had become so
great that The Shipbuilder, a professional journal for maritime architects, dedicated a
"special souvenir number" to the class. Besides detailing the history of White Star,
Harland & Wolff, and IMM, the book described construction techniques, builder's
plans, and interior arrangements. Hailing the advancements of Olympic, the author paid
particular attention to its watertight integrity. Noting that the doors were controlled on
the bridge, he explained, "the captain can, by simply moving an electric switch,
instantly close the doors throughout and make the vessel practically unsinkable." 333 This
claim, though not made by White Star itself, later came back to haunt the company.
Even crew members were both impressed and intimidated by the Olympic class.
Looking back on his time aboard Titanic, Second Officer Charles Lightoller said that it
took him fourteen days to feel confident finding his way about the ship. Even a large
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main passage with a huge door, "through which you could drive a horse and cart on the
starboard side, aft," took three late-joining officers an entire day to find. 334 He could not
help but observe that, "Each day... everybody's admiration of the ship increased." 335
Considering what these ships represented, it is hardly any wonder that Ismay wired
Lord Pirrie after Olympic's first arrival in New York, "Olympic is a marvel!"336
Titanic Troubles
While the size, luxury and prestige of these new ships set imaginations afire,
their unprecedented size had unforeseen consequences. The man placed in charge of
Olympic and the Titanic, Edward J. Smith, had never captained a ship so large. His most
recent command, White Star's Adriatic, was 150 feet shorter and twenty-two thousand
tons lighter than Olympic. For Smith, as well as for the hundreds of men responsible for
sailing the Titanic and her sister ships, the consequences of these vessels’ massive size
would surface only after Olympic came into service. These problems included
hydrodynamics as well as numbers of lifeboats and bulkhead designs. Unfortunately,
lacking piloting and engineering experience, neither Smith and his counterparts nor the
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sailors under their respective commands would be able to resolve these problems when
they arose at sea.
On September 20, 1911, Olympic was steaming south out of Southampton in
an area called the Silent. HMS Hawke, a Royal Navy cruiser, roughly one-sixth the size
of Olympic, was sailing on a parallel course on the larger ship’s starboard, or right, side.
As Olympic increased speed Hawke suddenly veered into her side, ramming Olympic in
the stern near the propeller shafts. Hawke's bow, designed for ramming and sinking
enemy warships, so damaged Olympic the voyage had to be cancelled. In the following
Admiralty Court hearing, Olympic was found at fault because of the suction caused by
water rushing to fill the void in her wake. According to evidence presented at the
hearing, the great strength of the vacuum pulled Hawke into Olympic's side despite what
officers on both ships did to avoid the accident. Scientific experiments with scale
models demonstrated the effect over repeated tests. 337 Olympic had to return to Harland
and Wolff for six weeks of repairs which had the side effect of delaying Titanic's maiden
voyage as shipyard employees were shifted to repair work.338
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The Olympic-Hawke incident, moreover, was not the last time this particular issue
arose. As Titanic left the Ocean Dock terminal in Southampton, a similar situation
occurred. On that fateful day, April 10, 1912, a number of liners were tied up to the
terminal from which Titanic prepared to depart, due to a strike by dockyard workers.
Ahead of Titanic were Oceanic moored to the dock itself, with the old New York tied to
her. Titanic, steaming at about six knots, came abreast of the liners at a very narrow
point in the channel. As she did so, the same type of vacuum that pulled Hawke into
Olympic the year before formed in the water. Six thick ropes holding New York to
Oceanic snapped and New York began to drift into Titanic's stern. Captain Gale and the
crew of the tug Vulcan, passed some ropes to crewmen on New York, succeeding in
slowing the ship while Capt. Smith on Titanic's bridge ordered extra power to his ship’s
port, or left, engine creating a wash that pushed New York away. Although adrift and
being pulled by the vacuum of Titanic's wake, New York quickly got maneuvered into a
new birth down river by tugs.339
Lawrence Beesley, a Titanic passenger, described the incident:
"Apart from the serious nature of the accident, it made an irresistibly comic
picture to see the huge vessel [New York] drifting down the dock with a snorting
tug at its heels, looking for all the world like a small boy dragging a diminutive
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puppy down the road with its teeth locked on a piece of rope, its feet splayed out,
its head and body shaking from side to side in the effort to get every ounce of its
weight used to the best advantage."340
He continued:
"We now moved slowly ahead and passed the Teutonic at a creeping pace, but
notwithstanding this, the latter strained at her ropes so much that she heeled over
several degrees in her effort to follow the Titanic... But as we were just clear, and
as we slowly turned the corner into the river I saw the Teutonic swing slowly back
into her normal station, relieving the tension alike of the ropes and of the minds
of all who witnessed the incident." 341
Titanic’s foreboding problems on the day she set sail were soon overshadowed
by the fateful and infamous events that occurred on the night of April 14-15, 1912. At
11:40 pm April 14, Titanic brushed the side of a massive iceberg, bumping and
scrapping along roughly 300 feet of hull. Although the damage from the iceberg has
never been seen, neither at the time nor during any of the expeditions to the wreck, it is
now believed the collision buckled hull plates and sheared off rivet heads opening the
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hull along hull plating seam lines.342 The opening exposed the first five watertight
compartments to the sea. The worst disaster Titanic's designers could foresee involved
head-on collisions or ones in which as many as four watertight compartments became
flooded. The fact that bulkheads between fifth and sixth compartments only went as
high as E Deck, a few levels below the bulkhead between the fifth and fourth
compartments, doomed the ship. 343 This meant that as the ship sank by the bow the
compartments further back would become flooded much in the same way an ice-cube
tray fills with water through overflow.
While the ship's pumps slowed the sinking, the volume of water entering the
hull eventually overwhelmed them. A little more than two and a half hours elapsed
from the collision until the ship disappeared from sight. The conditions in between
allowed almost perfect circumstances to evacuate the ship. During all that happened,
the sea stayed flat calm, the night clear and illuminated by thousands of stars, and the
ship itself remained steady with functional electrical systems until almost the very
end.344
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A brief timeline of the disaster provides highlights of the discipline and order
with which evacuating the ship took place. At 12:15 am, about 30 minutes after the
collision, wireless operators began sending out distress messages that continued until
power failed around 2:15 am. Boats, loaded with women and children, began lowering
away at 12:45 am. At the same time, Capt. Smith ordered white rockets fired in case any
ships were near enough to see them and offer assistance. Only at 1:40 am did the ship
begin to list to one side, endangering the launching of lifeboats. Quick action by Chief
Officer Henry Wilde averted the new crisis. He ordered all passengers to the opposite
side, their weight counterbalancing the ship. Although no panic erupted, the now
obvious condition of Titanic made passengers more willing to get into the remaining
boats. Prior to this, boats left half-filled due to the crew's fear of the boats buckling as
they were lowered and passengers’ reticence the leave the warmth and perceived
security of the nearly 900-foot-long Titanic for a 20 foot long boat.
By 1:55 am, the last of the boats to be properly launched eased into water only
15 feet below the boat deck, a distance that should have been over 60 feet. At 2:05 am
Capt. Smith ordered "every man for himself," yet despite this, crewmen and passenger
volunteers worked feverishly to free remaining collapsible boats A and B from their
secured positions on the roof of the officer's quarters, beside the first funnel. They later
floated off, providing rafts for several swimmers. At 2:15 am the final notes of the
ship's band could be heard as Titanic's lights went out, blinked back on and then
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darkened forever.345 Five minutes later, Titanic was gone leaving slightly more than 700
in the boats and over 1,500 in the freezing waters of the North Atlantic. 346 Drifting in
Boat 5 with about thirty passengers and four crew, Third Officer Harold Pittman looked
at his watch seconds after the waters closed over Titanic's stern. "It is 2:20," he said.347
§§§
The sinking of the Titanic remains a widely known disaster today, yet most
remain unfamiliar with its broader implications. Perhaps most importantly, the sinking
forced a reappraisal of the great liners in the United States, Britain, and throughout the
world. While the overall national policies and business practices that created the
Olympic class did not change, the ships themselves and the technologies they
represented underwent heavy re-evaluation by leaders of shipping companies,
policymakers, and the public alike. For the remaining members of the class, Olympic
and the hastily renamed Gigantic (now Britannic), that meant a number of structural
changes. These changes, in turn, would, at least in theory, allow Olympic and Britannic
to survive the damage sustained by Titanic. Even if the ships suffered structural failure,
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lifeboat capacity increased to accommodate all passengers and crew. These changes
were the first in a long line of efforts by shipping companies to outdo each other in
loudly demonstrating their dedication to safety.
Reevaluation began with the gathering of evidence about the disaster, first in
the United States and then in Great Britain. Beginning April 22, 1912 and continuing
well into June of that year, the British Board of Trade, a standing body regulating
merchant ships registered to British ports, held an inquiry, appointing Charles Bigham,
Lord Mersey of Toxteth, as wreck commissioner and head of the investigation. The
inquiry featured testimony by the surviving primary architects of the Olympic class,
Alexander Carlisle and Edward Wilding, as well as crew members, management and
passengers. Wilding’s testimony was particularly interesting because Board council
asked under what circumstances Titanic might have survived the collision with the
iceberg. He implied that no hull could have withstood the impact Titanic absorbed.
However, the following exchange between Lord Mersey, Commissioner of the Board of
Trade, and Wilding provided a suggestion as to how the ship might have been saved:

Commissioner Mersey: “I am rather interested about that. Do you mean to
say that if this ship had driven on to the iceberg stem on she would have been
saved?”
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Wilding: “I am quite sure she would, My Lord. I am afraid she would have
killed every firemen down in the firemen's quarters, but I feel sure the ship
would have come in.”

Mercy: “And the passengers would not have been lost?”

Wilding: “The passengers would have come in.” 348

A more exacting grilling occurred on day twenty of the inquiry when
Alexander Carlisle took the stand. Quizzed over and over about the number of lifeboats
he had originally suggested, Carlisle said that he planned for a total capacity of 64.
Asked if he thought the Titanic had enough boats, he said he repeatedly told
management there needed to be more. When questioned about who he told and how he
told them, all Carlisle could say was, "I showed them the plans of my proposals; I could
not do anymore."349
Eventually the final report of the inquiry listed several recommendations that
were adopted for new construction and for retrofits on older steamers. The
recommendations centered on the two most important issues addressed during

Wreck Commissioner's Court. "Formal Investigation into the Loss of the S.S. Titanic."
1912. Vol.5
348

349

Ibid., Vol 6.
187

testimony by the Harland & Wolff engineers: watertight integrity and lifeboat
accommodation. The Board urged that total lifeboats not be determined by the tonnage
of the ship, as had been done previously, but rather by the number of people the ship
was intended to carry. As for bulkheads and watertight doors, the board directed:
1. That the newly appointed Bulkhead Committee should enquire
and report, among other matters, on the desirability and practicability of
providing ships with (a.) a double skin carried up above the waterline; or, as
an alternative, with (b.) a longitudinal, vertical, watertight bulkhead on each
side of the ship, extending as far forward and as far aft as convenient; or (c.)
with a combination of (a.) and (b.). Any one of the three (a.), (b.) and (c.) to be
in addition to watertight transverse bulkheads.350

In the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, White Star’s leaders began
implementing new safety redesigns and enhancements into its remaining ships in an
effort to incorporate the lessons learned from the disaster. However, despite these major
changes, a crisis of confidence erupted among the public over just how safe ships of that
size could be. This loss of public confidence greatly affected not only White Star and the
International Mercantile Marine but other companies with "monster liners." Cunard,
HAPAG, and North German Lloyd all quietly instituted their own redesigns in existing
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ships and new construction to prove their giant ships were indeed safe. For Olympic, the
near identical sister of Titanic, an immediate decrease in passenger reservations
occurred. Hoping to reverse these trends, Ismay pledged reforms and modifications to
existing liners and new construction.351
However, Ismay himself had become a liability to IMM. In the public
imagination, he was the embodiment of dishonor and disgrace. His survival when even
one passenger was left behind to die (let alone 1,200) ruined his reputation. For much of
the American public, therefore, his promises to increase safety meant little. As long as
he held the title of president of IMM, the public would have little faith in the combine's
leadership. The broader implications of both the competition over safety features and
innovation and of Ismay’s fall from grace will be fully explored in the next chapter.

Conclusions

J. P. Morgan’s purchase of the White Star Line in 1902 set up a series of events
that led to the construction of some of the greatest steamships to sail the Atlantic,
vessels that even today remain well known. By purchasing so much of Britain's
maritime shipping, Morgan and his associates had called into question the nation's
prestige and self-image. In an attempt to maintain independence, Lord Inverclyde of the

351

Anonymous, "Ship Reform Sure," The Washington Post, May 1, 1912.
189

Cunard Line played British national interests of economics and military preparedness to
help preserve his company's status. This in turn led to a new era in the relationship
between British business and the British government.
Whereas before subsidies formed a common business practice, the
arrangement between Cunard and the British government represented a long-term
partnership that merged business and national interests over the long term. One key
clause of the deal, which gave the British Admiralty approval over ship designs that
included speeds over 18 knots, effectively gave the British government a seat on the
board of directors of Cunard. Additionally, Cunard gained the financial foundation that
allowed them to face Morgan's international conglomerate in combat for Atlantic
supremacy.
Meanwhile, Morgan's syndicate and its formation into the International
Mercantile Marine represented another evolution of business. While firms engaged in
commerce on an international scale are common throughout history, IMM represented
something new. Businesses like the British East India Company had global interests, but
its directors and leadership always centered in Great Britain. IMM differed in key
respects. Although the parent company of IMM existed in North America, its
constituent companies in the United States, England, and other countries maintained
their own boards of directors, in theory retaining a nominal independence. This,
however, only existed on paper. As the 1903 transfer of ships between IMM companies
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and the resolution of the Leyland Line situation showed, these boards of directors
ultimately had to bow to the mandates of the central offices of IMM in New York. At
the same time, the high stakes negotiations with the British Government represented
something new. Morgan found himself in the position of having to maintain both
United States and British national interests.
IMM had traced its ancestry to Clement Griscom's quest to rebuild the
American merchant marine. Once fully formed in 1902, IMM straddled two planes of
existence. Although it brought the lion's share of Atlantic shipping under American
control, the ships themselves remained British with British registry. In a somewhat
awkward arrangement, Morgan could own the companies, such as White Star,
Dominion and Leyland Lines, but not the ships themselves, thereby maintaining
Britain's right to use the ships in time of war. By the time the Olympic class came into
existence, this arrangement had been firmly cemented into the minds of the public. The
Olympic class, from the time of its inception, became known as British and American
steamers. For example, Britannic's launch booklet advertised her as a "Royal and United
States" mail steamer.352 The press coverage amplified this aspect. When Titanic sank on
her maiden voyage, likewise, it triggered government oversight inquiries in both the
United States and Great Britain.
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Though the Olympic class represented the greatest achievement of the IMM,
the sinking of Titanic marked the beginnings of a series of disasters, public relations
nightmares and misfortunes that bought the recently stabilized IMM to the brink of
collapse. From April 16, 1912 until the eruption of World War I in the summer of 1914,
IMM hobbled on. Far from ushering in the glorious and triumphant reestablishment of
the American merchant marine that had been envisioned in 1902, however, IMM would
instead experience slow decline.
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Chapter 4

Abandoning Ship
April 16, 1912, Leadership Losses and WWI

The loss of Titanic created a massive but not insurmountable disaster for the
International Mercantile Marine. The ship could be replaced and, fortunately for IMM’s
leadership, few lawsuits followed. While several individuals did sue for lost property,
White Star and IMM faced relatively little legal trouble. 353 At the same time, inquiries in
both the United States and Great Britain did little to affect IMM’s bottom line. The
disaster left behind many widows and families without a means of support in its wake
as well as loss of property. Both companies could have faced major lawsuits over loss of
life, income and more, but many individuals simply did not sue, preferring not to put a
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monetary value on a lost loved one’s life. As for the enquiries, no government fines or
censures ensued. After all, IMM and White Star did follow the law and had built ships
that could survive predictable damage based on past encounters. The companies would
need to reevaluate the safety features on their ships, but fortunately for them, there
would be no punitive expenditures.
But if IMM weathered the immediate aftermath of the Titanic disaster without
suffering indirect financial loss, all the negative publicity did create public relations
problems. These pertained to both real and perceived safety upgrades that needed to be
introduced throughout the IMM fleet and a crisis of confidence in large liners more
generally, especially the Olympic class. One of the most immediate public relations
problems, though, was the Olympic herself. The de facto flagship of White Star and IMM
was a virtual clone of a ship now known for sinking and causing the greatest loss of life
in a nautical disaster outside of war. The resemblance of both the interior and exterior
of the ships was so complete that existing promotional material used pictures of
accommodations and amenities interchangeably. Additionally, these materials always
mentioned both Olympic and Titanic, creating a close association between the ships in
the public mind. This problem was so immediate and obvious that when Bruce Ismay
was informed that Olympic was steaming to meet the rescue ship Carpathia to render
assistance the morning following the disaster, he was observed to physically shudder.
He quickly asked Capt. Rostron of Carpathia to order his wireless operator to instruct
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Olympic to avoid the area and continue to her intended port.354 A few days later, a large
portion of the crew refused to board her on the next trip to New York until more
lifeboats could be installed. Clearly, these problems had to be resolved if Olympic and
her incomplete sister, Gigantic, were to be profitable members of the fleet.
If these public relations problems immediately began to cripple IMM, in the year
following the disaster, a talent drain began at the highest levels of IMM that all but
secured its eventual demise. Ismay, who traveled aboard Titanic as a passenger and left
the ship in Collapsible Lifeboat C, experienced significant stigma for having lived. 355
That negative public image contributed to the management's decision to take a hard line
on his retirement from the presidency of IMM and the chairmanship of White Star Line.
Ismay’s departure, compounded by the death of J. P. Morgan in 1913, left IMM drifting.
Although replacements took up Morgan's and Ismay's duties, they simply did not have
the drive or the enthusiasm for the IMM project of Morgan or Ismay.
In addition to these internal issues, IMM also faced increased competition from
Europe. In 1913, Germany's Hamburg-Amerika Line roared back with the construction
of the Imperator class, building a fleet of ships bigger and faster than the Olympic class.
At the same time, Cunard's earlier escape came back to haunt IMM with the launch of
their new flagship, Aquitania, essentially a bigger Cunard version of Olympic. In

354

Lord, A Night to Remember. 157.

355

Lord, The Night Lives On, 211-212.
195

addition, IMM's capitalization problems continued. The company enjoyed solvency
from the very beginning, but profitability, especially considering the investment,
continued to elude IMM. This made building a financial foundation that allowed for
funding future construction projects or weathering economic downturns next to
impossible. While World War I provided a temporary life support, the handwriting was
on the wall long before the conflict erupted.
This chapter will examine these events as well as the economic, political, and
public relations forces that helped signal the beginning of the end for the International
Mercantile Marine. It will analyze the immediate public relations storm and the
resulting fallout, as well as its impact on Ismay and his efforts to remain in shipping. It
will also consider the public inquiries and how they affected not only the Olympic class,
but other ships, and the dramatic competition over safety. Next, the chapter turns to the
loss of talent at the highest levels, specifically Ismay and Morgan, and the lack of firm,
motivated leadership, the resulting chaos that followed, and the issues caused by World
War I. Finally, it examines the internal strife as stock fights erupted over the best course
to follow to make the company profitable during a temporary resurgence during the
war and the decline of IMM in the 1920s.
Mid-Atlantic, 1912
The survival of J. Bruce Ismay proved to be one of the most controversial
issues to come out of the loss of Titanic, and negatively affected the long-term health of
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the International Mercantile Marine. On April 19, just days after his rescue, Ismay
testified to the U.S. Senate about his actions. Ismay reported that he had made the
voyage, "as one is apt to, in the case of a new ship, to see how she works, and with the
idea of seeing how we could improve on her for the next ship which we are building." 356
Asked by Senator William Smith of Michigan about the circumstance under which he
left Titanic, Ismay responded, "The boat was there. There was a certain number of men
in the boat, and an officer called out asking if there were any more women and there
was no response, and there were no passengers left on deck. ...and as the boat was being
lowered away, I got into it." 357
Some observers seemed to accept Ismay’s version of the story. Most notably,
the presiding judge of the British inquiry, Lord Mersey, gave a fairly even-handed
assessment of Ismay's actions. "Mr. Ismay, after rendering assistance to many
passengers, found "C" collapsible, the last on the starboard side, actually being lowered.
No other people were there at the time. There was room for him and he jumped in. Had
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he not jumped in he would merely have added one more life, namely, his own, to the
number of those lost."358
But if Lord Mersey had offered a charitable take on Ismay's conduct, empathy
seemed to begin and end with him. Ismay’s testimony—and his actions—invoked the
American public’s ire. While Capt. Edward J. Smith and the other officers and crew of
the ship, both lost and surviving, escaped with relatively light criticism, Ismay became a
lightning rod for condemnation, facing the disdain and scorn of many throughout the
United States. The town of Ismay, Texas changed its name, while the press and public
roasted Ismay daily in reports and opinion pieces. Alfred Mahan wrote in the Evening
Post criticizing Ismay for taking a place in a lifeboat when someone else, anyone else,
could have taken it instead. Elsewhere in the press, he became known as J. "Brute"
Ismay.359 And Ben Hecht, a Chicago area journalist, composed a harsh bit of doggerel,
published in several papers:
The Captain stood where a Captain should
For the Law of the Sea is grim;
The Owner romped while the ship was swamped
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And no law bothered him.
The Captain stood where the Captain should
When a captain's ship goes down
But the Owner led when the women fled,
For an Owner must not drown.
The Captain sank as a man of Rank,
While the Owner turned away;
The Captain's grave was his bridge and brave,
He earned his seaman's pay.
To hold your place in the ghastly face of Death on the Sea at Night
Is a Seaman's job, but to flee with the mob
Is an Owner's Noble Right.360

Ismay thus found himself in a socially untenable situation caused by an
impossible choice made under the most trying conditions. Had he stayed on Titanic, he
would have died, leaving his wife a widow and children fatherless—but his honor and
social standing would have been maintained. By getting into a lifeboat, he lost his social
standing and became a pariah within his profession but preserved his family and his
own life. Initially, Ismay hoped that he could lead IMM and White Star out of the public
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relations debacle and help stabilize IMM as it sought to recover from the financial loss
Titanic represented. However, the public perception of him was too much to overcome;
overnight, he had become a social outcast.
Naturally, the fierce criticism Ismay faced created a problem for the
International Mercantile Marine. Ismay had been an asset as the very image of what a
leading member of the British shipping industry should be. Suddenly, that had all
changed. What kind of future could the directors of IMM expect if the president of the
company is the most reviled man in shipping? However, a solution existed for IMM in
something Ismay had done before the Titanic disaster: his pending retirement.
What is generally unknown is that Ismay had already given the required
notice several months before Titanic's loss. Ismay, however, had suggested it be kept
secret so as not to cause undue unrest among investors and the shipping community.
He planned to step down June 30, 1913 but later changed his mind around October
1912.361 He had intended to do this for some time. He demonstrated his reluctance to
take on the presidency of the syndicate at the time of his hiring through the list of
requirements he had given Morgan. It had only been at the urging of family and
professional associates that he took the job. Even as president of IMM, Ismay had
always been more interested in White Star. Ismay envisioned staying on with that
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company, reducing his responsibilities and no longer living part time in New York.
While placing IMM on a better financial footing than it had been under Clement
Griscom's leadership, Ismay desired to leave the position. However, the Titanic crisis
made him reevaluate these plans, hoping to help IMM and possibly more importantly
White Star, through post disaster troubles.
Who's the Safest of Them All?
While Ismay’s fall from grace and subsequent departure from IMM caused
problems in terms of the need to restructure leadership, the question of what to do with
the remaining members of the Olympic class caused further headaches for IMM’s other
managers. The Titanic disaster made it clear that they must make a number of structural
changes to the Olympic and the hastily renamed Gigantic (now Britannic). These changes
would take time and require rearrangement of schedules, moving ships around to cover
routes as liners were pulled out of service, updated and brought back online. These
changes meant loss of revenue and expenditures for new equipment, sometimes
mandating redesigns of existing deck spaces for the placement of additional lifeboats
and other safety equipment.
With that in mind, the question was how to increase safety measures on existing
ships. That could happen in several ways. First, the owners could install enough
equipment, such as lifeboats, on their own. In White Star's case, the Olympic class
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actually carried more boats than current laws required. 362 The belief that the ship could
survive long enough for rescue to come from other vessels answering radioed calls for
help led White Star management to dismiss the need for more boats. The second way to
ensure enough lifeboats for all would be a reevaluation of the laws governing ships.
This required action from the Board of Trade, at least for British ships. Other nations
would have to make their own way.
For Olympic and Britannic, this meant virtual redesigns—which for IMM
meant a tremendous outlay of capital. While Britannic still sat under construction,
Harland & Wolff could retrofit many of the desired improvements. Olympic—an
existing ship, almost identical to Titanic—was another case entirely. She returned to
Belfast in late 1912 to have an inner skin built and an increase in lifeboats from 20 to
68.363 Olympic's modifications cost a total of £250,000 ($45,799,077 in 2018). 364 The most
obvious visible change occurred on the top deck that previously had only sixteen boats
lining the deck with four rafts stowed elsewhere. Post refit, her top deck held two
continuous strings of double nested life boats the length of the deck on either side.
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When she returned to service in March of 1913, she was probably the safest ship afloat
on the North Atlantic and differed greatly from her original configuration.

Figure 3 RMS Olympic, 1922. Notice the additional lifeboats on the Boat Deck. Credit:
Public Domain.

Because of IMM’S relationship with Harland & Wolff, which was the exclusive
designer and builder of White Star ships including the Olympic class, these alterations
caused minimum disruption to Olympic's sailing schedules. Since the same designer and
construction crew often worked on a ship throughout its service life, modifications were
completed with minimal down time due to setbacks as new designers familiarized
themselves with a ship. Remodeling the last of the Olympic class, however, took a bit
more planning and time. Construction of Britannic simply halted until the findings from
the hearings were released and the information taken in for modifications to the design.
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Britannic eventually underwent many of the same modifications as Olympic. Without
mentioning the reasons for the changes, Britannic's launch booklet detailed the virtues
of her inner hull and her bulkheads that "carried right up to the Bridge Deck." 365 The
booklet called special attention to the lifeboat arrangements. New, massive, crane-like

Figure 4 His Majesty's Hospital Ship Britannic, 1916, showing the difference from Titanic.
Credit: Public Domain.

davits stood along the sides of the ship that could lower the boats electrically while
holding them out several feet from the side of the ship. Even if Britannic listed heavily to
one side during an emergency, all boats would remain useful, unlike boats mounted in
traditional davits. The massive crane davits made this possible because of their
capability to reach across the ship and launch boats stored on the opposite side.
Harland & Wolff initially planned to install eight of these davits. The onset of the First
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World War in 1914, however, meant that the ship needed to be completed quickly, with
the result that only five of the planned davits ultimately got installed. 366
Additional safety features figured prominently in newspapers when Britannic
was launched. One article discreetly pointed out Britannic's similarity to Olympic "with
the addition of some improvements which experience has suggested." Among these
were the double bottom of the ship extending its whole length and the fact that lifeboats
could be lowered fully loaded.367 The confirmed ability to lower fully loaded boats came
as a direct response to criticism in the papers about boats on Titanic leaving the ship
only half-filled. Establishing the ability of life saving equipment to function under
extreme stress should have been just one of the safety measures routinely carried out,
especially for new ships. This could have been solved by a lifeboat drill early in the
voyage, but no such activity occurred. It would later become one of the features of
added safety protocols on all liners.
The impact of the new focus on safety produced highly visual differences for
the newest member of the Olympic class. While Olympic and Titanic were visually
identical, except for some windows on the promenade deck, Britannic revealed
prominent modifications making her easily distinguishable in surviving photographs.
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Importantly, these differences would be equally obvious to the traveling public. The
most noticeable included oversized crane-like Toplis Davits which overwhelmed the
boat deck, emphasizing Britannic's ability to launch as many lifeboats as needed to
evacuate all on board. Additional regular Wellin style davits, which could handle three
boats took up the remaining space. If a ship could be made into a symbol of "lifeboats
for all," Britannic achieved it. By making these changes, which were carried out to
various degrees throughout the IMM fleet, IMM intended to show it had learned
lessons from the Titanic disaster and the ensuing government enquiries. 368
Hoping to achieve some much-needed good publicity for these costly
alterations, IMM and White Star made certain that potential passengers were aware of
safety improvements to their ships through press announcements, other forms of
advertisement, and of course the highly visible design changes themselves. White Star’s
competitor lines, by contrast, quietly made changes to their ships almost making it seem
that they always had boats for all from the design stage. HAPAG's new flagship,
Imperator, saw her lifeboat number balloon to eighty-three and two motor launches. 369
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Additionally, she had an "inner skin" that featured longitudinal and transversal
bulkheads throughout the ship, with bulkheads extended far above the waterline. 370
Cunard’s owners, likewise, made their own subtle public relations overtures
emphasizing their ships’ safety centered designs. The April 1913 launching of their new
flagship, Aquitania, featured a souvenir booklet that highlighted safety features of her
construction without mentioning Titanic, despite the launching happening on the oneyear anniversary of the sinking. As Cunard’s publicity explained, "The division of the
ship into watertight compartments is much more extensive than is required by any
regulations, and exceptional conditions might therefore have been obtainable in
connection with lifeboats.” In addition, the booklet boasted, “Cunard Company, early
in 1912, submitted their plans to the Board of Trade for an installation of lifeboats, to
accommodate everyone on board." Cunard also repeatedly mentioned that Aquitania
continued features that previously existed in Mauretania and Lusitania, including a
double hull and extensive watertight subdivision. 371 In other words, although Cunard's
booklet celebrated the launching of the new Aquitania, company leaders used the
opportunity to report on the safety provisions of liners that preexisted Titanic in hopes
of maintaining their ongoing success.
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While all these modifications needed to be made for safety reasons, for IMM
and White Star, making the most highly visible changes was just as important from a
public relations perspective. The remaining members of the Olympic class had a
potential lifespan of twenty-five to thirty years. If these ships were to be profitable, the
specter of a repeat of the Titanic disaster needed to be banished. Publicizing the
modifications to the ships that held the flagship positions was one of the best ways to
achieve this goal, especially with competing companies loudly proclaiming the safety
features of their super liners. IMM and White Star wore the albatross of owning a vessel
renown for massive loss of life. They needed to replace that distinction with one of
owning the safest, most reliable ships on the Atlantic. Their efforts to refit Olympic and
Britannic, as well as the other ships of the IMM fleet, went a long way to adjusting that
perception.
At Headquarters
As all this played out, J. Bruce Ismay began to reconsider leaving the
International Mercantile Marine. In August 1912, P.A.S. Franklin, one of the leaders
within IMM, wrote Ismay encouragingly, saying, "I can only say that I regret
exceedingly that you have decided to go out of the business and wish it were otherwise.
Your position regarding the Titanic is improving everyday and the more thinking
people consider it the better it will be, and you certainly have nothing to reproach
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yourself with."372 Ismay, it seemed, was persuaded by these sentiments. By October,
Ismay decided he wished to continue at least as a board member of White Star and
communicated his wishes to the directors of the combine.
Ismay would not have his wish, however. E. C. Grenfell, chairman of the British
committee running IMM's British holdings, made it clear to Ismay that he could not
remain at White Star.373 "As president,” Grenfell wrote, "you have been in absolute
control of all the companies forming the I.M.M. Company, and you have, as was only
natural, by your ability and strong personality overshadowed the other managers, and
to a certain extent they have looked to you for guidance in all matters great and small.
On your retirement,” he continued, "several of these junior men will have to be
promoted to more responsible positions, and I think it will be easier for these men, as
also for the incoming president, to assert their independence if their former chief is not
on the boards with them." Although Ismay was allowed to remain on the IMM board of
directors and the British committee responsible for running the British lines under IMM
control, regarding White Star, the message was clear: thanks, but no, thanks. 374
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Despite the rejection, Ismay persisted in trying to remain with White Star. "I
really do not care one iota about the other companies, but you will appreciate I am
bound to have a good deal of sentiment in connection with the White Star Line,” he
informed Grenfell. “I quite understand junior men will be promoted when I go and
rightly so, but I cannot see how my remaining a director of White Star Line will in any
way hamper matters. At present there are only three directors, therefore four vacancies
on the board; why not fill them up and so promote the juniors?” he added "I cannot
think my being on the board would in any way interfere with the incoming president,
but if it would do so this ends the matter."375 Ismay's sentimental attachment to White
Star was entirely understandable. Oceanic of 1899, the last ship built by his father, still
sailed with the fleet.376 The rest of the fleet represented his own life's work and the
continuation of his father's legacy. The Titanic disaster amounted to the greatest threat
White Star had ever faced. That Bruce Ismay wanted to guide the company safely
through its current troubles seems hardly surprising.
Unfortunately for Ismay, IMM management had its collective mind made up.
After speaking with J.P. Morgan and J.P. Morgan Jr., Grenfell wrote Ismay to say, "I
fully appreciate your desire from sentiment to remain on the board of O.S.N. [Oceanic
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Steam Navigation, the official name of the White Star Line], and I much regret that, after
further consideration, I do not see my way to alter the opinion expressed to you in my
letter of the 23rd October."377 Harold Sanderson, Ismay's heir apparent whom he had
helped promote through IMM ranks, offered little help. In November, he sent Ismay a
letter detailing a dinner with Grenfell. After reinforcing Grenfell's comments, he
reiterated that, "as retiring President, your name might very properly be expected to
appear amongst the directors of the controlling company (I.M.M. Co.), and that this
expectation could hardly apply in the case of any of the boards of the subsidiary
companies, not even the O.S.N. Co."378 So much for loyalty to a mentor.
While Ismay dealt with the blow, newspapers began carrying rumors of the
coming reorganization in amazing detail. The New York Times, for instance, recounted an
IMM board meeting in London, reporting that a "reliable source" said that the
resignation of Ismay and elevation of Sanderson formed the principal subject of the
meeting. The correspondent even went so far as to ask Ismay himself about the rumors.
Ismay responded, "I am sorry, but I have nothing whatever to say.” The correspondent
told Ismay of reports that he had broken down and had gone to a sanitarium as a result
of the Titanic disaster. "You can see that is not so for yourself," Ismay replied. 379
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The effects that the loss of Ismay had on IMM cannot be overemphasized.
Next to Morgan himself, Ismay possessed the most drive, knowledge and experience of
anyone at IMM, qualities needed to make IMM a success. Morgan, though a financial
mastermind, had entered the twilight of his years as IMM critically needed a stabilizing
hand. J. Bruce Ismay, played the role of the "ideal man" as leadership of the IMM
matured.380 He typified the British shipping owner "headman;" an anthropological term
denoting someone with widely known and acknowledged skills in a particular area.
Raised and apprenticed within his father's business, he brought a status no one else
could to the leadership of the IMM. Indeed, Bruce Ismay's elevation had reassured
nervous stock holders in 1903. On the one hand, his rise represented a commitment to
British interests as Morgan had promised. On the other, he represented expertise and
experience that few on either side of the Atlantic could rival. At the time of his ascent it
was a win-win for investors and IMM alike. His loss would be yet another major blow
to IMM as it weathered the post-Titanic years.
Ismay’s replacement, Harold A. Sanderson, simply did not equal Ismay in terms
of pedigree. While Sanderson had served as a member of the board of directors and had
been associated with White Star for seventeen years by 1912, he did not have the name
recognition and family history Ismay enjoyed. Sanderson had spent most of his life in
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shipping and came from a shipping family. By 1899 he had become a partner in Ismay,
Imrie and Company which managed White Star and from there became first vice
president of IMM in 1902.381 Even with all this prior experience, however, Sanderson
had never held the responsibilities Ismay had as the independent leader of a major
shipping firm. Though he came from a shipping family, moreover, his family had not
known the success or fame of the Ismays. For nervous investors, psychological elements
such as these often factored in determining continued investment. Having a wellknown and experienced leader in a position of responsibility, especially in times of
crisis such as the aftermath of the Titanic disaster, mattered greatly. Despite these
setbacks, Sanderson succeeded Ismay in 1913 after a short interlude with P.A.S.
Franklin as acting president while Sanderson prepared for his new duties.
While Ismay’s departure from IMM set in motion one set of problems for the
company, another major blow hit shortly after Ismay stepped down: the death of J.
Pierpont Morgan himself. Morgan had been vacationing in Europe when Titanic sank.
Hearing of the disaster, Morgan wired his son Jack that, "Have just heard fearful rumor
about Titanic with iceberg without any particulars. Hope for God sake not true." The
Wednesday following the disaster happened to be Morgan's seventy-fifth birthday.
Friends and business associates remarked that he was appalled and that his heart was
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"very heavy."382 By early January 1913, Morgan sought rest. Between personal strain
from the Titanic disaster and facing grillings in Washington by politicians (many of
whom were looking to make their reputations during the recent election year),
Morgan's age finally caught up to him.383 Hoping to escape the chaos, he set sail for
Egypt on White Star's Adriatic reaching Cairo by January 26th. In mid-February, he had
an attack of chest pains and shortly afterwards sent for his personal doctor George
Dixon and biographer Herbert Saterlee. On February 17th, the New York stock market
slumped following news of Morgan's declining health and The New York Times began
publishing daily updates on his condition. 384
When Dixon, and Satterlee, arrived on March 3rd, they found a wrecked
Morgan. Overwhelmed by nervous strain, Morgan believed the Khedive of Egypt
wanted to hurt him and that the American government planned to subpoena him for
contempt of court. He had lost weight and believed himself on the verge of death. On
March 10th, the Morgan party went to Rome. In Italy, his health deteriorated at an
alarming rate. Between March 23rd and 29th Morgan became more withdrawn, refusing
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to eat, subject to severe lethargy and not recognizing friends or family. By Sunday the
30th he became delirious and too weak to move. After a spike in fever, he died the
following Monday.385 In a quirk of fate, which seemed oddly symbolic of the decline to
IMM that would follow Morgan's death, his body journeyed home aboard France,
flagship of the French Line which IMM neither owned nor controlled.386
Even more than Ismay’s departure, the death of Morgan represented a fatal
blow to IMM. The International Mercantile Marine stood as the culmination of
Morgan's storied career. The success or failure of IMM reflected on his personal
reputation. While his mental decline in his last years put IMM in danger, his death
insured that IMM no longer had a personally invested patron. The surviving members
of J.P. Morgan and Company, including Morgan’s son and name sake, had to look to
the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Survival of the ailing IMM now
depended strictly on the potential to make it profitable, not just the vindication of
Morgan's business decisions. Only during the tenure of Ismay's presidency did IMM
become viable or have a bright future. While Morgan and his associates accumulated
considerable experience within the United States as railroad barons, that had not
completely translated into running a trans-Atlantic steamship multinational.
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While the principles certainly applied, the practices differed. Ownership of
the shipping lines, the deal with Harland & Wolff, and control of United States steel
manufacturing together made for perfect integration. However, the railroad interests
primarily dealt with one set of federal laws within the United States as opposed to
IMM, which had to deal with multiple national governments representing varied
cultures, histories, worldviews, and differently valued currencies. On top of this, the
extra layer of bureaucracy, necessitated by British law in particular, slowed and
complicated business decisions.
The British committee that oversaw the British assets of the International
Mercantile Marine never really worked as intended. From the beginning constituent
lines tended to run their affairs independently of the edicts of IMM management. Only
J. Bruce Ismay's leadership, backed by Morgan, stopped Henry Wilding's reckless
management of the Leyland Line, for example. Wilding exemplified the early problems
within IMM. The constituent companies never quite saw themselves as anything other
than independent companies. Wilding's maverick leadership of the Leyland Line
provides the best example. With both Morgan and Ismay out of the company, IMM
faced a leadership vacuum that encouraged an "every man for himself" attitude among
the companies. With no certainty for the future of the International Mercantile Marine,
the respective constituent companies' managements seemed justified in looking to their
futures.
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HAPAG Giants and Cunard
Making matters worse, the resurgent German and British merchant marines
began increasing in prestige at a time when IMM struggled most. Even before the loss
of Titanic, the German company HAPAG announced a trio of giant liners that would
eclipse Olympic and Titanic in size. The ships were to be named Imperator, Vaterland and
Bismarck. News of the German giants resonated as far from the Atlantic Ocean as Salt
Lake City, where the local press hailed the design of the new ships, although they did
get some of the details wrong. Calling the lead ship of the trio Hansa, the paper
proclaimed she would be "about 50,000 tons, or 18,000 more than the Mauretania and
5,000 more than the Titanic," highlighting this with very accurate silhouettes of the
future Imperator beside her competitors. The paper further pointed out the new ship
would have a service speed of 22 knots and "her cargo and passenger accommodation
will be immense."387
The town paper of Franklinton, Louisiana discussed Imperator two years later,
documenting the constant growth of liners, as well as the hold they continued to have
on the national imagination. Noting Imperator's recent launch, the Era-Leader described
her accommodations including "apartments with private verandas," a "magnificent

Anonymous, "More Ocean mammoths for Atlantic Travel," The Salt Lake Tribune,
August 28, 1910.
387

217

swimming pool, and a Ritz-Carleton managed restaurant." With the Titanic disaster
only a couple months in the past, the newspaper also took care to emphasize the safety
aspects of the new ship. In addition to lifeboats in excess to the numbers required for
passengers and crew, the ship's staff included three wireless operators. 388 Watertight
bulkheads ran both transversally and longitudinally throughout the ship and dynamos
for lighting and operating the wireless system sat above her waterline, decreasing the
likelihood of them being exposed to water immediately in case of emergency. 389
Imperator was quickly succeeded and improved upon by her sister, Vaterland. As
flagship of the German merchant marine, Vaterland was without question an impressive
ship. A commodore commanded her supported by four captains and seven officers and
a total of 1,234 crewmen of which 442 worked in the engine rooms. Wireless
communications featured three separate machines, with three operators allowing the
main system to be crewed continuously. Another feature that gave Imperator and
Vaterland an edge in the race for luxury and superlatives lay in the design of their funnel
uptakes. While most ships had exhaust trunked through the center of the ship
restricting the length of public rooms, the German ships' exhaust left the ship through
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uptakes built along the sides of the ship. This allowed for a main dining room that
could seat eight hundred guests. Arriving in New York on May 21, 1914, Vaterland
measured in at 924 1/2 feet long, 100 feet wide and 53,500 tons. 390 This outstripped
Imperator's length of 900. Almost immediately though, that ship was bumped to second
place by Cunard's Aquitania at 901 feet. 391 HAPAG leaders increased their ship to 919
feet by adding a bronze imperial eagle on Imperator's bow.392 Germany, twice in
succession, claimed the largest ship in the world.
While HAPAG built its new liners, Cunard constructed Aquitania, a ship that
departed from the paradigm set up by Mauretania and Lusitania. While her older fleet
mates continued to make records for speed, trading the Blue Riband back and forth,
Aquitania's design emphasized comfort, luxury, and cargo capacity. Effectively,
Aquitania became Cunard's Olympic class ship. At the same time, she competed with
the HAPAG ships in her own version of safety theater. The ship carried eighty lifeboats
and two motor boats. Of the eighty boats, "twenty-two are of the standard class of open
boat, each constructed to carry 66 persons. The boats of the decked class are 58 in
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number and have each accommodation for 54 persons. Omitting the two motor boats,
the total number provided, there for, is 4,584, or 382 in excess of the total complement of
the vessel."393 The motor boats had their own unique features. Each had its own Marconi
wireless sets with a range of 300 miles with arias carried on bamboo masts that could be
raised and lowered at will. The boats could also tow away "a considerable number of
the lifeboats" from the scene of any disaster to Aquitania. Additionally, they carried
medical provisions, blankets and food supplies should survivors need to wait an
extended period for rescue.394
While these features provided a very real enhanced potential to save lives in
an emergency, in many cases they simply boiled down to "safety theater." While all the
boats and the highly publicized detail that surrounded them may have soothed a
nervous traveling public, none of the publications disclosed how long it would actually
take to fully evacuate the ships, a major safety issue in its own right. Titanic took over
three hours to sink, providing plenty of time for orderly evacuation and stayed on an
even keel (not capsizing) allowing the sixteen primary lifeboats and two of the
collapsible boats on both sides of the ship to be lowered. However, the final collapsibles
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(Boats A and B) floated off as water washed over the boat deck. 395 The sad fact that few
acknowledged at the time or after is that even if Titanic had the sixty boats originally
called for, there would have been nowhere near the time needed to launch them all. The
next two major shipping disasters, Empress of Ireland in 1914 and Lusitania in 1915, both
sank in less than twenty minutes making organized evacuation impossible and creating
casualty lists in excess of one thousand people.396 Even with all the safety precautions
possible, in other words, conditions could and did prevent their implementation. While
all the new safety precautions provided mental security to jittery passengers and
contributed to making ships harder to sink under known circumstances, they often
required specific conditions to be fully used.
Additionally, the layout of the extra safety features seemed truly bizarre.
Aquitania featured sixteen boats stacked in twos across the width of the aft boat deck,
near the stern. "While the first and second outboard boats are being put into the water,”
the journal Shipbuilder explained, “the inboard or feeding davits are engaged in picking
up the inboard boats and dumping them in position for hooking on to or lowering away
by the davits proper."397 In other words, the inboard boats had to be manually hooked
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up, moved, and then detached from the davits to get them in position to be loaded and
lowered. This process would have to be repeated as many as ten times for the farthest

Figure 5 RMS Aquitania, showing the odd lifeboat arrangement on the stern. Credit:
National Maritime Museum, Greenwhich, London.
inboard boats to be launched. Notably, this operation would be happening
simultaneously with the eight boats beside them. The only electrically-powered
mechanism associated with the life boats were the winches that brought them back
aboard after lowering. The process would be laborious, time consuming and crewintensive under emergency conditions when the manpower would have been at a
premium at twenty-six other lifeboat stations and other evacuation duties. This does not
even account for handling passengers, gathering supplies, damage control measures to
extend the ship's time afloat, and other issues.
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In the war over publicity, however, none of these practical concerns mattered.
Companies had to out-do each other making loud and visible safety modifications no
matter their viability. The practicality of many of these features appeared secondary.
Another example included the lifeboats on the new HAPAG steamers. While the boats
were positioned in more practical areas the company painted them black instead of the
more traditional, and far more visible, white. Oddly enough, the one factor that never
seemed to matter was time. While all these changes no doubt made ships safer, their
practicality under extremely limited time was highly questionable, as the Lusitania and
Empress of Ireland disasters later proved.
Safety features aside, Aquitania had many other eye-catching details. Like the
Olympic class, she had a service speed of 23 knots, and accommodation for 3,230
passengers and 972 crew.398 Like the White Star liners she was patterned on, designers
placed most of her best rooms amidships where the movement of the ship impacted
passengers the least.399 Second and Third class passengers also enjoyed higher standards
than previous Cunard offerings, with large public rooms and well-appointed cabins
featuring running water and ladders for upper bunks. 400 Like the HAPAG giants, her
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command staff included the best the line had to offer. The commodore of Cunard line,
Capt. William T. Turner headed a sailing department that included two staff captains,
seven deck officers and others totaling seventy-seven with additional staff. As they did
on Imperator, Marconi wireless officers held status as crew members (unlike Imperator,
however, Aquitania only carried two). The chief engineer, Mr. Bryce, had thirty years of
experience and headed a department that included 339 members. The rest of the crew
served in the purser's staff which counted stewards, stewardesses, chefs, nurses, typists,
barbers, band members and others totaling 556 to cater to passengers' every need. 401
Aquitania arrived in New York for the first time on May 10, 1914, briefly bringing the
title of world's largest liner back to Britain. 402 Eleven days later, Vaterland arrived,
eclipsing Britain's brief triumph.
The rapid succession of the world's largest liners demonstrates the intense
nature of the rivalry between companies for supremacy on the North Atlantic. Each
new ship reigned as the pinnacle of marine engineering for only a short time before
being outstripped by an even larger, more luxurious rival. Ships coming after the
Olympic class, however, needed more to win accolades other than simply being fastest.
Interestingly, the emphasis on cargo capacity and luxury in both the Imperator class
and the Aquitania show the influence of IMM and their Olympic class - moderate speed
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coupled with very high-quality passenger accommodation and large cargo capacity,
which minimized operating costs while maximizing payload. This was most evident in
Aquitania. Prior to the Olympic class, Cunard's primary commercial appeal lay in speed.
Lusitania and Mauretania offered the fastest crossing time possible. Many German liners
came close, but the Cunard flyers held them off. White Star and IMM began the process
of luring passengers away with comfort and luxury with the Celtic of 1901.
By the time the Olympic class came along, White Star's success in creating an
enjoyable travel experience demanded a response. IMM, White Star Line, and Harland
& Wolff had indeed crafted the defining design paradigm for early twentieth century
ocean liners. The results took form in Cunard's Aquitania and the HAPAG trio. While
imitation may well be the sincerest form of flattery, in this case it provided the avenue
to try to topple IMM from its leading position on the North Atlantic. Morgan's failure to
gain control of Cunard and the German lines virtually guaranteed competitors eagerly
seeking to end IMM's dominance. While this competition certainly gave IMM’s
leadership and investors cause to worry, IMM's unstable financial foundation left them
ill-positioned to respond in an effective manner. With the loss of Ismay and Morgan on
one front and increasing competition on another, the leadership of IMM needed to take
steps to stabilize its financial base if it hoped to survive. Those efforts began in earnest
in the aftermath of Titanic's loss and the resurgence of international competition.
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Bond Fights and World War
On October 1, 1914 and again on April 1, 1915 the International Mercantile
Marine defaulted on payments on its outstanding 4.5% bonds. At first glance, this may
have come as a surprise: earnings for 1913 had totaled $9,567,048 ($244,380,094 in 2018),
rising from a low of $903,176 ($24,826,050 in 2018) in 1908.403 But while these number
appeared to suggest a brightening future, the final numbers after all costs and
depreciation for IMM gave a less bullish outlook. After charges and depreciation,
profits for 1913 stood at $315,602 in liquid capital ($8,061,718 in 2018). Between 1903 and
1913 the combine's liquid capital averaged just $291,131 ($7,436,632 in 2018). By
comparison, the capital of Germany's HAPAG over the same period averaged
$3,729,216 ($95,258,867 in 2018).404
The outbreak and escalation of the Great War only worsened the situation for
IMM. With so many of its ships called up to wartime service in the British navy, IMM
became even more reluctant to pay out dividends. While cargo space demanded a very
profitable premium from those shipping into the warzone, costs to find the crews, fuel,
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and everything else needed to sail the remaining civilian ships increased. Furthermore,
the uncertainty of ships moving in and out of a zone in which unrestricted submarine
warfare and mines laid in shipping lanes made shipping even more unpredictable than
regular sailings on the stormy Atlantic.
The fate of His Majesty's Hospital Ship Britannic, the once-named Gigantic and
last of the Olympic class, offered a clear example of the issues brought on by the
eruption of the Great War. Britannic finally launched on February 27, 1914 and moved
to one of the berths at Harland & Wolff for completion. Denied the title of the largest
ship in the world by Germany's HAPAG trio and Cunard Aquitania, she only claimed
the title "the biggest British built ship." 405 Even though the worsening situation clouded
the European horizon, papers and the launch booklet put out by White Star pointed to
Britannic's luxurious and comfortable accommodations. Her increased width allowed
installation of more private bath facilities, still an innovation on the North Atlantic. 406 Of
course, her new safety features received star billing. The launch booklet listed her
electrically powered gantry davits, arc lamps, and gangway lanterns and other extra
lighting as well. Power "Morse Lamps" used to signal other ships at sea connected to
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special circuitry to avoid failures in emergency conditions. 407 Observers predicted her
maiden Atlantic voyage to be sometime in September 1914. The commencement of the
Great War that summer disrupted these plans. 408
Although the process of fitting out Britannic as a passenger ship continued
until the outbreak of war, that work was abruptly suspended in favor of more pressing
warship construction: namely, converting Britannic to a hospital ship. As such, she
could accommodate a maximum of 3,300 patients and a medical staff of fifty-two
doctors, 101 nurses, and 336 orderlies. The doctors and other senior staff members
occupied the First-class areas, while junior staff took up residence in Second- and Thirdclass rooms. Public rooms through the ship became the locations of medical treatment
areas. The First-class dining room became the intensive care ward, while next door, the
grand reception room became the operating theater. Upper portions of the ship, such as
the enclosed promenade, became dormitories for those with less severe wounds. 409 The
re-outfitted hospital ship Britannic was called up for service by the British Admiralty on
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November, 15, 1914. Commanded by one of White Star's senior officers, Capt. Charles
Bartlett, Britannic left Liverpool for her maiden voyage on December 12, 1915—not to
New York, as originally planned, but to Mudros on the island of Lemnos in the Aegean
Sea, a collection point for casualties from the Gallipoli and Dardanelles battles. There,
joining Olympic, Mauretania and Aquitania, Britannic provided medical support for the
"Dardanelles route." 410
Britannic served ports along this route until November 21, 1916, when she
met her premature demise. At first believed to have been attacked by a U-boat and
torpedoed, evidence later pointed to a German mine. 411 The damage was relatively
similar to that suffered by Titanic four years earlier. The same number of watertight
compartments opened to the sea in about the same area. Yet despite all the touted safety
improvements, Britannic sank in less than half the time of her elder sister. When the
mine detonated she was undergoing a shift change, with watertight doors open to
facilitate crew movement. To make matters worse, all her portholes were open in
preparation of taking on new wounded from the Mediterranean theater, even though it
violated regulations for obvious reasons. Despite all the design changes, Britannic
quickly took on water. The earlier outlined design changes could only have worked had
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Britannic's portholes and watertight doors been closed. With them all open to the sea,
Britannic could not survive. It will never be known how well, if at all, Harland & Wolff's
structural design changes would have performed had the violations of safety
regulations not been made. In all likelihood, she would have survived at least long
enough to be beached in the shallow water of nearby Kea Island. What would have
happened from there is anyone's guess. But if Britannic herself did not fare well, her
crew and passengers fortunately did: the added life boat launching features and
accommodations proved more than adequate. The only casualties occurred when one
boat launched prematurely and got pulled into the ship's propellers. 412
Significantly, even though her loss meant a blow to wartime needs, especially
in terms of care for the wounded, the changes made to Britannic in lifeboats won praise
in the aftermath of the sinking. "The fact that out of a compliment of 1,500 all except
fifty have been saved is a practical proof of the value of the precautions,” crowed the
Manchester Guardian. “They are expensive additions to the construction of a liner, but
they have proved their worth against mine or torpedo, and it is to be hoped that, when
shipbuilder have only ice and collision to face, that fact will be remembered." 413
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While the Britannic saga unfolded, IMM’s financial troubles continued to
mount. In October 1914, IMM defaulted on its payments. In response, the New York
Trust Company, as a trustee of the bonds, declared principle of the bonds payable and
due initiated a law suit to foreclose in April 1915. The U.S. District Court in New York
appointed P.A.S. Franklin receiver of the company. Franklin would later succeed
Harold Sanderson as IMM president. But before that could happen, in February 1915,
IMM defaulted a second time on both stock dividends and bond payments. This led to
efforts at reorganization of its financials, most notably the creation of committees to
represent the different groups of bond holders. 414 By August, the committees proposed
what became known as the "Bannard Plan," named for Otto Bannard, who chaired the
bondholder committee that proposed the plan. 415 According to Bannard, their goal
aimed not only “to recognize the existing priorities and equities between the various
classes of securities, but to also fix the capital of the New Company on a basis more
nearly approximating the intrinsic value of the tangible properties and securities to be
owned by the New Company."416 This "New Company" according to the scheme, was
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"whatever company may be finally utilized to issue new securities to be used under the
Plan. The New Company will acquire the ships owned by the International Mercantile
Marine Company, and either directly or indirectly, through a subsidiary company…" 417
In other words, the "new company" that came out of the reorganization would have a
better financial standing based on its real assets, not the intangibles such as "good will”
and reputation that J. P. Morgan had relied on. The New Company would also provide
new bonds for two of the existing classes of bond holders of IMM (4 1/2 and 5 %
holders). Other bond holder would have to buy new bonds. The plan, finally, would
reduce IMM's capital by $80,000,000 ($2,003,149,504 in 2018) and annual fixed charges
by $1,272,000 ($31,848,487 in 2018). 418
Bannard had high hopes for his reorganization scheme. He also had a good deal
of support. After visiting Europe, he returned with the backing of English and Dutch
bond holders and of the foreign bondholders committee. However, a group led by
Henry S. DeForest opposed the plan because he and others believed common stock
holders stood to lose a great deal. In September 1915, Bannard agreed to hear out the
DeForest Committee's complaints but did not think they would be accommodated. 419
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The DeForest Committee, however, decided to challenge the plan and a stock holder
fight ensued.420
DeForest and other shareholders had several reasons to battle the
reorganization, but the new context of the Great War was without question the most
compelling of them. Due to substantially increased profits, the company's position had
suddenly become far less dire. IMM went from a deficit of $300,000 in 1914 to a profit of
$11,000,000 ($7,586,550 and $275,419,306 in 2018) for the first seven months of the war. 421
In large part, this can be explained from the lack of competition. German merchant
marine sat interred in ports stretching from South America, to New York, to
Bremerhaven Germany, while the British merchant marine had been taken up for war
service, with many ships becoming armed merchant cruisers, hospital ships, or
troopers. Driving rates up even more, most of the ships controlled by IMM came under
British government wartime jurisdiction in accordance with the agreement between J. P.
Morgan and Arthur Balfour negotiated in 1902. IMM controlled the few remaining
ships freely trading on the North Atlantic. If someone wanted to sail or ship something
across the Atlantic, IMM had become the only game in town. In other words, the Great

Anonymous, "Mercantile Martine Plans 3 In Number," Sept 1, 1915 The New York
Times, p. 15.
420

421

Fields, "The International Mercantile Marine Company," 363.
233

War had done what J. P. Morgan could not: give the United States a virtual monopoly
of Atlantic trade.
With little else for the management of IMM to do, monitoring the financial
health of the company became a primary concern. The war may have given IMM a
boost, but Bannard and his allies fired back that the war would have to end sometime.
When it did, they argued, the British and German merchant marines would return,
placing IMM in the same position it had previously been in. For this reason, Bannard
endorsed reorganization. His plan soon had support from another faction of the
ongoing stock holder's fight, the Wallace Committee, chaired by James N. Wallace,
president of the Central Union Trust Company of New York and a preferred stock
holder.422
In August 1916, building on Bannard’s initial proposals, Wallace and his
committee offered a new plan for reorganization—the “Wallace Plan.” Based on the
idea that while the astounding wartime profits continued, the company should be
reorganized to pay off its current debts and stave off complete reorganization. The new
plan sounded an optimistic note by reporting that the value of assets owned by the
company greatly exceeded its indebtedness. Admitting that "current earnings were
extraordinarily large,” it suggested “that upon the return of normal times under
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conservative management the earnings should be sufficient to show a substantial
balance after payment of all fixed charges." 423 Ultimately, the plan was adopted at a
meeting of stockholders on September 29, 1916, but it only went so far. Although it
succeeded in paying off previously defaulted interest payments and loans, no changes
were made to the structure of the company.
This failure to fundamentally overhaul IMM was a response to the belief that
current war time profits would continue indefinitely, even after the war. The enormous
profits proved enough to quell the stock fights once the Wallace plan was adopted. The
stockholders were for the moment satisfied. Yet new problems formed as the war
continued that the Wallace plan did not envision. The United States required ships for
its own trade and war time needs. In 1916, the U.S. government began taking action to
provide them.

Wartime and Postwar, 1917-1920

While all IMM ships sailed under American ownership, at least on paper, in
reality the ships remained under control of their nations of registry, due to the deal J.P.
Morgan made with Balfour during the formation of IMM. As the Great War ramped up,
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ships under IMM control reverted to the British Royal Navy, convoy duty or other war
measures that took them out of general mercantile service. While this meant great
profits for IMM, it severely constricted American trade outside of the Entente, or British
allies. Even though the United States held onto its neutrality at that time, trade with
Germany came to a halt because of the British blockade; German ships could not get
out, and American ships were not permitted in. Additionally, with European trade to
Central and South America radically decreased, an opportunity presented itself to
expand trade within the Western Hemisphere.424 But for all that to happen, there had to
be ships completely controlled by American interests. IMM simply could not fulfill that
need.
In a long belated move, the United States Congress finally created the bills
Morgan and Clement Griscom before him had sought in 1916. One measure, sponsored
by Joshua alexander of Missouri, allowed for the purchase and American registry of
foreign built ships. It even allowed those ships to be used as naval auxiliaries for
military purposes.425 The bill would make IMM irrelevant and potentially represented
the end of IMM since the firm could no longer market itself as the American merchant
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marine. Those shippers looking to use truly American vessels would now find ships
with American registry, American crews, and American flags flying from the stern post.
Quite possibly, they would choose those over IMM ships which still flew British or
Belgian flags with largely foreign crews.
The bill allowed for the purchase of ships by the new United States Shipping
Board which existed for "encouraging, developing, and creating naval auxiliary and
naval reserve and a merchant marine to meet the requirements of the United States with
its Territories and possessions and with foreign countries," and to "to regulate carries by
water engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the United States." 426
Importantly, the Shipping Board could authorize construction and purchase vessels, "as
far as the commercial requirements of the United States marine trade may permit for
use as military purposes, and to make necessary repairs on such vessels." 427 The
Shipping Board could, in turn, sell or lease those ships to American business interests,
with the restrictions that "Any vessel acquired from Board, whether American of
foreign built, may be registered or enrolled and licensed or both as a vessel of the
United States, and entitled to the benefits and privileges there under and may engage in
the coastwise trade." Likewise, any of those vessels would only be allowed to trade
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under American registry and "shall not, without approval of Board, be transferred to a
foreign registry or flag, or sold, chartered, or leased, except under prescribed
regulations."428
The legislation represented a looming threat to the interests of IMM. While the
bond holders fought over dividends, members of IMM leadership, including current
company president Philip A. S. Franklin, saw danger. Franklin gave testimony at
congressional hearings hoping to steer the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce away
from supporting the bill. He told the committee rather than buying up ships, the new
Shipping Board should be used to examine "whether or not there are any handicaps
under the American flag as compared with other flags, and if there are, what can be
done to eliminate them."429 In other words, what would make the shipping world better
for IMM? Obviously, British shipping had far more support in the form of larger
subsidies, as outlined earlier. If the bill restricted the new board to examining
difficulties of American shippers, most notably IMM, it would certainly find that
shipping faced a deficit of support as compared to pre-war Britain or Germany.
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However, Franklin argued, the current problem with American trade lacking transport
would continue.
Additionally, Franklin correctly foresaw the Shipping Board itself as a potential
competitor to IMM. "My objection to the power you have given the board is entirely as
regards operation of ships. I do not think a board controlling and sitting as a judge over
a trade should also be a competitor in that trade and have an interest in the trade." 430 As
written, the Shipping Board could "charter, lease or sell vessels acquired to citizens of
the United States."431 If the Board chartered or leased ships to American citizens, it
would naturally be obligated to look for the most profitable returns on those leases for
the benefit of the American taxpayer. The Board itself would then become a de facto
shipping line, operating much the same way as IMM itself. Like IMM, the Shipping
Board would not be saddled with the day-to-day operations of ships, instead delegating
these duties to leasees, much like the British Committee and individual companies ran
IMMs individual lines.
Franklin's testimony made plain his concern. "You are giving a board... power
over shipping; at the same time you are proposing to give them a line of steamers to
operate against that shipping,” he observed. “Will they be an impartial board? Will the
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trade think they are impartial and consider them so, or will they say, ‘All you are after
is to make a good showing with your own property,’ which would be perfectly
natural."432
Franklin's concerns, it turned out, were largely justified. Despite his objections,
the bill passed and Woodrow Wilson signed it into law on September 7, 1916. By then, a
large percentage of the German merchant marine sat interred in New York and other
American ports for fear of destruction or capture by the British Royal Navy. Included
among those vessels were the 54,000-ton Vaterland, largest ship in the world, Amerika of
21,000 tons, and former Blue Riband holder Kronprinzessin Cecilie, as well as many other
large passenger and cargo ships. Should the United States enter the war and the
Shipping Board confiscate the German ships they would most likely find themselves in
American merchant service after the conflict ended, all with American registry. Should
this come to pass, IMM would face major domestic competition for the first time.
Beyond the Shipping Board issues, the war caused other problems for IMM. As
German exports halted because of the British blockade, American manufacturers began
to fill the gap. As production increased, so too did the need for export services. 433 IMM,
however, had no ships to take advantage of the new trade boom. With nearly all their
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ships appropriated for British war service, only neutral, completely American-owned
ships could take advantage of the new business. In the short term, this did not seem to
matter to IMM stockholders—IMM made considerable profits from British wartime
shipping, the stock fights had ended, and the company had stabilized, at least for now.
But once the war ended the new Shipping Board, whose creation Franklin had hoped to
prevent, would have already established an American shipping firm that would have
been active in the trade for some time. Moreover, the British government-backed
Cunard Line would return to regular trade, while the German merchant marine would
no doubt return to business as well. All of these promised to increase the competition
for IMM down the line. IMM would have to do a lot of work to break into an
established market against shippers that effectively had the backing of the United States
government. Any hope that the complete Atlantic monopoly would ever be made real
evaporated even as IMM enjoyed its most profitable era.
The shipping bill became law in September 1916, but it was not until the U.S.
entry into the war, seven months later, that IMM would see the full effects of the
measure. Within ten days of the declaration of war on April 16, 1917, the Fleet
Corporation, which would operate the confiscated German liners, was formed with
$50,000,000 ($987,832,031 in 2018) in capital from the United States Shipping Board on
behalf of the United States. Combined with the Emergency Shipping Fund Act of June
15, 1917, this set the stage for a major expansion of U.S. shipping that eventually
241

sidelined IMM as both the American merchant marine and a monopoly. The act gave
the president of the United States the power to requisition, authorize construction of,
and operate ships.434 Although this power was legal, an executive order dated July 17,
1917 delegated this power to the United States Shipping Board. 435 The Board held the
authority to acquire ships already built as well as to operate or dispose of them. It also
benefited greatly from the fact that President Wilson transferred control of enemy ships.
In a series of executive orders between May and November of 1917, Wilson ordered the
confiscation of German ships in American ports all over the world. Among these ships
were over eighty-nine well-built Atlantic steamers and a number of support vessels,
including tugs, tenders, cargo and harbor fuel carries, many of which were virtually
new. At the top of the list of those confiscated in Executive Order 2651 sat Vaterland.436
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For IMM, the competition created by the Shipping Board’s abrupt fleet expansion
represented a disaster of the first magnitude.
The effects for IMM would not be immediate. The Shipping Board’s new vessels
would be held up for some time undergoing refit, repair and being crewed for United
States service. For the remainder of the war, they would be used almost exclusively for
wartime needs. After that, however, they could easily be refurbished and employed for
the private sector (and indeed, this is precisely what later happened). While facing this
looming threat during 1917 and 1918, IMM still experienced public relations problems.
IMM was seen by the American public not as an American firm, but as a front for
British interests. With J. P. Morgan, a symbol of American capitalism dead and buried,
public perception grew that British interests dominated IMM actions. 437 As Franklin
would later say, "As you can see, you have purely Americans on there [the IMM board
of directors] and they are very much interested in the development of the American
flag. We are very much criticized at the moment by people who are not doing
anything."438
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Determined to shed the perception that IMM was a British front, Franklin
decided to entertain offers from a British syndicate for the purchase of the White Star
Line. The syndicate later turned out to be Owen Phillipps, 1st Baron Kylsant's, Royal
Mail organization. In November 1917, IMM reached a tentative deal with Lord Kylsant
on the sale, but knowing a transaction of such magnitude would have effects on the
American stock market, leading to negotiations with the U.S. Treasury. 439 The decision
to sell off British assets marked a fundamental change in the nature of the IMM. While it
had always been intended as a basis for an American merchant marine, its very name—
International Mercantile Marine—clearly demonstrated wider scope. Morgan began
building IMM with the goal of an international monopoly controlled by American
interests. By preparing to sell off foreign assets, Franklin signaled the end of IMM as a
monopolistic entity and international business. If Franklin's plan worked, IMM would
morph into just one of many Atlantic shippers. However, IMM would be entirely
American-owned with American ships registered in the United States. Potentially, it
would truly become the American merchant marine.
The idea of IMM selling off foreign assets prompted treasury Secretary William
McAdoo to write President Wilson. "While I do not agree with all of Mr. Walters’
conclusions and inferences,” he noted, referring to a Baltimore businessman involved
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with the sales, “I am in full accord with him about the fundamental question, namely,
the transfer of British ships owned by the American corporation, the International
Mercantile Marine, to the British Government. I believe that this Government should
not permit these ships to be transferred but should insist that their American
ownership, although under British registry, should be preserved."440
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, fully agreed. "Just before I went abroad
I had a talk with Mr. Hurley [head of the Shipping Board] about the proposed purchase
by Great Britain of the International Merchant Marine,” Daniels explained to Wilson,
just after the 1918 Armistice. “Both of us thought that until the Peace Conference settled
all these problems, it seemed unwise for Great Britain to be buying corporations owned
entirely by Americans, and while the course pursued by Americans of building the
ships and putting them under British registry, this has always seemed to me justified
only because our Government has paid no attention to securing a large merchant
marine, which would guarantee to us a part of the world’s trade." 441 Even though
negotiations had been completed to sell all British interests, President Wilson directly
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intervened, asking Franklin for the sale to be suspended. The IMM board complied with
his request.442
At the same time, Bainbridge Colby, a member of the U.S. Shipping Board,
had an idea to make IMM more fully American, possibly by purchasing the combine's
British assets.443 Evidently, neither Colby nor Wilson knew about the intervention of the
British government that prevented Morgan from doing that when he formed IMM.
Colby's goal would be an established firm to take up operation of the confiscated
German ships once the war was over. Writing to Wilson about a meeting he had with
members of Congress, he noted that there was a general agreement that the sale should
not occur. "Judge Hardy [a Democratic representative from Texas] went even further,”
Colby explained, “and stated it as his opinion that we should not only acquire the
International Company’s ownership in the British vessels, but should acquire, if
possible at a reasonable price, the stock of the International Mercantile Marine
Corporation, carrying with it the ownership of nine ships under the American flag." 444
Wilson replied stating, "It is my hope, therefore, that the Shipping Board will at once
buy everything there is to be bought in connection with the transactions we have been
discussing. I dare say that they can hardly decline to sell to us rather than to the
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British,” the president continued. “I am inclined to think that perhaps we should better
sound them also about the possibility of buying the stock of the International Mercantile
Marine Association, carrying with it the ownership of the nine ships under the
American flag."445
It was an interesting plan. If the Wilson administration followed through on
the purchase, there would be a number of benefits for both the government and IMM.
First, the U.S. would gain control of the largest shipping organization in the world.
Secondly, the Shipping Board could turn over all the confiscated German ships to the
IMM, secure in the knowledge that an established firm with considerable experience
would use the ships to foster American commerce and international interests. For
IMM’s leaders, the perception of being a British puppet in the eyes of the public would
cease, allowing them access to the goodwill of th American people as a truly American
merchant marine.
The idea hinged, however, on British interests accepting the proposal, an
outcome that ultimately did not occur. With the backing of the President, Colby sent the
IMM board of directors a letter announcing the offer to buy IMM's British interests on
the same terms as the Kylsant syndicate had offered. 446 By January 1919, however,
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Wilson had begun to have second thoughts. British interests and political leaders now
threatened to condemn and confiscate the British built ships controlled by IMM. 447
Echoing the President, Josephus Daniels confided to his diary that the “President said
Great Britain would be very sore if we bought the stock in the Mercantile Marine Co &
we would get so little advantage (we could not get ships since [Sir Joseph] Maclay
[British Minister of Shipping] says he would take them) would it be worthwhile?" 448 In
the end, the idea came to nothing due to fierce opposition by the British. On April 1,
1919, the Shipping Board told IMM’s leaders that they were free to sell White Star and
other British interests if they chose.449
If such a sale went through, the perception that IMM was simply a British front
might finally disappear. In a postwar environment that was veering more toward
isolationism, negating the public perception of IMM as being one of the greatest British
shipping companies in the world—despite its American ownership—would finally
allow IMM to be recognized as a fully American company in the eyes of the public. As
Franklin put it later, "We were also desirous of developing under the American flag,
and we felt that if we could get such a good price for all our foreign property, we would
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have a very huge sum of money to be invested in American shipping, if we found we
could get American shipping on what we considered a proper basis." 450 Unfortunately
for Franklin's plans, IMM stockholders voted down a renewed offer by Lord Kylsant's
Royal Mail.451 Most likely this was because of the fantastic profits from war time
shipping. With so many of IMM's British holdings about to be released from war time
service and a war-ravaged Europe in need of American exports, the profits would still
be rolling in. At least, that's what stockholders may have believed.
Franklin, however, still had one remaining potential avenue to minimize
competition on the postwar Atlantic. What if, he pondered, IMM gained control of all of
the former German liners, or at least the very best of them? During the war, most of the
German ships had been used as troop transports and support ships. Shortly after the
war in 1919, the Shipping Board began to seek civilian buyers or leasees and released
ships in ones and twos. In 1918, IMM put in a bid seeking to purchase Leviathan as well
as several other liners. The bid was placed early because IMM had handled the
management and maintenance of Leviathan during the war. Opposition quickly
emerged in Congress. In questions before the select committee on Shipping Board
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Operations, Franklin faced grilling in Congressional hearings on the assets, ownership,
and leadership of IMM.452 Despite repeated offers to manage the ship or buy it outright,
IMM never gained control of Leviathan or any other German ship confiscated by the
United States.453
Offloading Ballast and Correcting Course
By the time Warren G. Harding became president in 1921, IMM found itself in a
strange position. Having tried to divest itself of foreign assets to change public
perception, the company reversed course at the behest of the President Wilson in what
might be deemed a patriotic rather than practical decision. Subsequently, IMM was
frozen out of gaining access to German war prizes because of hostility from the same
government that had asked it to retain its foreign holdings. In August 1921, failing to
find what it saw as suitable managers, the Shipping Board founded the United States
Line, which it subsequently operated. The line was government owned but privately
managed because there were no commercial buyers. The company offered service from
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Danzig and Mediterranean routes at first, adding London and New York by 1924. 454 On
July 4, 1923, the line added a refurbished and modernized U.S.S. Leviathan. Advertising
her as the largest ship in the world, the United States Line was now in direct
competition to IMM, White Star Line, and even Cunard. Leviathan, now painted with
red, white and blue funnels, boasted American crew, registry and ownership and
formed the flagship of an American fleet. 455 This fully American steamship service
completely undermined IMM as the United States’ merchant marine.
In the postwar division of the German merchant fleet, White Star had not
completely lost out. It gained the Bismarck, the newer, even bigger sister ship of
Leviathan, from the British shipping controller. Renamed Majestic, she joined Olympic as
a replacement for the lost Britannic. The running publicity battle between the United
States Line and White Star over which ship was really the world's largest continued
until the construction of Cunard's Queen Mary in 1936. Long before that, however,
White Star had ceased to be an IMM property. In January 1927, Lord Kylsant finally
purchased White Star from IMM, as the syndicate divested itself of foreign properties. 456
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The hostility to foreign entanglements engendered by World War I in the United
States, coupled with a worldwide shipping slump following the war contributed to
falling profits for IMM. Increasingly, IMM's foreign holdings became a burden
politically, financially, and in terms of public relations. Net profits decreased from a
high of over $13 million in 1921 ($183 million in 2018) to just over $5 million in 1926 ($71
million in 2018). With depreciation of assets and other fixed charges subtracted,
moreover, IMM actually ran a deficit of over $2.4 million ($34 million in 2018) from 1922
to 1927.457 IMM found itself in an even worse position than had existed before the Great
War. It faced both slowly sinking income and increased world competition, a
competition made difficult by a homegrown competitor that had usurped the position
IMM was initially created to fulfill. The company had failed in both its primary
missions: to create a true monopoly on the North Atlantic and to be the rebirth of an
American merchant marine.
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Chapter 5:

Sailing into the Sunset
The End of the International Mercantile Marine

When Clement Griscom began his quest to rebuild the American merchant
marine in the late 19th century, his ambitions included the acquisition of American
owned, built, registered and crewed ships. The laws of the United States and
prohibitive cost of construction prevented all of this except for American ownership but
even that had its limits. After Morgan took over, his International Mercantile Marine
modified Griscom's original ambitions into not just an American merchant marine, but
an international monopoly bringing all Atlantic shipping under American control.
Ultimately, Griscom's and Morgan's plans failed for several reasons.
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The first reason lay in the difference in construction technology between Europe
and the United States. As detailed in chapter one, American ship builders continued to
build wooden hulls designed for coastal trade. European builders, on the other hand,
transitioned from iron and then to steel. Likewise, European builders, supported by
shipping owners who were in turn supported by generous subsidies by governments,
experimented with engines designing faster and faster ships. Paddlewheels gave way to
screws, also known as propellers and old-style steam engines gave way to modern
turbines. A related issue came about because of the abundance of shipbuilders in
Europe. As Griscom noted in his testimony to Congress in 1901, the cost of building a
ship in America was twenty-five percent higher. The lack of American interest in
international affairs had consequences in American industry in that there was little
demand to build modern steel ships that could resist the punishing environment of the
Atlantic Ocean.
It was only after Admiral Alfred Mahan began his series of books and articles
that the American public began to warm to the idea of a world class navy. As Mahan's
influence grew, American interest in all things nautical increased, Mahan gained
supporters in high places, including Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore
Roosevelt. Likewise, politicians in Congress began warming to the idea of supporting
an American merchant marine to the point that discussion of subsidies began. Here in
lay the second reason Griscom and Morgan's ambitions failed.
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Though repeatedly discussed in Congress, subsidies never gained the traction
the shippers, including Griscom and Morgan, believed they needed to make American
shipping profitable. Indeed, when Morgan founded the International Mercantile
Marine, taking over from Griscom's International Navigation in 1901, his plan
depended on the passage of s shipping subsidy being debated in Congress at the time.
While Congress debated subsidies almost annually in the 1890s, the results were always
minimal. The defeat of the 1901 subsidy represented a major problem for IMM and
aspiring U.S. shippers. British shippers received generous subsidies while IMM relied
almost exclusively commercial receipts. Since Morgan had overpaid for so many of the
assets IMM gained control of, the combine's financial foundation was overvalued at
best. This ultimately resulted in the bondholder fights over reorganization during
World War I.
A third major problem that led to IMM's decline was the failure to create a true
Atlantic monopoly. Without having all shipping under his control, Morgan could not
set shipping rates and insure profits. Had he been able to do so, as he had with
American railroads, the need for subsidies would have been minimal since Morgan
could insure prices completely covered the price of operating the ships in the fleet.
While his profit sharing deal with the German firms and warm relationship with the
Kaiser insured at least a détente type relationship for the duration of Morgan's lifetime,
no such agreement existed with Britain's Cunard Line. As this dissertation shows, the
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escape and continued independence of Cunard from Morgan's monopoly represented
another major blow to Morgan's ambitions. An independent Cunard not only gained
even more support from the British Government, that included more subsidies and
loans to build major new steamers. These steamers were so superlative that even IMM's
newest ships were eclipsed. In the public relations war that erupted (and persisted)
over which nation and company controlled the largest ships in the world. This was a
challenge that could not be ignored. However, Cunard was not the only renegade in
shipping. A number of small British firms as well as the national line of France
remained independent with the ability to undercut IMM rates at will.
The Olympic class ships resulted directly from the rivalry with Cunard. While
they initially generated the type of public relations buzz that helped revive the fortunes
of IMM, the losses of Titanic and later Gigantic/Britannic represented a financial upset, as
well as a crisis of confidence and prestige, that occurred at bad times for IMM. Titanic's
loss initiated a crisis in confidence in large liners in general that affected the entire
shipping community, leading to years of "safety theater" that lasted right up to the
outbreak of the Great War. Companies went to great lengths to prove that their ships
were the safest on the sea, while IMM had to demonstrate they had learned lessons
from the disaster in particular as the owners of Titanic's near identical two sisters.
Indeed Olympic suffered ticket cancellations until her virtual rebuilding in 1913.
Britannic's loss represented another problem for several reasons.
256

First was the public relations problem. For the second time an Olympic class
liner sank to the bottom of the ocean. Being the victim of the German war machine,
however, mitigated the issue. The biggest problem lay in the fact that the ship itself
would not be available to the combine following the war. The British government
released Olympic from war time service in August 1919. After a refit at Harland & Wolff,
she reentered service in July 1920, in time for the renewed Atlantic season. A suitable
running mate, Germany's former Bismarck renamed Majestic did not enter service until
May 1922, a gap of nearly three years.458 Even then, Majestic had to be purchased from
the British shipping board and her construction completed all costing time, money and
resources most assuredly in excess of what reconditioning Britannic would have cost.
As during the war, public perception of IMM had changed. Now viewed as a
front for British interests as opposed the American takeover of British interests that it
really was, IMM suffered under attacks from politicians and media leaders because
almost all IMM's ships were in British service during the war, leaving America without
a merchant marine for its own pressing war time needs. This led to pressure in
Congress to build a true American merchant marine, a political battle which
represented the final blow to IMM existing as controlling force and symbol of American
shipping. With its foreign assets increasingly seen as a liability both within IMM
management and by the general public, attempts began to divest of those assets. The
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intervention of Woodrow Wilson to stop this eliminated IMM's opportunities post-war.
Even though IMM leaders obeyed the request of the government, that same
government refused to allow them to take confiscated German ship after the war,
placing IMM in an untenable situation.
Unable to gain control of large, first class ships that the U.S. government had
confiscated from the German merchant marine, IMM had to stand by as the American
Shipping Board ignored its existence and sought an American management firm for
hundreds of thousands in shipping tonnage. Considering that IMM had complied with
the will of the government during the war this seemed like an injustice. Eventually the
Shipping Board gave up looking and formed a company itself. With the creation of the
United States Lines, IMM lost any claim to being the American merchant marine. For an
organization created to rebuild American shipping this put the final nail in the coffin to
its original ambitions as designed by Griscom and Morgan.
Not only did IMM lose the public relations angle of being the American shipper,
it now had competition in the form of a line that decked itself out in patriotic themes.
Postwar advertising for Leviathan feature her red, white and blue funnels almost as
prominently as the words "United States Lines" striking a decidedly patriot, perhaps
even nativist chord in post war shipping.459 Rather than using British ships, even if they
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were under American control, exporters now had the option of shipping their produts
on truly American ships. Their German origins did not matter since their registries were
now American. At least not for the purposes of public relations. In this environment,
IMM did the only thing it could do, finally shed itself of its foreign holdings and
attempt a makeover.
In 1926 White Star Line, formerly the crown jewel of IMM, became a part of the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, a British owned firm. The profits from the sale of
White Star went to the retirement of outstanding debts, not any type of restructure,
almost assuring the eventual demise of IMM as an international company. 460 The
liquidation of foreign assets continued and by 1934, in the deepest throes of the Great
Depression, control of the Atlantic went to the British. With the last of the foreign
holdings gone IMM ceased to be an international merchant marine, but just one of
several American shipping firms. Thus ended J. P. Morgan's dream of an Atlantic
monopoly.
They All... Well, Some, Lived Happily Ever After
For the rest of the players in the story of IMM and the rebuilding of the U.S.
merchant marine, mixed futures lay in store. Of the companies that played a role in
Morgan's ambitions, perhaps White Star had the most lamentable fate of all, falling into
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disrepute after being sold. The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which mirrored
Morgan's IMM in terms of outrageous sums spent to gain control of assets, attempted to
create a British version of IMM. Like IMM, they purchased White Star with the
intention of making it a flagship line within the company. However, Lord Kylsant, the
head of the combine, had neither the skill nor ethics of Morgan, and went to jail for
fraud in 1931.461 The world-wide depression hit his interests hard leading him to
embezzle money from the profitable White Star to keep his other companies afloat. 462
With White Star's financial foundation gutted, its bewildered stock holders had to sell to
arch rival Cunard in a deal brokered by the British government. 463 By 1936, the new
Cunard-White Star gained Atlantic supremacy with RMS Queen Mary, the largest ship
in the world at the time, and winner of the Atlantic Blue Riband. 464 However, White Star
endured the junior position of the new company's formation and ceased to exist with
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the buyout of its remaining shareholders in 1949. 465 The last of the great White Star
Liners, RMS Britannic (III), a motor liner built in 1929 and only two thirds the size of the
Olympic class, went off to the breaker's yard in 1960.466 Today there remain only a few
remnants of the once great White Star Line. The museum ship Nomadic in Belfast, tender
for the Olympic class, sits in the Hamilton Dry Dock on the former grounds of Harland
& Wolff, who carried out most of her restoration. 467 Cunard's "White Star Service"
promises "All staff are trained at our White Star Academy, so each and every member of
our crew delivers the same high level of service across every element of your cruise" in
a gimmicky last vestige of White Star at sea.468 And of course Titanic and Britannic, the
great ships built by White Star, IMM, and Harland & Wolff to be the final words in
Atlantic dominance, rest on the bottom of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.
Cunard, HAPAG and North German Lloyd all remained independent and
survived World War I. The German firms lost most of their fleets to the Allies as war
reparations and faced a long rebuilding program, made all the more humiliating as
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their former ships, now in Cunard, White Star, or United States Line livery, plied the
North Atlantic and even served German ports. By 1929, HAPAG built the twin fliers
Bremen and Europa, once again gaining the Blue Ribbon for speed. However, WWII saw
a virtual repeat of events for the German merchant marine; Bremen destroyed during
the war, and Europa ceded to the victorious Allies.469
Cunard exists to this day, now an American owned subsidiary of Carnival
Cruises, which purchased the company in 1998.470 After the long fight to "remain
British," Cunard had actually left British ownership two years previously in 1996, when
the Norwegian firm Kvaerner purchased Trafalgar House, Cunard's owner, for $1.38
billion in 1996.471 Cunard currently operates a fleet of three ships with a fourth under
construction as well as the world's last trans-Atlantic liner, Queen Mary 2.472
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The people involved in the IMM adventure continued on as well. Lord
William Pirrie, Morgan's chief negotiator with the Ismays, remained on the board of
directors of IMM but eventually left it, succeeded at Harland & Wolff by Lord Kylsant.
During the Great War, he oversaw the construction of numerus warships in his yards,
as well as dummy warships, civilian ships disguised as battleships, to help mislead and
defeat the Germans. He died in 1924 while on a three-month business trip in transit
from Buenos Ayres to New York.473 In New York, his body was transferred to Olympic
for the voyage home.474

After suggesting J. Bruce Ismay for the chairmanship of IMM, Albert Ballin
remained head of HAPAG and a leader of German shipping. He became increasingly
depressed for the future as World War I became imminent, however, suffering from
insomnia and overwork as his greatest ships, Imperator, Vaterland, and Bismarck took
shape against increasingly dark war clouds. On his desk, a framed copy of the words
"Life is just one damn thing after another." appeared. By the end of the war, the
company he had spent his life building lay in ruins and the ships he designed were in
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enemy hands, used to help bring his country to its knees. On November 9, 1918 a couple
days before the armistice, Albert Ballin ingested a lethal overdose of sleeping pills. 475
He was 61.
J. Bruce Ismay lived in semi-secluded retirement after leaving IMM in 1913.
During World War I, he contributed to patriotic causes, including a substantial
donation to the Mercantile Marine Service Association in Liverpool which earned a
grateful telegram from King George V. While his wife occasionally gave dinner parties,
they always occurred in Ismay's absence. Indications are that he was an introvert and
the scrutiny endured during the Titanic's aftermath did not help. When frequenting St.
George's Hall for musical concerts he usually bought two seats, one of which held his
hat and coat.476 Increasingly, Ismay seemed determined to never again have to be in the
public eye. By 1936, as Cunard and White Star merged, Ismay entered his 70th year in
declining health losing a leg to diabetes. He maintained his physical independence as
much as possible, using devices such as a pulley system to allow him to take baths in
privacy.477 On October 14, 1937 he suffered a stroke that ultimately proved fatal, passing
away just three days later.478
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Phillip Albright Small Franklin got a bonus from the sale of White Star in
1927 of $250,000 (Over $3.6 million in 2018), in addition to his $100,000 salary which
decreased to $50,000 ($739,429 in 2018) during the Great Depression. In 1931, IMM
merged with the Roosevelt Line, a shipping company which his son, John Franklin,
helped found. He stepped down as president of IMM in favor of his son at that time. He
later served as chairman of the United States Lines until his retirement in 1938. He died
on August 14, 1939 of Parkinson's disease at the age of 68. 479
As much as this dissertation is about businesses and people that owned and
managed them, it is also the story of the great liners of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Often these ships became celebrities in their own right, capturing
imaginations to the present day.

The German line HAPAG's giant trio, Imperator, Vaterland and Bismarck,
ended up confiscated by the Allies during the First World War. Imperator and Bismarck
went to Britain becoming Cunard's Berengaria and White Star's Majestic, respectively,
replacing Lusitania and Britannic. Vaterland became a trooper for the United States,
renamed Leviathan, eventually finding her way to the United States Lines. The
management of United States Lines and White Star engaged in a running battle over
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whether Leviathan or Majestic held sway as the largest ship in the world until 1934,
when Leviathan was laid up after being hit by the Depression. She was scrapped in 1938.
Majestic was laid up after the merger of Cunard and White Star in 1935 and then sold to
the Royal Navy for use as a training ship and renamed Calendonia. When a fire broke
out in 1939, she was deemed beyond repair and subsequently scrapped. Berengaria
remained in service until 1938, when a series of fires caused Cunard-White Star to
declare her unsafe for passenger service. She was sold for scrapping later that year.

Cunard's Aquitania survived service as an armed merchant cruiser, hospital
ship, and troop transport in the Great War, returning to regular trans-Atlantic
passenger runs in 1920. She remained in Cunard's express service through the 1920s
and '30s with Mauretania and Berengaria. Cunard-White Star planned her retirement for
1939 after the completion of the new Queen Elizabeth. World War Two changed that
because of the dire need for large ships. Again called up as a trooper, she served the
Allies transporting soldiers world-wide. She returned to an austerity refugee service in
1948, finally being retired and scrapped in 1950 aged thirty-six, a ripe old age for a
major liner. Indeed, Aquitania holds the title of the last and longest lived of the fourteen
four-funneled liners of the Atlantic.
Olympic came out of the World War I relatively unscathed. After the loss of
Britannic, Olympic soldiered on as a troop ship spending most of her time shuttling
personnel between Halifax and Europe. On May 18, 1918, during a voyage from New
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York, her lookouts spotted a surfaced U-boat. Captain Bertram Hays, commanding
Olympic, recounted what happened: "There was only one thing to do, and that was to
try to ram it, so I altered course to bring it ahead... ...and at 3:55 am hit him a swinging
blow with our stem which put an end to his career."480 From the bridge, Capt. Hays saw
the wreck of the U-boat pass along the side of Olympic already upended and sinking
fast. Hays later received the Distinguished Service Order medal from King George V. 481
The sinking of U-103 by Olympic remains the only recorded ramming and destruction of
a U-boat by a commercial liner during either world war. After the war, Olympic enjoyed
refurbishment, conversion to oil fuel from coal, and continued as a primary member of
the White Star fleet.
As a side note, Olympic's later career potentially lays low some modern
theories on the structural weakness of the Olympic class in general. The U-boat sinking
in 1918 started a string of collisions followed by one in the Hudson in 1927 and the
ramming and sinking of the Nantucket Lightship in 1935. In the Hudson River incident,
Olympic backed into the Furness Bermuda liner Ft. St. George, causing minimal damage
to both ships.482 The incident with the Nantucket Lightship proved much more severe.
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On May 15, 1934, Olympic sliced through the lightship in dense fog while approaching
New York. Only three of the smaller ship's crewmen survived. Both Capt. Binks of
Olympic and Capt. Braithwaite of the lightship later appeared on a newsreel discussing
how fast it all seemed to occur. A crewman from the lightship said that before he knew
what happened, he found himself in the water. Footage from the newsreel shows only
minor damage to Olympic's paint above the waterline.483
What makes these incidents interesting relative to the Olympic class's
structural integrity are recent articles, such as a 2008 piece that appeared in the New
York Times suggesting that a possible reason Titanic sank was substandard or weak
metal used throughout the hull.484 In 1934, Olympic was 23 years old. If weak materials
or poor construction were to blame in the loss of the substantially younger Titanic,
researchers now ask, shouldn't collisions in roughly the same area (with both the U-boat
and the lightship) caused similar damage, especially in a ship that had sustained many
years of wear and tear? While Titanic suffered damages beyond what she was designed
to withstand, Olympic's career points to a well-constructed ship that served admirably
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in the roles she was meant for, even under circumstances that caused stress to her
design. This is only to be expected given the special relationship between White Star
and Harland & Wolff.
Olympic continued on briefly after the formation of Cunard-White Star, when
like so many of her former White Star fleet mates, Cunard-White Star declared her
surplus in favor of keeping older Cunard ships. For a brief period she sat in "lay-up"
next to another unwanted liner, Cunard's own Mauretania, which had just recently lost
the Blue Riband to a sleek new German liner.485 Sir John Jarvis eventually bought her in
September, 1935 expressly to relieve the jobless in the city of Jarrow, on the River Tyne
in England.486 Over the next two years, grateful employees of Jarrow's scrapping
industry disassembled Olympic until only the bottom of the hull remained, which then
got towed away to Inverkiething, Scotland for final demolition on September 19, 1937.
J. Bruce Ismay survived her by less than a month.

§§§

485

Oldham, The Ismay Line, 245-246.

Anonymous, "Olympic to be Broken Up," The Manchester Guardian, September 11,
1935. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/guardian/advancedsearch.html (accessed November
4, 2014).
486

269

The International Mercantile Marine was the first modern multinational
corporation. Using the power of modern technology, J. P. Morgan attempted to build a
combine that crossed not just oceans, but national boundaries. In today's world, the
gigantic multinational is common. Titanic tech-based businesses like Google, Facebook,
or financial entities like JPMorgan Chase are now both powerful as well as plentiful.
Additionally they continue the tradition of informal empire by transmitting culture
around the world often changing local culture in its own image. The pervasiveness of
Disney, or the “House of Mouse,” is but one example. 487 Yet to understand the roots and
origins of today’s multinationals, as this dissertation has shown, we must look back
more than 100 years, to one of the first companies that launched this trend: the
International Merchant Marine.
Built from existing steamship companies with the goal of conquering the
Atlantic for American industry, IMM was in many ways the prototype of today's
multinational. While this dissertation focused on the economic, policy and business
aspects of IMM, the combine continues to have lasting significance in every day life.
The great liners of IMM transported thousands of immigrants from all over Europe, and
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frequently, the world.488 While this is an important story, it’s one that could easily have
double the size of A Tall Ship further complicating a narrative and analysis that is
already challenging to follow. Rather than losing the importance of immigrant
passengers in a maelstrom of business and government intrigue, A Tall Ship eschewed
the issue, reserving it for future analysis.
Understanding how IMM formed and ultimately failed shows the starting point
in the evolution of the multinational corporation. Since IMM’s era, companies have
learned to diversify to strengthen their economic foundations, reaching into the deepest
foundations of world economics. IMM, however, failed to take these steps. Unable to
gain a complete monopoly of the North Atlantic due to British and German resistance
to Morgan, IMM never had the footing Morgan intended. This, followed by the
formation of an American company in 1920 built from confiscated German liners,
insured IMM’s eventual decline as an international corporation. Yet even though IMM
was a failure in its intended role, it nevertheless represents one of the earliest examples
of American informal empire in a global age. In the end, its history offers an important

The scene in James Cameron’s Titanic in which Kate Winslet’s Rose survives by
floating on piece of paneling actually happened. However, it was a Chinese man, one of
eight 3rd class passengers, six of which survived. Cameron actually filmed a scene
showing this which was later deleted although it is available on YouTube and director’s
cuts of the movie. Amy B. Wang, “Why you’ve never heard of the six Chinese men who
survived the Titanic,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/04/19/why-youve-neverheard-of-the-six-chinese-men-who-survived-the-titanic/?noredirect=on
488
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lens for thinking about the United States and its rise as a world economic power in the
early 20th century.
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